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ABSTRACT 
The thesis examines the direct reference theory of proper names and natural kind 
terms as expounded by Saul h p k e ,  Hilar; Putnam and others and finds that it has 
not succeeded in replacing some kind of description theory of the reference of such 
terms - although it does concede that the traditional Fregean theory is not quite 
correct. 
It is argued that the direct reference theory is mistaken on several counts. First of 
all it is question-begging. Secondly, it is guilty of a ‘use/mention‘ confkion. And 
thirdly, and most importantly, it fails to deal with the notion of understanding. The 
notion of understanding is crucial to the present thesis - specifically, what is 
understood by a proper name or natural kind term. It is concluded that sense 
(expressed in the form of descriptions) is at least necessary for reference, which 
makes a significant difference to Knpke’s claim that there are necessary a posteriori 
truths as well as contingent a priori truths. 
It is also argued that sense could be sufficient for reference, if it is accepted that it 
is speakers who effect reference. In this sense, sense determines reference. The 
thesis therefore not only argues against the account of reference given by the direct 
reference theorists, it also gives an account of how proper names and natural kind 
terms actually do function in natural language. 
As far as the epistemology of necessity is concerned the thesis concludes that 
h p k e  (along with many others) has not succeeded in establishing the existence of 
the necessary a posteriori nor the contingent a priori from the theory of direct 
reference. Whether such truths can be established by some other means, or in 
principle, is not the concern of the thesis; although the point is made that, if a certain 




It has been claimed by Saul Kripke that how proper names and natural kind terms 
function in natural languages has certain consequences for what is to be regarded as 
necessary and contingent, and also certain epistemological consequences regarding 
how necessary truths come to be known. Before Kripke it was more or less taken for 
granted that necessary truths could only be known a priori and that contingent truths 
could only be known a posteriori. Kripke challenges this assumption by challenging 
the semantics of proper names and natural kind terms -specifically, how their 
reference is determined. Kripke’s challenge is to what we might term The 
Traditional Theory of meaning for names whereby the reference of a name is 
determined by a sense given by a definite description, or a set thereof. This theory, 
normally associated with Frege, says that a name ‘N‘ will have a sense, something 
like ‘The F‘, such that whatever fits the description ‘The F‘ will be the referent of 
‘N‘. Kripke, and various others - mainly Keith Donnellan, David Kaplan and Hilary 
Putnam - provides several arguments against this description theory and concludes 
that proper names, and natural kind terms, refer directly and not by means of a 
sense. 
Kripke further concludes that proper names are not only direct designators, but 
rigid designators; which means that they designate the same thing in all possible 
worlds (where the appropriate thing exists). Definite descriptions on the other hand 
are, generally, non-rigid designators - i.e. they can refer to different things in 
different possible worlds. For example, the name ‘Nixon‘ will refer to the same 
person in all possible worlds where Nixon exists - namely, Nixon himself. The 
definite description ‘The 37th President of the United states’ will refer to different 
individuals in different possible worlds because it is surely not a necessary truth that 
Nixon was the 37th president of the United States. There are possible worlds where 
someone other than Nixon has this distinction. Applying the concept of rigidity to 
certain empirical discoveries, Kripke overturns our notion of what is to count as 
necessary. For example, the statement 
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Hesperus is Phosphorus 
may seem obviously contingent, since it was an empirical discovery that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, but on Kripke’s view this is mistaken because of the rigidity of the 
names involved. Since both ‘Hesperus‘ and ‘Phosphorus‘ are rigid designators they 
will refer to the same object in all possible worlds where the object (the planet 
Venus) exists. Consequently, if it is true in the actual world that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus then it will be necessarily true because there will be no possible world 
where Hesperus is not Phosphorus, other than worlds where the planet Venus does 
not exist. This is what Kripke calls ‘weak necessity‘, or metaphysical necessity, to 
distinguish it from logical necessity. The main point here for Kripke is that if we 
regard the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus‘ as synonymous with a description 
which determines reference - something like ‘The heavenly body in such-and-such 
position in the evening/morning sky‘ - then the statement ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ 
will be contingent because something other than the planet Venus might have 
occupied this position in the sky. 
In Kripke’s scheme the illusion of contingency in such statements as ‘Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘ arises from a confusion between descriptions that merely fix the 
reference of a name and those that are synonymous with the name. He uses this 
distinction to generate contingent a priori truths in the following way. First of all, a 
name can be introduced into a language via a description which fixes its reference 
but is not synonymous with it. For example, the name ‘Neptune‘ could be 
introduced into the language as a name for whatever is causing certain anomalies in 
the orbit of the planet Uranus using a description something like ‘That which is 
causing such-and-such perturbations’, such that the person who does this would be 
in a position to know a priori that Neptune is the cause of the perturbations - even 
though it is contingent that Neptune is the cause of the perturbations. 
Thus, Kripke mounts a strong challenge to what is to be regarded as necessary 
and how necessary truths are discovered, horn a theory of semantics. Perhaps the 
most interesting part of his thesis is the claim that natural kind terms, such as 
‘water’ or ‘gold‘, for example, are rigid designators, which leads to the conclusion 
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that scientific discoveries such as the discovery that water is H 2 0  or that gold has 
atomic number 79, will turn out to be necessary, thus reviving claims that science 
can discover the real essence of natural kinds. It is the purpose of the present work 
to challenge Kripke’s claims, as well as any supporting arguments due to Putnam, 
Donnellan etc. 
Although I shall grant that some of the arguments of the direct reference theory 
do force us to make adjustments in the Description Theory of names, I shall 
nevertheless maintain that the Description Theory has not been refuted. I shall argue 
that most of the claims made by advocates of the direct reference theory are 
mistaken. This not only applies to their view of how names function in natural 
language but also to the claims that there are necessary a posteriori truths and 
contingent a priori truths; although I cannot rule out such things in principle. 
The first two chapters examine the attempt by the direct reference theorists 
(mainly Kripke) to refute the Description Theory and to replace it with a causal 
theory of reference, whereby the reference of proper names and natural kind terms is 
determined by a causal chain of reference preserving links leading from present use 
all the way back to an initial baptism. Chapter 3 deals with Putnam’s attempt to 
establish a direct reference theory for natural kind terms and also with what I regard 
as the true theory of how names function in natural language. Chapter 4 deals with 
the meaning of identity statements, and challenges the claims by Kripke and Ruth 
Marcus that identity statements involving proper names and natural kind terms are 
necessary. Finally, chapters 5 and 6 examine the claims made by Kripke (and others) 
that there exist contingent a priori truths as well as necessary a posteriori truths. 
I shall not say a great deal about possible worlds or about the precise meanings of 
the terms ‘a priori‘ and ‘a posteriori‘. I shall simply follow Kripke’s usage in 
Naming and Necessity where he defines a priori truths as “those which can be 
known independently of any experience” (1980,~ 34 ). A posteriori truths, on the 
other hand, are those which have been discovered empirically, such as the discovery 
that water is H20 or that gold is the element with atomic number 79. Possible 
worlds will be regarded non-realistically - ‘‘stipulated, not discovered”. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Perhaps nothing illustrates the gulf between philosopher and layman better than the 
philosophical treatment of the semantics of proper names, such as, for example, 
‘Socrates’, or ‘London’, or ‘John Smith’. What to the man in the street are the most 
mundane and straightforward of linguistic items have presented philosophy with 
over a century of seemingly very serious problems with far-reaching consequences. 
In this chapter we will be concerned with the two main contenders for the true 
theory of what is to count as a genuine name and how they h c t i o n  in language: 
specifically, natural language. These are the Direct Reference Theory ( hereafter, 
DRT ) which holds that names refer to their objects directly, without the mediation 
of any kind of sense; and what might be called the ‘Description Theory’, or ‘Sense 
Theory‘, which is the view that proper names refer indirectly by means of a sense. 
This sense is usually identified with some definite description or set thereof, and for 
a long time seemed to give the true picture of how names functioned. Senses, for 
example, seemed to be indispensable to any attempt to solve the so-called ‘Problems 
of Reference‘. As is well known Frege (1 892) introduced his theory that names have 
sense as well as reference in order to solve the problem, as he saw it, of how true 
identity statements of the form a=b can differ in ‘cognitive value‘ (Erkenntniswerte ) 
from those of the form a=a. Also in this paper Frege uses the theory of sense to 
solve the problem of the behaviour of proper names in belief contexts which seems 
to lead to paradoxical results, as in the following example: 
1) John believes that Hesperus is a planet 
2) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
3) Ergo, John believes that Phosphorus is a planet 
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This looks like a perfectly valid argument if ‘Hesperus‘ and ‘Phosphorus‘ are co- 
referential; and yet, surely John can consistently deny that he believes that 
Phosphorus is a planet. 
Frege’s solution to the problem in terms of the sense of proper names is to deny 
that names have their customary reference in such contexts. Rather, they refer to 
their customary sense. This means that in 1) what John believes is different from 
what he believes in 3). 1) and 3) express different ‘thoughts‘ ( in the non- 
psychological sense ) or propositions. The question of what a proper name 
contributes to propositional content is a major difficulty for DRT, as we shall see. 
These two puzzles, along with the problems of negative existential statements and 
vacuous names, like ‘Pegasus‘, seem to pose serious problems for any theory of 
naming which does not allow a fundamental role for sense. Nevertheless, in the last 
few decades the orthodox sense theory has been severely criticised and gradually 
replaced in the minds of many by the direct reference theory, a revival of the theory 
of naming advocated by J.S. Mill in his 1843 “A System of Logic”, where he argues 
that proper names have denotation only, and no connotation. Reference is direct and 
unmediated by anything like a sense. 
The chief advocate of DRT in recent times has been Saul Kripke in his works 
“Identity and Necessity” (1971) and Naming and Necessity ( 1972, 1980 ) and no 
doubt the success of DRT in overthrowing the Fregean orthodoxy in spite of the 
difficulties of the problems of reference is a tribute to the considerable persuasive 
power of Kripke’s arguments which seem to provide a devastating critique of the 
description theory. Before proceeding to discuss Kripke’s views we must be clear 
about what it is that DRT is opposed to, since it may seem obvious to some people 
that names have sense in the sense that we associate senses with names, in our 
minds. The name ‘Neil Armstrong‘, for example, will be associated with the 
description ‘The first man on the moon‘. No direct reference theorist could or would 
deny this. Kripke even concedes that we can f i x  the reference of a name with a 
definite description, although typically we do not do this, and there is certainly no 
need to ( 1980, p.15, 54 - 57). The crucial point for Kripke is that reference-fixing 
descriptions and descriptions associated with names in the minds of speakers are not 
9 
what determines the reference of the names. They are therefore not synonymous 
with the names. Reference is direct and unmediated. 
Kripke’s starting point is a purely formal one, namely, the model-theoretic 
treatment of quantified modal logic; in particular the theorem: 
4) (Vx) (Vy) ( x=y + U x=y ) 
This theorem makes it obvious to Kripke that identical objects are necessarily 
identical. Once we assign values to these variables we get the necessary identity of a 
particular instance, as in : 
5) ( a=b ) + 0 (a=b) 
It seems natural that ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ should be ordinary proper names like, for example, 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus‘. If proper names refer directly, and therefore rigidly 
(i.e. they refer to (or designate) the same object in all possible worlds, where the 
object exists - what Kripke calls ‘weak rigidity’) we get (5) for ordinary proper 
names. Assigning values to variables in a formal language does not seem to require 
anything like a sense; but of course, the situation could be different when we move 
away from formal languages to natural languages. It is the functioning of ordinary 
proper names in natural languages that is the concern of Naming and Necessity. 
More precisely, it is the way in which the functioning of ordinary proper names 
relates to modality and epistemology that is the concern of this famous text. For 
Kripke, it is a consequence of the direct reference theory, specifically the claim to 
rigidity, that there are necessary a posteriori truths as well as contingent a priori 
truths. When applied to general terms such as natural kind terms Kripke is lead to 
resurrect Aristotelian essentialism - the claim that objects, and kinds of objects, have 
some of their properties essentially. This is real essence and not just nominal 
essence arising out of our way of describing an object or a kind. What is more, this 
essence is discoverable by science. For example, the empirical discovery that water 
is H20 is the discovery of a necessary truth, in Kripke’s view. Science has 
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discovered the essence of water, or so it is claimed [Particularly, 1980, p128-134, 
and 140-1461 
Such bold claims require very strong arguments, and this Kripke thinks he has 
produced in Naming and Necessity. In this claim he is supported, in one way or 
another, by such luminaries as Keith Donnellan (1 972), David Kaplan (1 968,1979, 
Hilary Putnam (1973,1975a ), and Nathan Salmon who seeks (in his 1986) to deal 
with the seemingly fatal difficulty of the contribution made by a proper name to a 
sentence contained in a belief context. 
Naming and Necessity consists of two theses - a negative one and a positive one. 
The negative thesis is Kripke’s allegedly devastating critique of what he terms the 
‘Frege/Russell’ view of proper names whereby a proper name ‘N‘ is synonymous 
with, or abbreviates, to use Russell’s term, a definite description which gives the 
sense of the name, and by means of which the name refers. The positive thesis 
consists of Kripke’s attempt to explain, or give a ‘better picture‘, of how names 
actually do work and how their semantic properties of direct and rigid designation 
relate to the epistemological questions of how we come to know necessary truths 
and contingent truths. It will be the aim of the present chapter to show that Kripke, 
and his aforementioned confederates, has singularly failed to establish either the 
negative or the positive thesis. It will also be argued, however, that all is not well 
with the description theory and that a new theory of the semantics of names is 
required. 
The Negative - Thesis 
(The Argument Against the Description Theory) 
In Lecture I of Naming and Necessity Kripke defines the description theory as the 
theory that “...really a proper name properly used, simply was a definite description 
abbreviated or disguised.” (1980, p27), a view he attributes to Frege and Russell. It 
is by means of this sense that the name refers. Both Dummett (1973) and Linsky 
(1977) have claimed that Frege held no such view about the sense of a proper name 
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being just that of a definite description. Linsky further claims that Russell did not 
hold the view either if it means that names refer by means of definite descriptions, 
since definite descriptions do not refer in Russell’s scheme; nor do they have a 
sense. ( 0p.Cit. p43,44). Both Dummett and Linsky are adamant that Frege never 
held the view Kripke attributes to him. Although Dummett concedes that Frege 
expresses possible senses of proper names by means of descriptions, he is quick to 
point out that these descriptions should be considered as “...merely a device for a 
brief characterisation of a sense, rather than as a means of conveying the thesis that 
Kripke ascribes to Frege.” (0p.Cit. p 110). The crucial point for Dummett and 
Linsky is that a name have associated with it a criterion for recognising a given 
object as the referent of the name (Dummett, 0p.Cit. pl10; and Linsky, 0p.Cit. p71) 
According to Dummett this criterion can sometimes be conveyed by a definite 
description, sometimes not. Linsky, on the other hand, is reluctant to talk of definite 
descriptions at all, preferring to characterise this criterion of identification as a 
concept of the thing in question (Op.Cit.p71) For both Dummett and Linsky Frege’s 
theory of proper names is undoubtedly a sense theory but not a description theory - 
or at least not the description theory attributed to Frege by Kripke. 
This denigration, by Dummett and Linsky, of the role of descriptions in giving the 
sense of proper names is hard to accept. Afier all, how else is the criterion of 
identification to be characterised? It is all very well for Linsky to argue that anyone 
who acquires the respective senses of the names ‘Hesperus‘ and ‘Phosphorus‘ 
acquires two different concepts or two different criteria of identification of a 
particular object, but we must surely ask what this difference consists in, and how is 
the difference to be expressed if not in terms of descriptions? It is easy to agree with 
Strawson when he writes: 
.... it is no good using a name .... unless we know who or what is referred to by 
the use of the name. A name is worthless without a backing of descriptions 
which can be produced on demand to explain the application (1 959, p20) 
At any rate, what is clear is that Frege held that there is more to a proper name 
than its reference. It will have a sense which determines its reference. It is equally 
clear that Russell’s treatment of vacuous or non-referring names lead him to 
conclude that what we ordinarily call names are not genuine names at all. They are 
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really truncated descriptions. What Kripke may be guilty of is conflating the views 
of Frege and Russell into the thesis that a name is synonymous with a definite 
description which determines what the name refers to - a view which perhaps neither 
Frege nor Russell actually held. It must be remembered that Frege and Russell differ 
enormously as to what is to count as a genuine name - to such an extent in fact, that 
any combination of their respective views would lead to a gross distortion of both 
positions. 
However, we do not need to look too closely at the text of Naming and Necessiv 
to see that Kripke is attacking a, broadly, Fregean view of naming rather than what 
he calls the ‘FregeRussell’ view. Linsky is surely correct when he says that 
Russell’s theory of proper names does not include the claim that names refer by 
means of some definite description. For Russell, what we ordinarily regard as proper 
names are not genuine names at all; and definite descriptions do not have sense. 
The view being attacked in Naming and Necessity is the view that proper names 
refer indirectly by means of a sense given by a definite description ( or perhaps a set 
of descriptions ) where the description is used attributively, in Donnellan’s sense 
(Kripke, 1980, p26,28). It is very difficult for a defender of Frege to deny that this 
is, or ought to be, the Fregean thesis. This is the thesis that we shall examine in the 
present chapter along with numerous variations designed to avoid the criticisms of 
DRT. These will include the Cluster Theories of Wittgenstein and Searle ( and, as it 
turns out, Linsky); the so-called ‘meta-linguistic‘ theories of Jerrold Katz and Kent 
Bach ( ‘sense-only’ theories); plus other attempts at a compromise between DRT 
and the Fregean Description Theory. 
Kripke has three main arguments against the description theory 
term ‘Epistemological‘, ‘Modal‘, and ‘Semantic‘. These are best i 
example: 
which we may 
lustrated by an 
(A) Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander 
or 
Aristotle taught Alexander 
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According to Kripke, if ‘Aristotle‘ just means ‘the teacher of Alexander‘, then (A) 
should be a priori, necessary and analytic. 
i) (A) is not a priori because it was an empirical discovery that Aristotle taught 
Alexander 
ii) (A) is not necessary because we can surely make sense of a counterfactual 
situation (possible world) where Aristotle is not a teacher 
iii) (A) is not analytic because it may not even be true. It is epistemically possible 
that it is not true. I.e. we could yet discover it to be false. 
(A) is therefore a posteriori, contingent and synthetic, since it tells us something 
about the world and not about the meanings of words. 
The first point to note here is that Kripke is on rather shaky ground when he 
claims that (A) is not true by virtue of the meanings of the words, since he does not 
make it clear what he means by ‘meaning‘. He does make the celebrated distinction 
between fixing a reference and giving a synonym (1980, p15,37, 53-60) - definite 
descriptions may be used for the former purpose but not the latter - but this merely 
tells us what meaning is not. To give a positive account of meaning would involve 
Kripke in some account of the propositional content of sentences containing proper 
names, and this, notoriously, is not forthcoming in Kripke’s work. This is probably 
because, if names lack sense given by definite descriptions, their contribution to 
content can only be in terms of their reference. In the case of co-referential names, 
this leads Kripke head-on into the problems of reference, especially the ‘Identity 
Problem‘ and the ‘Propositional Attitude‘ problem. (Actually not all advocates of 
DRT deny that names have sense - for example, Salmon, (1981) where, following 
Burge (1977, p 356), he distinguishes different roles for senses - a reference- 
determining role, a psychological role, and a role whereby co-referential names can 
contribute different senses to propositional content. However, Salmon later recants 
this piece of heresy and argues that proper names do not have sense at all). 
It seems, however, that DRT can avoid the problems of vacuous names and non- 
refemng names, such as ‘Pegasus‘, which troubled Russell so much, by simply 
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denying that they are genuine names. They are not genuine names simply because 
they do not in fact name anything. Consequently, DRT does not owe any account of 
how these ‘names‘ function in these circumstances. Actually it could be the Fregean 
who has the problem with non-referring names. He wants to claim that they are 
genuine names because they have a sense, but he then has to explain how a genuine 
name does not actually name anything. Frege’s ad hoc move of providing an 
arbitrary reference for these terms, such as the number zero, will not do for any 
theory of natural language (for which it was never intended). Whilst it may be 
acceptable formally, in a natural language such as English, it is barely intelligible. 
What, for instance, does it mean to say that the name ‘Pegasus‘ denotes the number 
zero? The only possible way in which the Fregean can deal with non-referring 
names is to make something of the fact that the sense of these terms contains the 
fact that they do not refer. For example, it is an integral part of the sense of 
‘Pegasus‘ that Pegasus is a mythica2 creature, and therefore did not exist. Not to 
include this when giving the sense of ‘Pegasus‘ is to give a sense that is seriously 
deficient and misleading. To take another example, the sense of ‘Sherlock Holmes‘ 
is ‘theJictiona2 detective created by Conan Doyle etc.‘ This solves the problem of 
non-referring names in terms of sense. The sense of these names includes the fact 
that these ‘names‘ do not and never did refer to any actual object. Something similar 
can be done with theoretical terms, such as ‘neutrino’, for example, whose sense can 
be given by the description “The theoretical particle believed to have such-and-such 
properties”. Despite having sense, however, these terms are still not genuine names 
since they do not (or may not) name anything. They are not nothing, however. They 
have sense and can be used in meaningful discourse. We could call them ‘Pseudo- 
names‘ to distinguish them from genuine names. 
So long as the notion of meaning is unclear, then, the notion of analyticity must 
also be unclear, since Kripke defines analyticity as truth by virtue of the meanings 
of the terms involved (1 980, p39). 
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The Epistemological Argument 
To deal with the epistemological objection first, (A) certainly does not seem to be 
the sort of thing we could know a priori. It was undoubtedly an empirical discovery 
that Aristotle taught Alexander, so (A) would seem to be the very paradigm of a 
posteriori knowledge; unlike, for example: 
(B) Bachelors are unmarried 
which seems to be the very paradigm of a statement which is necessary, a priori and 
analytic. However, we surely only know a priori that bachelors are unmarried once 
we know what the word ‘bachelor‘ means - and this we discover empirically. Why, 
then, can we not say something similar about (A)? Why not say that we know a 
priori that Aristotle was a teacher, once we know what the name ‘Aristotle’ means? 
This is an empirical discovery, but then so it is with the meaning of any word. When 
we discover that Aristotle taught Alexander we not only discover something about 
Aristotle himself, we also discover something about the meaning of the name 
‘Aristotle‘. Now this may seem a strange claim to many philosophers because it 
means that any new discovery about Aristotle, or whatever, leads to a shift in the 
meaning of the name ‘Aristotle‘. It also leads us to question whether any and all 
discoveries about Aristotle contribute to the meaning of his name. This is not such a 
strange claim, however. If‘Aristotle’ has a sense given by a set of descriptions, then 
why not add to the sense of the name when we discover new things about Aristotle? 
After all, we surely have to do something with this new information. As to the 
question of what exactly is to be included in the sense of the name this will depend 
on the context in which the name is being used. What seems like a trivial piece of 
information in one context could be of great significance in a different context - 
although, ultimately, and strictly speaking, anything and everything that is true of 
Aristotle will contribute to the sense of his name. This will also apply to general 
names, as we shall see in chapter 3. 
Whether we discover the whole meaning of ‘Aristotle‘ or only part of the 
meaning may determine the epistemic status of (A). According to Linsky it does. If, 
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for example, being the teacher of Alexander exhausts our knowledge of Aristotle, in 
the way in which being the mother of Mary (to use Linsky’s example) exhausts our 
knowledge of the name ‘Saint Anne‘, then it would be a priori that Aristotle taught 
Alexander, just as it is a priori, in Linsky’s view, that St. Anne is a mother because 
“..Having acquired the name ‘St. Anne‘ by means of the single definite description 
‘the mother of Mary‘, I cannot make intelligible to myself the supposition that, 
though she exists, she is not a mother” (1977, p83) (Philosophers like Kripke and 
Donnellan would find this perfectly intelligible. These diametrically opposed 
intuitions lie at the very heart of the debate between DRT and the description 
theory). 
The situation is somewhat different, according to Linsky, in the case of a name 
where we acquire a whole set of descriptions which we believe express knowledge 
about a person. Linsky cites Wittgenstein’s example of the name ‘Moses‘ in 
Philosophical Investigations (p3 6,3 7) where Wittgenstein questions whether 
‘Moses‘ has a fixed and unequivocal use in all possible cases because of the variety 
of descriptions we could substitute for the name. We would not therefore, know a 
priori that Moses was ‘The F‘, or ‘The G‘, or ‘The H‘, because of this lack of “a 
fixed and unequivocal sense ... in all possible cases’’ (Linsky, Op. Cit. p86). Thus 
Linsky concludes, significantly, that “ ..under these circumstances ... the notion of a 
priori truth becomes impossible to apply’’ (Ibid.) 
Note that in Linsky’s view Wittgenstein’s ‘Cluster Theory‘ is very different from 
that of Searle (1958) who does seem to hold that names have a fixed and 
unequivocal sense. Searle agrees that to use a single description as giving the sense 
of a name would commit us to claims about necessity that are clearly wrong - such 
as the claim that it is a necessary truth that Aristotle taught Alexander. Searle 
recognises that such a truth is clearly contingent. He does, however, argue that it is a 
necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of the 
properties commonly attributed to him (Searle, 1958, in Caton, p160) Whatever has 
most, or a weighted most, of these properties, is Aristotle. If most of these properties 
do not pick out any individual uniquely, then we must conclude that Aristotle did 
not exist. Similarly, if the Biblical story of Moses turns out to be substantially false, 
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then we would conclude that Moses did not exist, according to the cluster theory of 
Searle. 
Kripke is quite clear that these claims are just false. As he says in Naming and 
Necessity: “I have already argued (p58 -WP) that the Biblical story does not give 
necessary properties of Moses, that he might have lived without doing any of these 
things .... The Biblical story might have been a complete legend, or it might have 
been a substantially false account of a real person” (p66). Likewise at page 62: “Not 
only each of these singly but the possession of the entire disjunction of these 
properties is just a contingent fact about Aristotle.. 77 
At first sight at least, it would seem to be Kripke who has the correct intuition 
here, since it would seem to be straightforwardly the case that Aristotle and Moses 
could have existed and not done any of the things they actually did, or are believed 
to have done. That things are not quite so straightforward when deciding whether or 
not names have a descriptive sense is best illustrated with a thought experiment. 
Suppose, for instance, that we could build a time machine and travel back to the 
time (and place) that Moses is supposed to have lived. If we try to identifL Moses 
the only way we can do so is by looking for someone who fits all, or most, of the 
descriptions we associate with the name. If we did come across such a person ( who 
need not actually be called ‘Moses‘) then the Fregean would conclude that we had 
found Moses. Kripke, on the other hand, would have to say that this person is not 
necessarily Moses. In fact Kripke is committed to the view that we have no more 
right to conclude that this person is Moses rather than any of the other people we 
encounter. Moses could be any of these people, or none. The fact that there is an 
individual who fits all our descriptions does not help us at all. 
I think this thought experiment may help even up the score between Kripke and 
the Fegean as far as intuition goes. It is surely very strange to claim that someone 
who fits all or most of our descriptions has no more claim to be Moses than anyone 
else, but that is what Kripke is committed to. ( We shall deal with the way in which 
reference is determined for DRT later). 
It is clear, then, that Kripke sees no real difference between the single description 
and the cluster theory. Linsky agrees with Kripke in his rejection of Searle, but sees 
a distinction between Searle and Wittgenstein, as already described, which Kripke 
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does not recognise. Linsky concludes his (1977) by maintaining that the 
Wittgensteinian cluster theory, which holds that we will give up a name if enough of 
the ground is cut from beneath us, is to be preferred to any other description theory 
because “ we cannot say now exactly what that ground is. It becomes fixed as we go 
along. Or else it does not and we do not know what to conclude from our 
investigation” (Ibid. pl  1 1) 
The obvious difficulty with this view is how to determine what descriptions are to 
be relevant ‘as we go along’. In other words the Linsky/Wittgenstein cluster theory 
is too loose, too vague to be of any use to us. Any theory of the sense of a proper 
name must be more rigid than this cluster theory if it is to deal with the problems of 
reference. Can a name like ‘Moses‘, for example, really have one sense in order to 
deal with Frege’s identity puzzle and another sense in order to deal with the problem 
of propositional attitudes? It must surely have the same sense in both cases. Note, 
that this is not the same problem as the problem of different speakers associating 
different senses with the same name. This is undoubtedly a fact and will have to be 
dealt with by the description theory. The problem with the Linsky/Wittgenstein 
view is that the same speakers do not have a fixed sense for a name like Moses. 
Linsky does point out that existence questions such as ‘Did Moses exist?‘ are vague 
but we can remove this vagueness in a given context by fixing on a definite 
description or cluster for which we will take these names as ‘abbreviations‘ (1977, 
p l l l ) .  What he fails to take into account, however, is that there are other contexts 
apart fiom questions of existence (the only problem he deals with in his 1977), other 
contexts where we need to fix on a definite description or cluster thereof in order to 
give a sense to the name. There is no reason to doubt that the descriptions should be 
the same in each context - i.e. for all the problems of reference. Any theory of sense 
which expresses that sense in terms of descriptions must be more rigid that the 
LinskyISearlelWittgenstein view. 
Of course if we reject this loosening of the sense of a proper name we find 
ourselves once again faced with Kripke’s charge that the truth of a statement like 
(A) should be known a priori. As already mentioned, however, this may not be the 
problem that Kripke takes it to be. Once we discover that Aristotle taught Alexander 
we do know certain things a priori, for example, that Aristotle was a teacher. This is 
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because, in discovering that Aristotle is The F, we also discover that it is at least 
part of the meaning of ‘Aristotle’ that Aristotle is The F. This seems a perfectly 
legitimate way of regarding the question of sense for proper names. We discover 
their senses empirically. This is no different from the way in which we discover the 
sense of any word. It is often claimed that we know a priori that bachelors are 
unmarried or that vixens are female foxes, but this is only the case once we know 
what these words mean - and this we discover empirically. Kripke’s epistemological 
argument, which initially had great intuitive appeal, is not nearly as obvious or as 
strong as he claims. At the very least, it is not clear that there is such a difference 
between statements like 
Aristotle taught Alexander 
and 
Bachelors are unmarried 
as far as questions of analyticity and a priority are concerned. 
The Modal Argument 
Kripke seems to regard his modal argument as his central objection to the 
description theory; although it has been regarded as his least convincing by most 
commentators, who mainly accuse him of trading on an illicit shift of scope. (For 
example, Dummett, 0p.Cit.; Linsky, Op. Cit. and Loar, 1976) (More of this below). 
The modal argument can indeed be regarded as an argument about scope, or it could 
be seen simply as an argument fkom counterfactuals. I t  is also intimately connected 
with Kripke’s most crucial idea - that of the rigidity of proper names (and general 
terms, as it turns out). The modal argument goes something like the following: 
(C) (i) If ‘N‘ meant ‘The F‘, then ‘N might not have been The F‘ would be false 
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(ii) ‘N might not have been The F‘ is true 
(iii) Ergo, ‘N’ does not mean ‘The F‘ . ( Due to Loar, 1976) 
For example, although Nixon was the U.S. president in 1970, we can make sense of 
the possibility that he might not have been. Kripke’s contention is simply that, if 
‘Nixon‘ meant ‘The U.S. president in 1970‘, then this would make it a necessary 
truth that Nixon became president, which violates all our intuitions about necessity 
and what we can suppose counterfactually. Furthermore, in talking about a 
counterfactual situation where Nixon does not become president - i.e. a possible 
world where someone other than Nixon is U.S. president in 1970 - we are talking 
about a situation where Nixon - that very man - is not president. This is the source of 
the claim to rigidity of ordinary proper names like ‘Nixon’ or ‘Aristotle‘. For 
Kripke, we have a “direct intuition” of the rigidity of proper names (1980, p4, 14, 
48). This intuition is supported by something Marcus says about names (1 976): 
We need a way in language of sorting a thing from its properties so that we 
may entertain the possibility of its not having this or that property. Proper 
names serve this purpose ..... Proper names are a way of mentioning an object 
without a commitment to any of its properties excluding trivial ones.. . . . . . . . . .It 
appears therefore that for the analysis of counterexamples the distinction 
between proper names and other modes of fixing reference is central. (1976, 
P134) 
In talking about counterfactual situations it is given, by stipulation, that we are 
talking about Nixon (or whoever) - not someone who satisfies certain descriptions; 
and certainly not what David Lewis calls a “counterpart” of Nixon. Such a 
counterpart would be of no use to Kripke in talking about counterfactual situations 
or possible worlds (See 1980, p45n). Our intuitions about counterfactual reasoning 
only make sense if trans-world identity of individuals is given, by stipulation. 
Indeed, for Kripke the trans-world identity of individuals is something of a pseudo- 
problem. As he says on page 44 of Naming and Necessity : “A possible world is 
given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it.” These descriptive 
conditions can contain the fact that Nixon exists in that world (Ibid.) 
Another way of looking at the problem of rigidity or non-rigidity is in terms of 
how we evaluate terms with respect to possible worlds. For Kripke, names and 
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definite descriptions are to be evaluated differently. In a footnote to his (1972) and 
(1 980) he explains the point thus: 
In the formal semantics of modal logic, the sense o f t  is usually taken to be the 
(possibly partial) function which assigns to each possible world H the referent 
o f t  in H. For a rigid designator such a function is constant. (1972, p 346n) 
In evaluating a definite description, on the other hand, we must go to a possible 
world and find the object, if any, that uniquely fits the description. This may vary 
from world to world. The evaluation function for definite descriptions is not 
constant. More simply, a rigid designator designates the same object in all possible 
worlds, whereas a definite description can designate different objects in different 
possible worlds. Actually some qualification is required here. Kripke feels that he 
must distinguish between, what he calls ‘strong‘ and ‘weak rigidity, and between 
‘De Facto’ and ‘De Jure ‘ rigidity. A designator is weakly rigid if it designates the 
same object in all possible worlds, where the object exists. (Ordinary proper names 
would fall into this category). A strongly rigid designator, on the other hand, 
designates the same object in all possible worlds, simpliciter. Such a designator 
would designate necessary existents, such as numbers (1980, p48). The de factolde 
jure distinction is introduced in order to deal with the fact that some definite 
descriptions are rigid - for example, ‘The square root of 4‘, or ‘The even prime‘. 
Such designators are merely rigid de facto, according Kripke. That is, they merely 
turn out to be rigid. Proper names, on the other hand, are de jure rigid; which means 
that they are stipulated to designate the same object in all possible worlds: or, as 
McGinn (1982) puts it, they have constant reference “ in virtue of the semantical 
rules of the language” 
Kripke can also appeal to the de facto/de jure distinction in order to deal with the 
allegation that any definite description can be made rigid by prefixing it with the 
operator ‘actually‘ (See Linsky, 0p.Cit. p58, and Plantinga, 1978). Thus, the non- 
rigid ‘U.S. president in 1970‘ becomes the rigid ‘The actual U.S. president in 1970‘. 
As Plantinga (1978) puts it, the property of being US. president in 1970, has been 
‘world-indexed’ - indexed to the actual world, which he calls ‘a‘. In general, a 
definite description such as ‘The F‘ can always be indexed to the actual world, 
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whence it becomes ‘F-in-a‘. Clearly such a description will be rigid since there are 
no possible worlds where Nixon exists and does not have the property of being the 
US. president in 1970 in the actual world. Such a move, according to Plantinga, 
makes the thesis that names are rigid designators compatible with the description 
theory. On this view names do indeed express properties of objects, but not ordinary 
properties, such as ‘The F‘, but world-indexed properties like ‘The F-in-a‘ 
(Plantinga, 1978, p131). These properties are essences of the objects in question 
(Ibid.pl32). Each object will, according to Plantinga, have several essences (pl32) 
which are logically equivalent but not epistemically equivalent (pl33). Co- 
referential proper names will also express logically equivalent but epistemically 
inequivalent essences. This would explain how a statement like ‘Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘ can be informative, while also explaining how statements like 
‘Hesperus is a planet‘ and ‘Phosphorus is a planet‘ can express epistemically 
inequivalent propositions. 
Despite the obvious attraction of a theory of rigid, though indirect, designation 
which solves the problems of reference, Kripke is unimpressed by the use of an 
actually operator in this way (See 1980, p59n). For Kripke, and DRT theorists in 
general, names are thoroughly non-descriptional. They do not express any properties 
of objects, other than possibly the property of being that very object - what has been 
termed the ‘Haeccity’ of the object. The kind of ‘essences‘ posited by Plantinga are 
not the kind that interest Kripke. Joseph Almog (1986) calls them ‘manufactured 
essences‘. . . “semantic assembly-line essences” that substitute semantical theft for 
metaphysical toil (1986, p224n). Salmon (1981) also doubts the efficacy of the 
actually operator in rigidifying definite descriptions. Specifically, he reminds us that 
the property of being the actual F, or whatever, is not a purely qualitative property 
of the sort that the orthodox (Fregean) theory demands (0p.Cit. p27). In other 
words, Salmon wants to know if the actually operator describes the actual world as 
the only possible world that has the ontological status of being actual; or does it 
directly and non-descriptionally indicate the actual world for semantic evaluation? 
(Ibid. p44). Plantinga does not consider such subtleties but, then, perhaps he has no 
need to since h is  is not an orthodox Fregean theory. 
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Despite any prima facie plausibility in Plantinga’s argument, I shall argue that 
definite descriptions cannot be rigidified in the way he claims. While not wishing to 
denigrate the use of the actually operator in general (See, for example, Davies and 
Humberstone, 1980, where the actually operator is argued to be essential to a correct 
logic of possibility) it seems clear that it cannot be used to rigidify a definite 
description. Such a procedure has certain consequences for essentialism, which are, 
at the very least, seriously counter-intuitive, and at worst, downright absurd. For 
example, it is a consequence of the type of view advocated by Plantinga that, while 
Nixon has the property of being the winner of the 1968 presidential election only 
contingently, he has the property of being the actual winner, or the winner in the 
actual world, essentially. What, we may ask is the difference between being the 
winner and being the actual winner? After all, we are not dealing with two events 
here - Nixon’s winning the election, and Nixon’s actually winning the election. In 
the sentence: 
(D) Nixon actually won the election 
the actually operator is as redundant as the word ‘now‘ in 
(E) It is raining now 
‘Now‘ is redundant because \re are sing the present tense. There is no point in 
having such a thing as the present tense if every use of it has to be augmented by the 
word ‘now‘, or the expression ‘at the present moment‘. We are in a similar situation 
as regards the word ‘actually‘. Take, for example, the following sentence: 
(F) It was an empirical discovery that Aristotle taught Alexander in the 
actual world 
Here the actually operator is clearly redundant, since any empirical discovery could 
only be of the actual world. We could not possibly be speaking truly about some 
other possible world here. Plantinga’s world-indexed properties look like a prime 
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candidate for Occam’s Razor, if we consider that it is a consequence of indexing 
properties to the actual world that, for any object that exists in the actual world, for 
any property it has, it will have the further property of having-that-property-in-the- 
actual-world. This just seems totally unnecessary. It may even be perverse. 
Perhaps the best argument against the distinction between a property such as The 
F and The actual F is that it leads to an infinite regress of essential properties as 
follows. First of all, let us, with Plantinga, call the actual world ‘a‘, and distinguish 
between F and F-in-a. Now if F-in-a is an essential property of, say, Aristotle, then 
he must have this property in all possible worlds where he exists - and this must 
include the actual world. So he has F-in-a, in a . Now if we go to any arbitrarily 
chosen world where Aristotle exists and ask the question ‘Who in this world has the 
property F-in-a-in-a?‘, then it has to be Aristotle. He has this property in any world 
where he exists. The key question now is ‘Does he have this property [ (F-in-a)-in- 
a] in the actual world?‘ If he does then we have another essential property on our 
hands. We are also on our way to an infinite regress. The only way to avoid the 
regress is to deny that Aristotle has the properry (F-in-a)-in-a in the actual world, or 
to deny that he has to have it in the actual world. But then if he need not have (F-in- 
a)-in-a in the actual world, why must he have F-in-a in the actual world? One 
reason why he must have (F-in-a)-in-a in the actual world is that it would be a very 
strange property that something has in all possible worlds except the actual world. 
That surely makes no sense at all. If we accept this then Aristotle must have (F-in- 
a)-in-a in the actual world and so we have the regress. At any rate, we either have 
the regress or F-in-a is not an essential property of Aristotle. The alleged distinction 
between being The F and being The actual F cannot be maintained. It would seem 
that the case for the rigidification of definite descriptions has not been successful. 
However, there are still many problems ahead for the rigidity thesis. Kripke’s 
distinction between weak and strong and de jure and de facto rigidity, with which he 
sees no real problem, are strongly criticised in Almog (1986). Almog’s main 
argument is that Kripke’s claim to be able to establish Aristotelian essentialism from 
a semantic theory is question-begging. (Salmon’s 1981, makes the same charge 
against Kripke, Putnam and Donnellan regarding natural kinds). For Almog, the 
crucial notion of rigidity is actually modally oriented. That is, I(ripke begins, not 
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with the designators, but with the designata and their modal properties. Thus 
‘Nixon’ is a rigid designator since the man Nixon is such that he could not have 
failed to be Nixon. He has the property of being Nixon essentially. On the other 
hand Nixon has the property of being the U.S. president in 1970 only contingently, 
and so the description ‘The U.S. president in 1970’ is non-rigid. In Almog’s view, 
this subjugation of semantics to metaphysics has adverse consequences for Kripke’s 
attempt to delineate the class of genuine naming devices. First of all, it allows too 
many designators in as genuine names - for example, ‘The offspring of gametes G‘, 
which rigidly designates Nixon (according to Kripke); whereas we would not 
normally regard it as a name. Secondly, as already mentioned, it leads Kripke to the 
distinction between strong and weak rigidity - strongly rigid designators designating 
necessary existents like numbers, and weakly rigid ones designating contingent 
existents, such as people, or in fact most objects. According to Almog such a 
distinction should not have been drawn for genuine naming devices. If Kripke had 
begun by attending to the designators rather than the designata he would have found 
a very different situation. For instance, from the point of view of language, there is 
nothing to prevent, say, the numeral ‘5‘ fiom signifying a contingent existent such 
as a person - in fact, anything at all. Moreover, if Kripke had stuck with the notion 
of possibility he employed in his early work on modal semantics, namely ZogicaZ 
possibility, then so-called ‘rigid designators‘ like ‘The offspring of gametes G‘, or 
even ‘The even prime‘, would no longer be rigid, unless we “sneak in arithmetic 
essentialism to restrain the range of possibilities” ( 1986, p2 1 7) 
As well as the modal orientation, Kripke’s crucial notion of rigidity also 
presupposes a background semantic framework concerned with evaluation in 
possible worlds. Almog describes this as a one stage theory of evaluation in which 
there is but one step to go through in order to determine the truth-value of a given 
sentence - evaluate it in a world. Of course, for Kripke, this would be a 
metaphysicaZZy possible world and so, in conflating the two ideas of the one-stage 
theory of evaluation and the modal orientation, he initiates what Almog calls ‘the 
metaphysical turn ’ in semantics. 
Almog distinguishes between a mild one-stage theory, which simply accepts that 
sentences should be evaluated in a world, and a strong one-stage theory, which 
26 
holds that contents of sentences are nothing over and above evaluation functions - 
i.e. the functions which assign to possible worlds truth-values in accordance with the 
‘facts‘ of these worlds. Now Kripke is a mild one-stage theorist only, in Almog’s 
view -i.e. he does not say anything about content. He does not tell us what a 
sentence like ‘Nixon is a Republican‘ actually says. According to Almog, we need a 
two-stage picture where we, first of all generate a proposition, where the name will 
contribute the object to which it refers to the propositional content of the sentence 
which contains it - what is termed (after Kaplan, 1975) a ‘singular proposition‘. 
Only then do we go on to evaluate it. This two-stage picture, and not Kripke’s, is 
genuine Millianism. Kripke’s theory cannot delineate the class of genuine naming 
devices. 
To summarise Almog ’ s argument, then, Kripke cannot distinguish between 
rigidity and non-rigidity because of his illicit ‘metaphysical turn‘- i.e. putting the 
cart before the horse. Neither can he, in Almog’s view, distinguish between de facto 
and de jure rigidity, because any de facto rigid designator can be made rigid de jure 
by prefixing the description with the actually operator. Such a move does not have 
the absurd consequences previously mentioned for Plantinga, since, in Almog ’ s 
scheme of things, the actually operator does not depend on any metaphysically 
based essential properties to guarantee its modal stability. For Almog, ‘The actual F‘ 
is made de jure rigid “in virtue of the semantical rules of the language, in virtue of 
the truth-conditions stipulated for all formulas containing ‘actual‘’’ (0p.Cit. p223) 
He goes on: “Whereas nothing less than full-blooded arithmetic essentialism must 
be relied upon to verify the rigidity of ‘The smallest prime‘, nothing more than pure 
semantics is called upon to demonstrate the modal stability of ‘The actual smallest 
prime‘ (Ibid. p224) 
Again I fail to see the justification for the use of the actually operator in this type 
of case, or even the motivation for it. The only possible motivation for prefixing a 
definite description like ‘The teacher of Alexander‘ with ‘actually‘ is to make sense 
of the fact that there are possible worlds where someone other than Aristotle has this 
property. (This is Plantinga’s motivation) It has already been argued that such a 
move is superfluous. The move made by Almog is just as pointless. In a way he is in 
a worse situation than Plantinga since there is no possible motivation for the move 
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which Almog advocates. Whereas someone may want to make a clear distinction 
between the actual teacher of Alexander and some possible teacher in some other 
possible world, there is no need to distinguish between the smallest prime and the 
actual smallest prime and some other possible candidate for being the smallest 
prime. There are no other possible candidates other than the number one. ‘The 
smallest prime‘ is rigid simply because it denotes the number one. It cannot denote 
anything else without changing the meanings of the words involved. 
Almog has not succeeded in repudiating the distinction between de facto and de 
jure rigidity; but what about his claim that the basic rigidhon-rigid distinction is 
modally oriented? It seems that Almog is probably right about this and that his two- 
stage picture of evaluation with its complete lack of modal involvement, should be 
the true Millianism. It also has the distinct advantage over Kripke of giving us an 
account of content and the contribution made by proper names. However, as we 
shall see, the problem of content leads DRT into more trouble than it can deal with. 
In the meantime we shall deal with one final version of the modal argument - the 
scope argument. This is the claim that names and definite descriptions behave 
differently in modal contexts to the extent that definite descriptions induce de re/de 
dicto scope ambiguities while proper names do not. Take, for example, the 
following statements: 
(G) Possibly, Socrates did not drink the hemlock 
(H) Possibly, the philosopher who drank the hemlock did not drink the hemlock 
Now if ‘Socrates’ means ‘the philosopher who drank the hemlock‘, then (G) and (H) 
should be equivalent in meaning and we should expect the name and the description 
to behave in the same way in both statements. But, so the argument goes, this is not 
the case, since (H) can be formalised with the possibility operator 0 and Russell’s 
Theory of Descriptions, in two ways. These are: 
(H*) 0 (3x (Vy ((Py & DHy) e x=y) & -Dhx)) 
(H**) (3x (Vy ((Py & DHy) e x=y) & 0 -DHx)) [McCulloch, 19891 
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(H*) is the de dicto reading of (H) and is obviously false. (H**) is the de re reading 
and is true. The point of this is to show that there are scope choices to be made when 
definite descriptions are modalized in this way, which do not arise for proper names. 
This difference in behaviour between the two leads to the conclusion that the name 
in (G) cannot be synonymous with the description in (H) because (G) and (H) are 
not synonymous, since one gives rise to scope ambiguity while the other does not. 
The first point to make here is that, once again, we seem to be faced with a 
question-begging argument, because zf names are synonymous with definite 
descriptions then they surely would not behave differently in modal contexts. The 
‘Scope‘ argument seems to be assuming that names are not synonymous with 
descriptions in order to show that they behave differently in modal contexts - and 
this will not do. 
Probably the most common way of arguing against the ‘Scope‘ argument is to 
point out that proper names are normally taken to have wide scope with respect to 
modal operators (E.g. Loar, 1976, p373); or, at least, we could adopt a convention to 
this effect (E.g. McCulloch, 1989, pl10, l l l ;  and Dummett, 1973, pl15). Such a 
scope convention would explain why (G) does not induce scope ambiguity while 
(H) does. Of course we could question the legitimacy of such a convention which 
may seem like a merely ad hoc manoeuvre designed to avoid the conclusion that 
names and descriptions have different semantic properties. In any case, if 
descriptions are not also subject to the same convention, then they would behave 
differently in modal contexts. 
Actually the convention may not be necessary at all, if we consider that one of the 
‘choices‘ (H*) is actually logically absurd. We could reject this as a genuine way of 
reading (H). If someone wants to object that (H*) is a perfectly legitimate 
formaZ reading of (H), then we could dispense with formalization and express the 
alleged scope ambiguity in natural language. We can certainly do this if the 
formalization depends on our accepting Russell’ s Theory of Descriptions. Russell’ s 
theory can easily be dispensed with. (See Strawson, 1950; Donnellan, 1966). If we 
take a non-formal view of (H) along the lines of 
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(hl) The philosopher who did such-and-such might not have done 
(h2) It might have been thecase that the philosopherwhodid 
such-and-such did not do such-and-such 
(hl) is clearly true, while (h2) can easily be regarded as false. It need not be 
regarded as false, but if it is then it is not only false but absurd, so how can it be one 
of the choices which renders (H) ambiguous? At any rate, I think it false that (H) is 
any more ambiguous than (G). If it makes sense to say that Socrates might not have 
drunk the hemlock, it surely makes just as much sense to say that the philosopher 
who drank the hemlock might not have done so. Marcus is just wrong when she 
claims that we need a way of sorting a thing from its properties in order to make 
sense of the possibility of its not having this or that property. It makes perfect sense 
to say that The F might not have been The F. It is also not true that we need the 
notion of rigidity in order to reason counterfactually. If we want to say that Aristotle 
might not have been the teacher of Alexander all we have to say is that if anyone 
was the teacher of Alexander, or if anyone has ever been anyone’s teacher, then such 
a person might not have been a teacher. We make sense of possibility here without 
the use of rigid designators - or even proper names come to that. 
If this is not accepted then we are back with the problem of scope conventions for 
proper names. Dummett not only accepts that names can be regarded in this way, 
but he also makes the claim (0p.Cit. p115) that Frege could be interpreted as 
holding the view that definite descriptions can also be regarded as taking wide scope 
with respect to modal operators (although Frege, of course, was not concerned with 
modality). Dummett fwrther argues that some proper names at least can induce this 
same de re/de dicto ambiguity (Ibid.). Such a name could be ‘St. Anne’, for 
example. Linsky adds the name ‘Homer‘ as a possible candidate for the scope 
phenomenon. On page 56 of his (1977) Linsky deals with the ‘Homer‘ example by 
claiming that, since all we know about Homer is that, if he existed, he is the author 
of The Iliad and The Odyssey, we cannot make sense of the possibility that he 
might have existed and not been an author. According to Linsky, this would make 
the statement 
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(I) Necessarily, Homer was an author 
interpreted de dicto, compatible with 
(J) Possibly, Homer was not an author 
interpreted de re. If this is accepted then ‘Homer‘ cannot be a rigid designator 
because, to say that Homer might not have been an author is to say both that there is 
a possible world where Homer is not an author ((J) taken de re), and also where 
‘Homer is an author‘ is true ((I) taken de dicto). This presents serious problems for 
Kripke if it can be maintained, since his claim to rigidity is just equivalent, in 
Linsky’s view, to the claim that proper names cannot induce the de dicto/de re 
ambiguity. 
Linsky wants to defend the rigidity thesis against Dummett’s claim that some 
proper names induce scope ambiguities by first of all claiming that, formally, there 
is no reason why definite descriptions cannot be regarded as rigid as well as non- 
rigid. If this is so, then there will be interpretations of 
(K) Necessarily, Homer = Homer 
and 
(L) Homer # Homer 
such that (K) is false and (L) true. That is: 
Necessarily, The author of the Iliad ( taken rigidly) = The author of The 
Iliad (taken non-rigidly) 
The author of The Iliad (taken rigidly) # The author of The Iliad (taken 
non-rigid1 y ) 
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(K*) is one interpretation of (K), and is false, making (K) false on one 
interpretation; while (L*) is an interpretation of (L) which is true, making (L) true 
on one interpretation. This reduces to absurdity the claim that ‘Homer‘ is equivalent 
to a definite description. 
So Linsky claims to have saved the rigidity thesis from Dummett’s charge that 
some proper names induce scope ambiguities, but only if we accept that we can 
rigidify descriptions in the way Linsky claims. Actually, Linsky ’s argument also 
relies on this special example of the statement ‘Homer = Homer’. If this statement 
says that Homer is self-identical then it cannot induce any kind of ambiguity in 
modal contexts because it will be unambiguously necessarily true that Homer is self- 
identical whether we take ‘Homer’ to abbreviate a description or not. If it is a 
necessary truth that Homer is self-identical, then it is also a necessary truth that the 
author of the Iliad is self-identical, whether this description is taken referentially, 
attributively, rigidly or non-rigidly, or whatever. Linsky ’ s argument seems to rely 
on distinguishing between the statements ‘Homer = Homer‘ and ‘Homer is self- 
identical‘, and there is surely no such distinction. Of course Kripke has no need of 
such manoeuvres since he would simply reject the claim that there is any sense 
whatsoever in which it is necessary that Homer is an author. 
The argument in terms of scope distinction in modal contexts does not impress 
Kripke’s critics. It seems to reduce to an illicit shift of scope between names and 
descriptions. That is, names are always given large scope with respect to modal 
operators, while descriptions are given a small scope reading. If descriptions were 
given a large scope reading as in “The F might not have been The F”, they would 
behave in the same way as proper names. 
Now whether Kripke recognises this or not, he seeks to avoid any criticism about 
scope distinctions by simply denying that his position can be reduced to a scope 
argument. This he does in the preface of the 1980 edition of Naming and Necessity, 
where he claims that the scope argument is a misrepresentation of his argument 
(1980, pl  1). He seeks to illustrate this with the following examples: 
(i) Aristotle was fond of dogs 
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(ii) The greatest philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs. 
(i) and (ii) are, what Kripke calls ‘simple‘ sentences - i.e. they do not involve modal 
operators - so there is no room for scope distinctions. The doctrine of rigidity is not 
one about scope conventions in modal contexts. Rather it is a doctrine about “the 
truth conditions with respect to counterfactual situations of (the propositions 
expressed by ) all sentences, including simple sentences” (Ibid. p12). So once again 
Kripke appeals to the type of access we have to possible worlds. No-one other than 
Aristotle himself will do if we are to consider the possibility that Aristotle was fond 
of dogs. Whereas, if we consider a possible situation where the last great 
philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs, we could be talking about someone other 
than Aristotle. ‘Aristotle’ is therefore rigid, while ‘the last great philosopher of 
antiquity‘ is non-rigid. So even if the modal argument in terms of scope distinctions 
does not work, Kripke rejects it anyway in favour of his intuitions about how names 
and descriptions give us access to objects in possible worlds; or how names and 
descriptions are to be evaluated with respect to possible worlds. Against this, 
however, we could simply object that this is exactly what the scope argument is 
about - and so it stands. 
There are a couple of points worthy of note here which will take us from the 
modal argument to the semantic argument. First of all, it might be suggested that, if 
a definite description such as ‘The teacher of Alexander‘ were to be used 
referentially, in Donnellan’s sense, it would be just as rigid as the name ‘Aristotle‘. 
Kripke would reject this for two reasons. First of all, a name cannot be synonymous 
with a referential use of a definite description because, if we ever discovered that, 
say, Aristotle did not teach Alexander, we would withdraw the description but we 
would not withdraw the name (1980, p87n). Secondly, Kripke rejects Donnellan’s 
distinction altogether. At least he does not accept that it is a genuine semantic 
distinction. (See 1980, p87n; and Kripke, 1977). If it is any kind of distinction, then 
it is a purely pragmatic one, in Kripke’s view. (He further argues, in his 1977, that 
proper names can exhibit a similar distinction to the referentiaVattributive 
distinction for descriptions). This raises the question of whether Kripke’s thesis is 
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really a semantic one, as he claims, or whether he is trading on pragmatic features of 
language use which are irrelevant to the semantics of proper names. 
The second point we could take issue with is Kripke’s qualification of his 
‘Aristotle‘ example (1980, p8,9). Kripke wants to be clear that, in this example, he 
is assuming a certain reading of (i) in order to recognise that there are, or could be, 
other people called ‘Aristotle‘. This is a relatively minor qualification for Kripke, 
not least because, according to Kripke, the classical description theorist makes the 
same assumption (Ibid.) 
The two points just raised are taken up by Bach (1987) where he argues both that 
Kripke is confusing semantics with pragmatics, and that this ‘minor qualification‘ is 
far from minor. In fact, according to Bach, Kripke’s ‘assumed‘ reading of a 
statement like (i) is a major qualification which actually exposes the rigidity thesis 
as illusory (0p.Cit. p167 -171). In Bach’s view there is nothing in the semantics of a 
name like ‘Aristotle‘ which tells us who it refers to - whether it be the philosopher 
or someone else with the same name. Kripke has, therefore, ‘built in’ to this 
example the fact that ‘Aristotle’ is being used to refer to the philosopher rather than, 
say, the shipping magnate. This relativizing of the rigidity thesis to uses of a name 
serves only to trivialise it. On pl69 Bach contends that “..the name ‘Aristotle‘ seems 
rigid only because its use to refer to a certain individual is fixed before the question 
of its rigidity is raised ...( This is what Kripke often calls (1980, e.g. p57) ‘using the 
description to fix the referent)”. Furthermore, the rigidity thesis is not even a 
semantic theory. It is merely a pragmatic theory about the use of proper names to 
refer. 
Bach seems to have a point here. There does seem to be some confusion in Kripke 
as to whether his thesis is semantic or pragmatic. Although he himself is quite clear 
that he is dealing with the semantics of ordinary proper names, at least in his 
negative thesis, his positive thesis, the so-called ‘Causal Theory’ is more of a 
pragmatic theory of how proper names acquire their reference and how they are 
subsequently used to refer. Bach also seems to be on to something when he argues 
that the use of a name to refer is fixed before the question of its rigidity is raised. 
This is borne out by something Kripke says on p14 of h is  (1980). When considering 
the possibility of introducing a name into a language as a rigid designator he writes: 
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“Let ‘a’ (rigidly) designate the unique object that actually has property F, when 
talking about any situation, actual or counterfactual.” The key phrase here is 
‘actually has’ because if we take the name ‘Aristotle‘, for example, and introduce it 
into a language as a rigid designator of Aristotle, using the description ‘The teacher 
of Alexander‘ to fix its reference as the object which actually has this property, then 
we must already have access to Aristotle before the name can be introduced in this 
way; otherwise we would not know who it is that ‘actually has ‘ this property. When 
Kripke talks about using a definite description in this way to fix a reference he is not 
using it attributively (nor referentially). He does not want the name ‘Aristotle‘ to 
designate just whoever happens to have this property, but Aristotle himself. But this 
is where the use of the name is fixed as a name of a certain person before the 
question of its rigidity is raised. 
Even if this foregoing is accepted, however, Kripke could reply that it only 
applies to cases where we do in fact introduce names into a language by means of a 
reference-fixing description. He later argues that there is no need to do this (1980, 
p59). (How reference is actually fixed is part of Kripke’s positive thesis). However 
reference is fixed, though, Kripke does seem to have a problem with the apparently 
innocuous fact that many names have multiple bearers. Kripke’s assumed reading of 
(i) does seem to have built into it the fact that we are dealing with one ‘Aristotle‘ 
rather than another. Seen in this way, Bach’s diagnosis of the illusion of rigidity 
seems to be correct. (We shall see, however, that Bach himself has difficulties with 
the fact that names can have more than one bearer). 
It would seem that the only theory that can adequately deal with the problem of 
names with multiple bearers is the orthodox description theory whereby names have 
a descriptive sense. Bach would reject such a claim, however. Although he 
advocates a description theory, it is no orthodox theory. Along with Jerrold Katz (in 
Boolos, Ed. 1990, and Katz, 1994) and William Kneale (in Nagel, Suppes and 
Tarski, 1962) Bach is an advocate of what we could call the ‘Meta-linguistic 
Description Theory‘ (MDT) whereby a name ‘N‘ has the sense of “The bearer of 
‘N’”; or, as Katz puts it, “The contextually definite thing that is a bearer of ‘N”’ 
(1994, p14). According to Bach et.al., if the sense of a proper name is given in this 
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way, not only can we avoid Kripke’s arguments against the orthodox theory, we can 
also solve the problems of reference. Such a bold claim is worthy of investigation. 
Kripke in fact deals with one version of MDT in his (1980) - that of Kneale (p 68- 
70). According to Kripke, Kneale’s theory is circular, as well as being open to the 
modal objection, since Kneale uses the predicate ‘call‘ rather than ‘bear‘. If we take, 
for example, the name ‘Socrates‘, then Kneale would give it the sense of 
“The man called ‘ Socrates”’ 
Now obviously Socrates might not have been called ‘Socrates‘, so the modal 
objection would apply. Furthermore, Kripke accuses Kneale of offering no theory of 
reference at all. This is the circularity objection which goes as follows. 
“Someone uses the name ‘Socrates‘. How are we supposed to know to whom 
he refers? By giving the description which gives the sense of it ....’ the man 
called ‘Socrates‘ .... We ask, to whom does he refer by ‘Socrates‘? And then the 
answer is given, ‘Well he refers to the man to whom he refers’. If this were all 
there was to the meaning of a proper name, then no reference would get off the 
ground at all” (1 980, p70) 
Bach’s (and Katz’) reply is simply to deny that MDT is a theory of reference at all. 
It is a theory of the meaning (sense) of proper names and not a theory about their use 
to refer (Bach, 1987, p160; Katz, in Boolos, 1990, p40). As Katz puts it in his (1994, 
p9): although sense is necessary for reference, since referential uses begin with 
knowledge of sense, sense does not determine reference. The problems of reference 
are thus easily solved. For example, the problem of a negative existential claim such 
as “Pegasus does not exist”, becomes “The bearer of ‘Pegasus‘ does not exist”. 
Similarly, we can solve Frege’s identity puzzle by pointing out that “Hesperus is 
Hesperus” expresses the analytic and trivial proposition that the thing which is a 
bearer of ‘Hesperus’ is the thing which is a bearer of ‘Hesperus‘; while “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus” expresses the informative and synthetic proposition that the thing 
which is a bearer of ‘Hesperus‘ is the thing which is a bearer of ‘Phosphorus‘. As for 
Kripke’s modal objection to Kneale, both Bach and Katz, while agreeing that 
Socrates might not have been called ‘Socrates‘, contend that things are different if 
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we use the predicate ‘bears’ rather than ‘calls‘. This choice of the predicate ‘bears‘ 
rather than ‘called‘, or ‘is known as ‘ etc. is crucial and fundamental to the success 
of MDT. 
According to Katz (Op.Cit. p39) “Only a theory formulated in terms of the bare 
name relation does not buy into the description theory”. To use a predicate like 
‘call‘, is, according to Katz, to make a further property, that of being called by the 
name in question by members of a certain community, part of the condition for 
something being the bearer of a name (Ibid.). If Bach and Katz are correct about this 
distinction between the predicates ‘bear’ and ‘call‘ then there would seem to be at 
least one version of MDT which would survive Kripke’s criticisms of Kneale. It is 
far from clear, however, that MDT has made this distinction. Katz gives the example 
of orthodox Jews who are not allowed to pronounce the name of God. Nevertheless, 
God is the bearer of this name. He is the bearer of the name even though no-one 
actually calls Him by the name. This will surely not stand up. If God is never known 
by the name (presumably, ‘Jehovah‘), he surely does not bear the name. Or if He 
does bear the name, it is only because there are people in the world who actuaZZy 
use the name. These people keep the name alive, as it were. We could certainly 
make a case for saying that an object does not bear a name unless the name is 
actually used from time to time. The fact is that MDT simply does not say what ‘the 
bare name relation‘ consists in. It relies on this crucial distinction between the 
predicate ‘bear‘ and other predicates such as ‘called‘ or ‘is known as ‘, but it does 
not make clear what the difference is between them. This is a major flaw in the 
theory. (Even if the ‘Jehovah‘ example did work it would not show that we can 
make the relevant distinction, in general. Bearing a name would seem to be every 
bit as contingent a property of objects as being called by a name). 
One obvious criticism of MDT is that it cannot deal with names with multiple 
bearers; a charge made against DRT by Bach and Katz, as we have seen. After all, if 
the name ‘John Smith’ has many bearers, how are we to know who is being referred 
to if the only sense the name can supply is “The bearer of ‘John Smith’”? Even if 
the sense is “The contextually definite thing which is a bearer of ‘John Smith‘” it is 
difficult to see how this context does not give a sense to the name in terms of 
definite descriptions, since the context is indispensable to the actual functioning of 
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the names in these sorts of cases. It is a curious feature of MDT that it wants to 
make a rigid distinction between semantics and pragmatics - something that could 
be seriously questioned - especially if we regard meaning as use. 
Bach says something very strange about names with multiple bearers in belief 
contexts, in (1987, p166). He says that when ‘N‘ has many bearers, the description 
“the bearer of ‘N”’ is incomplete, but can be completed in the following way: 
S believes that the bearer of ‘N’ WHO/WHICH is F is G 
In such cases MDT seems to require something more than a meta-linguistic sense 
when dealing with names with multiple bearers, which is as we should expect. Bach 
really gives the game away here when he admits that the meta-linguistic sense is 
incomplete in these cases and must be augmented in some way. How can he be 
giving a theory of sense for proper names if the senses are very often incomplete? 
Furthermore, on p160 of his (1987), Bach seems to again appeal to information 
other than the meta-linguistic information that ‘N‘ has the sense of “the bearer of 
‘N‘”. In dealing with Kripke’s circularity objection he considers the example of 
someone uttering ‘Socrates drank hemlock‘. The circularity objection would 
contend that the speaker is stating nothing more than that the man he is referring to 
drank hemlock. (Actually he is not even saying that, since Socrates could be a 
woman for all we know). Bach replies that MDT allows that the speaker is doing 
more than that. On pl60 - 16 1 he says: 
“After all, there is information on which the speaker expects the hearer to rely 
in order to identifl the individual being referred to. If the sentence is 
semantically equivalent to ‘The bearer of “Socrates” drank hemlock’ ... the 
hearer can infer the name of the intended referent (It is mutually believed that 
the relevant bearer of this name is an ancient Greek philosopher). Thus the 
speaker intends, and can reasonably expect the hearer to infer that he intends, 
to be stating that the ancient Greek philosopher bearing the name ‘Socrates‘ 
drank hemlock. Of course not all the relevant information is built into the 
meaning of the name, but MDT does not require that it should be.” 
Now it seems to me that it is simply not the case, or not necessarily the case, that the 
relevant bearer of the name ‘Socrates’ is a Greek philosopher, rather than a Brazilian 
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footballer. If the intended bearer of the name is determined by the context of the 
discussion, then it is this context, which would be given in terms of descriptions, 
which would give the sense of the name and not simply “the bearer of ‘Socrates”’. 
Bach and Katz would deny this of course. They would contend that any contextual 
information which determines reference is purely a pragmatic feature of particular 
uses of tokens of names. MDT is a semantic theory only, and does not give any 
explanation of uses to refer. 
Be that as it may, it seems that MDT is useless in dealing with names with 
multiple bearers, as well as the circularity objection, without these allegedly 
pragmatic features. MDT is really irrelevant as a theory of the sense of names if it 
wants to divorce itself altogether from the determining of reference. When Katz 
(1 994, pl0) claims that a meta-linguistic sense is necessary (though not sufficient) 
for reference, it could be that it is only necessary in the sense that it is simply taken 
for granted. 
MDT is no rival to the orthodox Fregean theory, or the cluster theory, because of 
its refusal to deal with reference. It attempts to win the game by not really taking 
part, or by creating a game within a game. It claims to be able to solve the problems 
of reference, but any theory that deals only in sense can only solve the problems of 
reference by denying that they are problems of reference at all. This would not seem 
to be the case. MDT cannot make the crucial distinction between bearing a name 
and being actually referred to by the name. Neither can it deal with the problem of 
names with multiple bearers without smuggling in something like a non meta- 
linguistic sense without which the name could not function. 
As well as the foregoing there is one important fault with MDT, and that is that it 
does not give the sense of a name in terms of what speakers understand by the 
name. Now there may be problems with what speakers understand by a name; the 
main one being that different speakers may understand different things by the same 
name. Nevertheless, it seems perfectly reasonable to suggest that the sense of a 
proper name is just what speakers understand by it; or what they ‘grasp‘ when they 
understand the name - or a sentence which contains the name. Seen in this light, 
MDT is hopelessly inadequate as a theory of sense because no-one would ever 
understand a name like ‘Socrates’ as “The bearer of ‘Socrates”’. That is just not the 
39 
sense of that name for speakers of the language. Something more is needed 
otherwise the name could not be used by anyone. This is certainly true in the general 
case. 
The Semantic Argument 
We come now to the last of Kripke’s main arguments against the Description 
Theory - the Semantic Argument; also known as ‘The Argument from Ignorance 
and Error‘ (Bach, 1987, Op. Cit., p157). The Semantic Argument is regarded by 
many as the most persuasive of the arguments proffered by DRT, and is by no 
means to be attributed solely to Kripke. One of the best known examples of the 
argument comes from Donnellan (1972). It concerns the sense of the name ‘Thales‘, 
which is usually taken to be something like ‘The Greek philosopher who held that 
all is water‘. Now, the argument goes, suppose there never was a Greek philosopher 
who held this view. Alternatively, suppose our use of the name ‘Thales‘ stems from 
a well-digger called ‘Thales‘ who was taken out of context and never actually held 
such a view. Suppose hrther that there was a philosopher living at the same time as 
the well-digger who did hold this view, although he had no connection whatsoever 
with the well-digger. The crucial question for the description theory is “To whom 
would we be referring when we use the name ‘Thales‘?” In the former case where 
no-one held the view that all is water, the Fregean seems to be committed to saying 
that the name ‘Thales‘ does not refer to anyone; while in the latter case the Fregean 
seems committed to the view that ‘Thales‘ refers to the philosopher with whom we 
have no connection, and not to the well-digger from whom our use of the name 
derives. The case against the description theory is compounded by Kripke’s famous 
‘Godel/Schmidt’ example from Naming and Necessity. Kripke asks us to imagine 
that the Incompleteness Theorem was in fact discovered by the unknown Schmidt, 
and not Godel, who simply took the credit for the discovery. Now if the Fregean is 
correct in saying that the name ‘Godel‘ refers to whoever satisfies the description 
which gives the name its sense, then, in this case, ‘Godel‘ should refer to Schmidt. 
When we say that Godel proved Incompleteness, we are not saying something false 
of Godel, but something true of Schmidt. Now this is just not the case, according to 
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Kripke et. al. When we use a name like ‘Thales‘ or ‘Godel‘ we refer directly to the 
person with whom our use of the name has some connection. The name ‘Godel‘ 
always refers to Godel, never to Schmidt, or to anyone who happens to fit a certain 
description (Kripke, 1980, p84: also Salmon, 1981, p29,30). The same goes for the 
name ‘Thales‘. It refers to the well-digger, if that is the source of our use of the 
name, and not to whoever happens to fit the description. This represents a Reductio 
ad Absurdum of the Description Theory. 
Now DRT seems to have a point here. A name 1ike’Godel‘ surely does not refer 
to whoever happens to have done a certain thing. If it is to count as a genuine name 
it must refer to Godel - that very person. And this must be the case for any theory of 
naming - any theory which is a theory of the reference of proper names and not just 
their sense. So what, then, must the Fregean concede to DRT at this point? It seems 
that he must concede that the sense of a proper name is not given by a definite 
description used attributively. The obvious question now is “Can a proper name 
have a sense given by a referential use of a definite description, which determines 
reference regardless of actual fit?” Kripke does consider such a possibility (1 980, 
p87n; ) but, as we have already seen, he rejects it on the grounds that, if we 
discovered that the description did not fit the object, we would withdraw the 
description, but not the name (1 980, Ibid.). The name is therefore not synonymous 
with the description. 
Of course Kripke is quite correct when he claims that we would withdraw this 
false description. What he fails to notice, however, is that, a soon as we have done 
this, we would immediately replace it with another description - something like 
‘The man who pretended to prove Incompleteness‘; or ‘The man who claimed to 
have etc...‘; or,’ The man who was formerly believed to have etc ...‘ It could be that 
the ‘Godel‘ argument merely shows is that we could be mistaken about the meaning 
of a proper name; not that names do not have any meaning. Once we discover our 
mistake we have the true sense of the name . So Kripke cannot shake off 
descriptions so easily. (We shall see later that he cannot shake them off at all. 
Names simply cannot fimction without descriptions). He may have shown that 
names are not synonymous with attributively used descriptions, but he has not 
succeeded in refuting the referential use. Of course, if we switch fiom the attributive 
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to the referential sense of definite descriptions, the sense of proper names will be 
very different from that posited by Frege. 
Not all commentators, however, accept that the attributive use should be 
abandoned. As we have already seen, Linsky (1977) has the opposite intuition from 
Kripke; at least regarding names whose sense can only be given by a single 
description - e.g. ‘St.Anne‘, or ‘Homer‘ (Op. Cit. p56). Linsky makes the point that 
if Homer exists, then he can only be the author of The Odyssey and The Iliad. This 
description exhausts our information about Homer, and we can make no sense of the 
claim that Homer might have existed and not been an author. This of course, is just 
the sort of claim that DRT would reject. Kripke would claim that it makes perfect 
sense de re to say that Homer might have existed and not been an author; although 
we could question this claim on the grounds that one of things at stake in this debate 
is whether it makes sense to talk or think de re at all. DRT simply takes it for 
granted. 
Clearly we have a clash of intuitions here, a clash which takes us to the heart of 
the question of whether names refer directly or indirectly. If Kripke’s intuition 
seems stronger than Linsky’s we can strengthen Linsky’s case by reformulating his 
‘Homer‘ example in the same way as the ‘Thales‘ and ‘Godel‘ examples. That is, we 
can ask whether we could be mistaken in thinking that Homer was an author of 
certain works, or whether we could actually discover that Homer did not do these 
things. Now it seems to me that the only way in which we could discover that 
Homer did not do such and such would be if we had access to Homer which was 
independent of the description ‘The man who did such and such’, and this is 
something we do not have in this case; or indeed in many other cases of names 
which have the sense of a single description. (We could of course discover that the 
author of the Iliad was never called ‘Homer‘ by his contemporaries, but that would 
be irrelevant). So it seems that some names, at least, are immune to the Semantic 
argument, and could be said to have the sense of a definite description used 
attributively. 
Of course there are examples of single description names where we could easily 
discover that the description did not fit the object it is supposed to fit. One obvious 
example is the name ‘Godel‘, but this is because we know who Godel is 
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independently of the description ‘The man who proved Incompleteness‘, or indeed 
of any one description. The situation is different with a name like ‘Thales‘ because 
if no-one held the view that all is water, then we could not discover that this 
description did not fit Thales. If this description is the only thing we know about 
Thales, then to discover that it fits no-one would lead us to conclude that Thales did 
not exist. 
This contrasts strongly with an argument put forward by Grayling (1982), where 
he says the following: 
Now suppose that Thales was a well-digger and not a philosopher ... Does the 
fact that he fails to fit the description ‘The philosopher who held that the arche 
is water’ mean that we are not talking about Thales? On the contrary. I t  only 
makes sense to say that a description fits or fails to fit ... something if we can 
refer independently of descriptions; otherwise we should be obliged to say that 
if Thales does not fit the descriptions of him, he would not have existed. 
(P 1 82) 
For Grayling, this way of arguing is a consequence of Donnellan’s work on the 
referentiaVattributive distinction and is a neat summary of the Semantic Argument. 
It also serves to highlight everything that is wrong with the Semantic Argument. 
To begin with, it is just not true that we must be able to refer independently of 
any descriptions in order to determine whether a particular description, say, ‘The F‘, 
fits an object. We only need to refer independently of ‘The F‘. We could refer using 
‘The G‘, or ‘The H‘. Secondly, suppose the name ‘Moses‘, for example, is taken to 
abbreviate the description ‘The leader of the Exodus‘, then we could discover that 
there never was an Exodus, and hence discover that Moses was not the leader of the 
Exodus, without referring to Moses in any way. This would be the type of situation 
where the Description theory would conclude that Moses did not exist. 
The third point involves a denial of this existential conclusion by DRT. Grayling 
is quite clear (and so is Kripke and Donnellan) that we should not conclude that 
Thales did not exist just because he does not fit a certain description. Thales after all 
could have been a well-digger about whom a false tradition arose. Now this may 
seem obviously true, but actually it is far from obvious. After all, who are we talking 
about when we say that Thales could have been this or that? Kripke would say that it 
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is the person we are connected to by a chain of communication. This is all very well, 
but how do we know that we are connected to anyone? If none of our descriptions 
fit anyone then it would become doubthl whether we were connected to anyone by 
a certain name. Thales may have been a well-digger or he may not have existed at 
all. We simply do not know. The way in which Grayling constructs his example 
simply begs the question against the Description theory because it is built into the 
example that the name Thales refers to a certain person. rfwe suppose that Thales 
was a well-digger then of course we are referring to Thales when we use the name 
(even though he fails to fit the description in question) but the point is that it is far 
from clear that we can do this. Similarly, when Grayling says that we must be able 
to refer independently of descriptions otherwise we would have to conclude that 
Thales did not exist because he fails to fit a certain description, he is again begging 
the question by more or less stipulating that we are referring to Thales, when we 
may not be referring to anyone. Of course if we discover that Thales did not do such 
and such then the name refers to Thales. But this is not what we do in these cases 
where we only have one description. The only way we can discover that Thales is 
not ‘The F‘ is if we can refer using another description, such as ‘The G’, which 
would then give the sense of ‘Thales‘. 
Kripke is guilty of the same question-begging conhsion in his ‘Moses’ example 
(1980, p58-59) where he is dealing with a whole set of descriptions rather than a 
single one. Kripke wants to argue that, not only can we reasonably suppose that 
there is some possible world where Moses does not do any of the things commonly 
attributed to him, but also that we could be mistaken about these things, and could 
discover that we are mistaken. On p58 he is again concerned with the distinction 
between descriptions which give a synonym and those which merely fix a reference: 
“If ‘Moses‘ means ‘the man who did such and such, then if no one did such 
and such, Moses didn’t exist; ... But if the description is used to fix a reference 
rigidly, then ... that is not what is meant by ‘Moses didn’t exist’, because we 
can ask ... of a counterfactual case where no one did indeed do such and 
such ... does it follow in such a situation Moses wouldn’t have existed” 
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Kripke answers his question in the negative because “...surely Moses might have 
just decided to spend his days more pleasantly in the Egyptian courts”(1bid.) Now 
again this may seem obviously true, and so the name ‘Moses‘ cannot be 
synonymous with any descriptions, but, again, it is not so obvious upon closer 
examination. If Kripke is correct when he says that Moses might have spent his days 
in the Egyptian courts and not done any of the things commonly attributed to him, 
then at least part of the Moses story must be true - the part which tells of his 
upbringing in the Egyptian court. So we have at least one non-trivial description 
which could give the sense of ‘Moses‘. Of course we could be mistaken in believing 
that Moses (i.e. the man who was brought up as a prince in the Egyptian court) did 
most of the things commonly attributed to him, but in order to be able to make sense 
of this possibility it seems that we require at least one description which gives us 
‘access‘ to Moses. The key question now is ‘Could we discover that even this 
description is false of Moses?’. For the Description theorist the answer must be a 
clear ‘No!‘ because we cannot make sense of the fact that Moses existed and did 
none of the things commonly attributed to him. DRT would of course answer 
affirmatively. 
Once again we have the clash of intuitions, and once again DRT seems to have 
the obviously true one. However, it is actually the Description Theory that is nearer 
the truth here; although it is not quite correct if it holds that Moses definitely did not 
exist if it turns out that none of these descriptions fit anyone. What the Description 
Theory should say is that, if we could be mistaken about all of these descriptions, or 
if we actually discovered that no-one fits any of them, then the question of the 
existence or non-existence of Moses becomes meaningzess. The onus is then on 
DRT to explain how the question could be meaningful. 
Despite the apparent intuitive correctness of the Semantic Argument against the 
Description Theory it is far fiom convincing in the type of examples just considered. 
In fact it is confused over the existence question. This confusion can be traced to 
Kripke’s original example of the name ‘Godel‘, where he argues that we obviously 
would still use the name ‘Godel‘ as a name of Godel even if the description we 
associate with the name fit someone else, or no one. Now this is undoubtedly true, 
but this is because with Godel we are in a completely different situation fiom the 
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‘Moses‘ or ‘Thales’ examples. The difference is that we know that Godel existed 
independently of the sort of descriptions normally taken to be the sense of the name. 
We can simply point to Godel, or to a photograph of him, and say “That is Godel. 
That is the man we believe to have done such and such, but who might not have 
done, and about whom we could yet discover that we were mistaken.” The same 
goes for Kripke’s other example of Nixon. We have a completely different access to 
these people than we do with Thales, or Homer, or Moses, or a whole host of others. 
So of course if we discover that Godel did not do such and such, the name ‘Godel‘ 
still refers to Godel, and not to whoever fits the description. (Godel is that man, or 
the man in the photograph). And of course we would not conclude that Godel did 
not exist if it turned out that no-one did such and such because we have an 
independent access to Godel. (Kripke probably knew him personally!) Kripke seems 
to take this one example and generalise to all names - which is premature, to say the 
least. It may even be downright reckless. 
So we have names of objects whose existence is not in doubt (Godel, Nixon etc.); 
names of objects whose existence is doubtful (Thales, Homer etc.) and ‘names‘ 
which purport to name objects which definitely do not exist (Pegasus, Zeus etc.) 
These latter are easily dealt with, as already mentioned. They are simply not genuine 
names since they do not name anything. Names which purport to name objects of 
doubtful existence are synonymous with definite descriptions used attributively. At 
least, they can survive the Semantic Argument. It makes no sense to say that we 
could be mistaken in believing that Thales did not do such and such since we have 
no idea who Thales is independently of a certain description. If we want to argue 
that we could be mistaken in thinking that the man Aristotle was referring to with 
the name ‘Thales‘ did not do such and such, then our access to Thales is still via a 
description (even if Aristotle had a different access to Thales ). However, if we do 
conclude that in these cases names are synonymous with a definite description, it 
seems that we cannot conclude that this description determines reference if it is 
doubtful whether there is a reference. In the case of a name like ‘Thales’ we cannot 
talk about referring, either directly or indirectly. In the case of names like ‘Nixon‘ 
which refer to objects whose existence is not in doubt, we do seem to have a direct 
access to these objects. In answer to the question ‘Who is Nixon?‘ we need not give 
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a description. We could simply point to Nixon, or to a photograph of him, and say 
‘That is Nixon’. But note, it is not the name ‘Nixon‘ that gives us this direct access. 
Rather, it is the demonstrative ‘that‘ which does all the work. Instead of saying 
‘Nixon did such and such’ we could say ‘That man did such and such’. Now 
demonstratives are undoubtedly rigid because they are direct designators, but their 
reference is also context-dependent, and so they would not be of any real use to 
Kripke in trying to establish the existence of necessary a posteriori truths. 
The Semantic Argument has not succeeded in showing that proper names are not 
synonymous with definite descriptions. Kripke has not succeeded in refuting the 
referential use of descriptions; or even the attributive use, if the description is 
formulated in the correct way. ‘Godel‘ is not ‘the man who...‘, but ‘the man 
commonly believed to ...‘ It is impossible for the linguistic community as a whole to 
be mistaken about a sense like that (although an individual speaker could be). Thus, 
Kripke’s ‘Godel‘ argument has been defeated; although we are forced to qualify our 
senses in the way just mentioned. If we actually found out that Godel did not do this 
thing then the sense would change to ‘the man formerly believed to have....’; or ‘the 
man who pretended to ...‘ DRT does not allow for this change in meaning; but it 
should be remembered that the meaning of proper names is discovered empirically, 
and so there is always the possibility of mistakes. This possibility does not count 
against the Description Theory, especially if we are careful to formulate the 
description in the right way. And of course there is no possibility of being mistaken 
if the name has the sense of only one description. 
The bottom line for the Semantic Argument is that a statement like 
(*) Godel proved Incompleteness 
cannot be analytic because we can always be mistaken about this ‘fact’. Now of 
course, if this turns out to be false, then ‘Godel‘ cannot be synonymous with the 
description ‘the man who ....‘ But why can we not have a qualified notion of 
analyticity, just as Kripke has a qualified notion of necessity? I.e. (*) is analytic, if 
true, just as Kripke claims that “Water is H20” is necessary, if true? 
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The main criticism of the Semantic Argument, indeed the whole basic claim that 
names are not synonymous with descriptions, is that DRT, and Kripke in particular, 
does not say what is to be understood by ‘meaning’. If, for example, meaning was 
simply to be identified with use; and we could not use a name without associating it 
in some way with a description (which seems to be the case), then that name would 
be synonymous with the description in question - in some sense of ‘synonymous‘. 
Until DRT can tell us what it means by ‘meaning‘ it is on very shaky ground when 
denying that names have a meaning given by a definite description. 
We end the examination of Kripke’s negative thesis with a brief look at his minor 
arguments against the Description Theory. These are: 
1) In many cases there is no single description which gives the sense of the name 
(1980, p30) 
2) Sometimes the speaker cannot give any description which gives the sense of the 
name (Ibid.) 
3) The Inextricability Objection (1 980, p8 1) 
The first objection arises from a passage in Frege (1892) where he highlights a 
looseness in our language whereby a name can have one sense for one group of 
speakers and a different sense for another group. Frege gives the example of the 
name ‘Aristotle‘, which could have the sense of ‘The teacher of Alexander‘ for one 
group and the sense of ‘Plato’s most famous pupil‘ for another. Now from a purely 
semantic point of view, this difference is not important, so long as the reference is 
the same. The only real problem would be if the two groups were to meet in order to 
discuss Aristotle. When one group voices the opinion that Aristotle was a great 
teacher, this may cause confbsion among the other group of speakers who know 
nothing of Aristotle’s teaching experience. This breakdown in communication is 
easily resolved, however. 
Objection 2) is simply not true. Anyone who can actually use a name to say 
something meaningful must be able to give some kind of sense to the name, in 
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terms of descriptions. He must be able to answer the question “Who is ‘N‘?”, in a 
non-trivial way. I.e. he must not simply say “N is the person who bears the name 
‘N‘”; or “N is the person about whom so-and-so was talking”. In Kripke’s 
‘Feynman‘ example (198O,p91) the person who simply hears the name ‘Feynman‘ in 
the market place is in no position to use the name. He is not entitled, for example, 
say something like “Feynman is the man about whom the people in the market were 
talking”, because he does not know who Feynman is - and of course there could be 
more than one Feynman. 
Gareth Evans tries to improve on the ‘Feynman‘ example in his (1 973) where he 
offers the example of a speaker who overhears a conversation in a pub about a man 
named ‘Louis‘. Evans thinks it obvious that the speaker could simply join in the 
conversation and denote Louis without having a sense for the name ‘Louis‘, saying 
things like “What did Louis do then?” or “Louis was quite right to do that” (1 973, in 
Moore Ed.(1993) ~212,213); but this is just a mistake, because the name ‘Louis‘ 
would take on the sense of “The man who did that” (whatever ‘that‘ may be) for the 
speaker. If the speaker has no sense at all for the name ‘Louis‘ he will mention it 
rather than use it, after the manner of “This ‘Louis‘ was quite right to do that”. 
Even if we grant Evans his claim here (and not forgetting his insistence on 
contextual factors in determining reference) could the conversation take place if 
none of the participants had a sense for the name ‘Louis‘? Surely not, since they 
would literally not know who they were talking about. Given this, then, if our 
speaker does denote Louis without having a sense for the name, then his act of 
denoting would be parasitic on the senses associated with the name ‘Louis‘ by the 
other participants. At least someone involved in the conversation must have a sense 
for the name. 
The ‘Feynman‘ and ‘Louis’ examples expose a clear use/mention confusion in 
DRT, at least concerning proper names. This is a serious mistake and arises from the 
failure of DRT, especially Kripke, to say what is understood by a name (More on 
this later). 
Finally, the so-called Inextricability Objection (McCulloch, 1989). This is the 
objection which states that in order to avoid circularity, a name must go on giving 
49 
senses for all the names appearing in descriptions which are taken to be the sense of 
proper names. For example, if we posit ‘The teacher of Alexander‘ as the sense of 
‘Aristotle‘, we still have a name as part of the sense; and so we can ask for the sense 
of ‘Alexander‘. Now we cannot give this as ‘The pupil of Aristotle‘ without 
circularity, so we would have to give some other sense - for example, ‘The son of 
Phillip of Macedon‘. But now we can ask for the sense of ‘Phillip of Macedon‘, and 
so on. We cannot get rid of proper names fiom our senses. 
The first point to make here in defence of the description theory, is that the same 
phenomenon arises for Kripke’s reference-fixing descriptions. If we fix the 
reference of ‘Aristotle‘ using the description ‘The teacher of Alexander‘, we can ask 
how the reference of ‘Alexander‘ is to be fixed, and so on. The solution of the 
problem is the same in both cases - viz, the descriptions will be grounded in some 
kind of ostensive definition. For example, if the description ‘The first man on the 
moon’ is not sufficient to give the sense of the name ‘Neil Armstrong‘ because it 
contains the name ‘moon‘, we end the regress by simply pointing to the moon. Neil 
Armstrong is the first man to set foot on that. Other examples will no doubt be more 
complicated, but the principle will be the same. So the Inextricability Objection 
fails; although once again we are relying on an indexical to effect reference. 
SUMMARY OF NEGATIVE THESIS 
What have we seen so far, then? We have seen that DRT wants to challenge, at a 
fundamental level, what we have called ‘The Description Theory of Proper Names’ 
whereby a name is synonymous with a definite description, or set thereof, used 
attributively, which determines the reference of the name. For DRT this view has 
absurd consequences, especially in connection with what we regard as a priori, 
necessary, and analytic. According to DRT reference is direct, unmediated by 
anything like a sense given by a definite description or a set thereof. In the hands of 
Kripke, proper names not only refer directly, but rigidly, which allows him to 
conclude that there are necessary a posteriori truths as well as contingent a priori 
ones. 
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We have seen, however, that the case for DRT against the description theory is 
nowhere near as convincing as its various advocates claim. First of all, the Modal 
Argument, which Kripke regards as a very important argument, trades on an illicit 
shift of scope. Secondly, the Epistemological Argument, while immune to Linsky ’ s 
criticisms, does not work in the way Kripke claims. Although we do indeed discover 
empirically that Aristotle, for example, taught Alexander, in doing so we also 
discover something about the meaning of the name ‘Aristotle‘- or at least we 
discover information which can become part of the sense of the name. Once we 
know the meaning of the name we are in a position to know certain things a priori - 
for example, that Aristotle was a teacher. Actually we discover the meaning of all 
names empirically; and so, if we know a priori that bachelors are unmarried, it is 
only because we first discovered the meaning of ‘Bachelor‘ empirically. Without 
knowing the meaning of the word ‘bachelor‘, we do not know anything a priori 
about bachelors. The same could be said for ordinary proper names. 
Prima facie, the Semantic argument is more successful than the aforementioned. 
It seems to show that the sense of a proper name cannot be that of a definite 
description used attributively, because if we use a name like ‘Godel‘, we surely do 
not use it as a name for whoever happens to fit a certain description. We use it as a 
name of Godel himself. However, even this argument does not show what DRT 
claims. DRT fails to distinguish between names which purport to refer to objects 
whose existence is doubthl, e.g. ‘Thales‘; and names of those whose existence is 
not in doubt. In the ‘Thales‘ example, we, as a linguistic community, could not be 
mistaken in thinking that Thales is the philosopher who held that all is water unless 
we have another way of gaining access to Thales (apart from that description). This 
we do not have. Grayling’s example simply begs the question against the description 
theory by building into the example that we have an independent means of referring 
to Thales. It makes no sense to say that ‘Thales‘ refers to Thales himself, rather than 
to whoever satisfies a certain description, because we do not know who Thales is 
independently of that description. 
The situation is different with names of objects we know to exist, such as Godel. 
As already mentioned, the name ‘Godel’ does not refer to whoever did such and 
such but to Godel himself. We can of course be mistaken in thinking that Godel is 
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the man who fits this description, unless we change the description to ‘The man 
commonly believed etc.‘ If the sense of ‘Godel‘ is ‘The man commonly believed to 
have done such and such‘, then we, as a linguistic community, cannot be mistaken 
about this, since it is the linguistic community who commonly believe this thing. 
The community can of course be mistaken in thinking that Godel is ‘The F‘; but it 
cannot be mistaken in thinking that it believes that Godel is ‘The F‘. Once we 
discover the truth, the sense of the name would simply be corrected. 
Now Kripke does deal with such a theory of the senses of proper names in 
Naming and Necessity (p88 - 90) and rejects it on the grounds that in giving the 
sense of a name in terms of what is believed to be true of the object named we 
would be violating a non-circularity condition of reference. As he says on page 89: 
All of us in the community are trying to determine the reference by saying 
‘Godel is to be the man to whom the incompleteness of arithmetic is 
commonly attributed‘. None of us will get started with any attribution unless 
there is some independent criterion for the reference of the name other than 
‘the man to whom the incompleteness of arithmetic is commonly attributed‘. 
Otherwise all we will be saying is ‘We attribute this achievement to the man 
to whom we attribute it’, without saying who that man is, without giving any 
independent criterion of the reference, and so the determination will be 
circular. 
Now Kripke certainly seems to have a point here and I am well aware of the need to 
specify exactly what is going on in such a situation, but I will deal with it in chapter 
3 when we deal with the general theory of how it is that proper names and natural 
kind terms actually refer. 
So the Semantic Argument does not work in the way that DRT claims. 
Nevertheless we get the feeling that something about the pure Fregean Description 
Theory must change. If we change the sense of a name from ‘The F‘ to ‘That which 
is commonly believed to be The F’, then we are relying on other speakers in order to 
effect reference. (In chapter 3 we shall see that other speakers are crucial to the way 
in which proper names refer). 
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In addition to the foregoing Kripke claims that we have an intuition of the rigidity 
of proper names. His original intuition seems sound enough. It is that, when talking 
about counterfactual situations where a certain person does not do the things he does 
in the actual world, we are talking, by definition, about that very person, and not 
someone who satisfies a certain description. If, for example, we accept that Nixon 
might not have been a politician, then this only makes sense if we are talking about 
Nixon himself. This is what Kripke means when he says that the trans-world 
identity of individuals is given. However, even if we agree with this, it is not 
obvious that this tells us anything at all about how names refer. In fact this argument 
from counterfactuals may show the opposite of what Kripke wants. For example, 
the counterfactual “Nixon might not have done such and such”, if it is a genuine 
counterfactual, only makes sense if Nixon is in fact the man who did such and such. 
I.e. if it makes sense to talk counterfactually, then we must assume that we are 
dealing with facts. So, for the counterfactual statement to make any sense, it must 
be at least part of the sense of the name ‘Nixon‘ that Nixon is the man who did such 
and such. Furthermore, someone who did not know the sense of the name ‘Nixon‘ 
would grasp the sense, or part of the sense, from this counterfactual. So the 
counterfactual argument could be turned against Kripke in order to argue for the 
opposite position. At any rate, as we have seen, the notion of rigidity is in no way 
essential to the ability to reason counterfactually. Descriptions with wide scope will 
do perfectly well. 
According to Almog, Kripke’s argument tells us nothing about names because he 
starts with the designata rather than the designators which could be designated by 
any name at all. Kripke is begging the question once again. Bach would agree, 
pointing out that the claim to rigidity is illusory. This is because, in the case of 
names with many bearers Kripke has to build into his example the fact that he is 
using the name to refer to one bearer rather than another. This seems correct, 
although Bach’s meta-linguistic thesis fares no better on this point, or indeed on 
many other points, and so is no alternative to DRT. 
So Kripke, and DRT in general, has not succeeded in eliminating descriptions 
from the sense of proper names, or in showing that names are not synonymous with 
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definite descriptions. Neither has he shown that names are rigid designators 
(although they may well be). He has not even succeeded in making the distinction 
between descriptions which give a synonym and those that merely fix reference. 
Actually Kripke may be confked about the very nature of naming if he thinks that 
we fix the reference of a name - however he wants to do it. In truth, we never fix 
the reference of a name. If something is a name for something then its reference 
must already be fixed - otherwise it could not be a name for anything. The reference 
could be fixed ostensively or using a definite description, but something must fix the 
reference of a word if it is to function as a name. This distinction between a word 
and a name is never made in the literature, either by DRT or by Fregeans, but 
actually it is crucial to the understanding of what a name actually is. What we do 
when we name something is take a word or sign and fix its reference in some way. 
This makes the word or sign into a name. It will now have certain semantic 
properties in virtue of its being a name, but the important point here is that this name 
would have remained a mere sign if we had not made it into a name by fixing its 
reference in some way. This means that Kripke can no longer talk about a definite 
description mereZy fixing the reference of a name, because if the description 
performs a reference-fixing role, then it is the description that makes the name into a 
name. Without the description to perform this role, and in the absence of an 
ostensive definition, the so-called ‘name‘ would remain a mere sign, devoid of any 
semantic properties whatsoever. Given this, it is very difficult to see how the 
description is not synonymous with the name since the name would not be a name at 
all without the description. At the very least, the foregoing blurs the distinction 
between descriptions that are synonymous with names and those that merely fix a 
reference. If Kripke cannot maintain this distinction then his claim that there are 
contingent a priori truths collapses. 
It may seem that we can fix the reference of a name in the sense that we can take 
an already existing name, such as ‘Aristotle’ for example, and use it as a name for 
something else - a dog, say. We could fix the reference of ‘Aristotle’ either 
ostensively or using a description such as ‘our new dog’ or ‘the dog we bought this 
morning‘. Either way ‘Aristotle‘ is not a namefor the dog until we do this. As far as 
the dog is concerned ‘Aristotle‘ is not a name until we make it into one. The fact that 
54 
it is already used as a name for something else is irrelevant - and of course we could 
have used any arbitrarily chosen sign as a name for our dog. 
Kripke definitely states at various points in (1 980) that we can fix the reference of 
a name (E.g. p14,57,59). What we actually do is fix the reference of a word, and in 
so doing, make it into a name. We could have made it into a verb or an adjective or 
a preposition. It is entirely up to us. This failure to distinguish between a word and a 
name not only undermines Kripke’s distinction between descriptions that give a 
synonym and those that merely fix reference, it may also indicate that philosophers 
of all persuasions do not really know what a name is. 
DRT has fallen woefully short of its aims as far as the negative thesis is 
concerned, although this may be in part due to the fact that its aims are too 
ambitious. But perhaps all is not lost for DRT. It could be that we will have to look 
again at the sense of proper names given by attributive descriptions; as well as the 
role of indexicals in fixing reference. For example, if we are forced to modify the 
description ‘The first man on the moon‘ as ‘The first man to set foot on that‘, then 
we introduce indexicals into the picture. If we modify the sense to read ‘The man 
commonZy believed to have been the first etc ...‘ then we are relying on other 
speakers in order to effect reference. This would not be a purely Fregean theory. It 




THE POSITIVE THESIS 
DRT is convinced that proper names do not refer by means of senses given by 
definite descriptions. How then, do they refer? This is the concern of Kripke’s 
positive thesis in Naming and Necessity - the so-called ‘Causal Theory of 
Reference‘. According to the causal theory, reference is effected by means of a 
causal chain of communication which leads from our current use of a name all the 
way back to an initial baptism of an actual object. Thus, language is causally 
connected to the world. Kripke gives an outline of the theory on page 91 of Naming 
and Necessity: 
“Someone, let’s say, a baby, is born; his parents call him by a certain name. 
They talk about him to their friends. Other people meet him. Through various 
sorts of talk the name is spread from link to link as if by a chain. A speaker 
who is on the far end of this chain, who has heard about, say Richard 
Feynman, in the market place or elsewhere, may be referring to Richard 
Feynman even though he can’t remember from whom he first heard of 
Feynman or from whom he ever heard of Feynman.” 
The main point about the causal theory is that, not only is reference passed from 
speaker to speaker in a causal chain, thereby giving the speaker a causal connection 
with the referent, but reference is effected by means of this chain, and the causal 
chain alone. No discriminating information is required to be able to refer to, say, 
Feynman. All that is required is that we be exposed to the name. This bare exposure 
is necessary and sufficient for the speaker to be refemng to the referent of the name. 
Not only does this theory apply to proper names, it also, rather surprisingly, 
applies to general terms, such as names for natural kinds. (More of this in chapter 3 
where we shall also look at Putnam’s version of the causal theory). Thus the causal 
theory provides a natural mechanism connecting language to the world. 
The two main features of the causal theory are the initial baptism, where the 
name is first introduced, and the notion of reference borrowing, where the 
reference of the name is passed fiom one speaker to another. On p96 of (1980) 
Kripke further explains the theory thus: 
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“An initial ‘baptism‘ takes place. Here the object may be named by ostension, 
or the reference of the name may be fixed by a description. When the name is 
passed from link to link, the receiver of the name must, I think, intend when 
he learns it to use it with the same reference as the man from whom he heard 
it.” 
Now there is no doubt that something like this happens with most of the names we 
know. That is, we acquire names in something like the way Kripke claims. There 
are, however, serious problems with this hypothesis as a way of explaining how 
reference is effected. The main difficulty is with the notion of reference borrowing 
and the intention to refer to whatever the other speaker is referring to. How exactly 
is this accomplished? I have never consciousZy intended to refer to anything, and I 
wouldn’t know how to anyway. Actually Kripke does say that the intention to refer 
is a given (Ibid. p97); but if it is just given that in acquiring a name we refer to the 
object that the other person is referring to, why do we need to talk about intending to 
refer at all? 
Searle (1983) takes issue with this point, accusing Kripke of introducing an 
Intentional element into the causal theory - something that should not be there in a 
purely extemalist theory. Searle then gives counter-examples to show that the causal 
chain is neither necessary nor sufficient for names to refer (1983, p237, 240). 
Although the alleged counter-examples are ultimately not very satisfying Searle is 
surely correct in claiming that the causal theory should not require this intemalist 
Intentionalist element in order to effect reference. In support of this claim we could 
argue that any intention to refer is actually irrelevant to a causal theory. For 
example, if a name does not refer, then we can intend to refer until we are blue in 
the face, but we will not refer. On the other hand, suppose we intend not to refer 
using a name which actually has a referent, then we will surely refer, due to the 
causal chain. The intention to refer is therefore irrelevant to whether or not we 
actually refer, and yet it is an essential component of the causal theory. 
Another major flaw in Kripke’s theory is the way in which names are actually 
passed from speaker to speaker. Kripke seems to think that it is enough simply to 
mention the name and it has been passed on. But this is not what actually happens. 
We pass on names in certain contexts, along with descriptive information which 
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could give the sense of the name, or could merely have a reference fixing role. 
Whatever the role of this descriptive information it is necessary to the functioning of 
the name. Kripke’s ‘Feynman’ example will simply not work. It is not enough to 
hear the name ‘Feynman’ mentioned in the market place in order to be able to use 
the name to refer to Feynman. This is because it is not enough to refer to someone 
simply to mention the person’s name. We must be able to use the name in a 
sentence, to say something about that person. Now in Kripke’s example, what could 
anyone say about Feynman if all they have is the name? Nothing, surely. The 
speakers in question could not even say that Feynman was the person being talked 
about in the market place because there could be many people called ‘Feynman‘. All 
they are entitled to say is that the people in the market place were talking about 
someone called ‘Feynman‘. They can mention the name but not actually use it to 
refer, because they cannot use it at all. Similarly, if the speaker in question goes to 
the library and asks the librarian if she has any books by or about Feynman the name 
is merely being mentioned rather than used. Kripke’s version of the causal theory is 
too simplistic to be of any use as a theory of how names refer. 
Gareth Evans (1 973; 1982) recognises the inadequacies of Kripke’s rather naive 
version of the causal theory while retaining its basic principle. In his (1973) Evans 
appeals to the body of information the speaker associates with the name, as well as 
causal origin, in order to explain how reference is effected. This causal origin is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for an object to be the intended referent of the 
use of a name (Ibid. p218). Intention to refer is another necessary condition, 
although for Evans, intentions must be ‘manifest‘, which means manifest in the 
community. As he says on p222 of (1 973): 
“Intentions alone don’t bring it about that a name gets a denotation. Without 
the intentions being manifest there cannot be the common knowledge required 
for the practice.” 
Evans’ version of the causal theory is that 
“ ‘NN‘ is a name of x if there is a community C 
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in which it is common knowledge that members of C have in their 
repertoire the procedure of using ‘NN‘ to refer to x (with the intention of 
referring to x)” 
( In Moore, Ed. 1993, p222) 
This development of Kripke’s basic theory, which Evans regards as simplistic, even 
‘magical’, has impressed many. Whether we should be impressed, however, is 
another matter. For instance, what exactly is this ‘procedure of using ‘NN’ to refer 
to x‘? What does it consist in, and how was it established? How does the 
community’s procedure differ from that of the individual? Unless these questions 
can be answered it seems that all Evans has done is shift the problem from how the 
individual refers to how the community refers. And there is still the Intentional 
element which really should not belong in a causal theory. 
Donnellan also attempts to defend a version of the causal theory, but in a different 
way from Evans. He sets out his theory in a paper, “Speaking of Nothing”, in the 
following way: 
“...when a speaker uses a name intending to refer to an individual and 
predicate something of it, successhl reference will occur when there is an 
individual that enters into the historically correct explanation of who it is that 
the speaker intended to predicate something of ” (1 974, pl6) 
In order to explicate the idea of the historically correct explanation Donnellan 
introduces the notion of an omniscient observer who can see the relation between 
the individual and the explanation. For example, our use of ‘Socrates‘ will refer to 
Socrates if an omniscient observer sees an individual related to the author of certain 
dialogues; that one of the characters in the dialogues was modelled on that 
individual, etc., and that the speaker is talking about this individual is explained by 
his having read these dialogues. 
Clearly we cannot know if the omniscient observer is correct about any particular 
name. We cannot know if the historical explanation is correct or, in many cases, 
whether our use of a name really does go all the way back to an actual individual. 
Presumably DRT would argue that we do not need to know these things. I disagree, 
for the following reasons. First of all, any theory of naming is only applicable to 
names; but no theory of naming ever tells us that there are any names. That is, they 
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purport to tell us how names refer but not that they refer. Now we must know this. 
We must know if any putative name really is a name - i.e. really denotes - otherwise 
we do not know whether it is a genuine name or not. If we don’t know whether any 
putative name really is a name there is no point in debating which theory of naming 
is most appropriate to explaining how this ‘name‘ functions. The best that any 
theory of naming could do would be to say that , if ‘NI is a name, then it will 
function in a certain way. Or, if there are any names at all, then they will function in 
a certain way. Now this is not good enough if we want to actually use names: 
especially if we want to be able to conclude anything about the necessary a 
posteriori or the contingent a priori from a theory of naming. Quite simply, we need 
to know of any putative name whether or not it is a genuine naming device - i.e. 
whether or not it actually names anything. 
Now some of our ‘names‘ do not refer to anything - for example, names of 
fictional characters or mythical creatures; but most of our names do in fact refer to 
some actual object and we have various ways of establishing this fact. Most of the 
names we use are of people we know personally or have seen on television or in 
photographs. In these cases we can see that our putative names really do refer. They 
refer to that person there - either in the flesh or in a photographic image. It is as 
though we have our own baptism. 
Now the ironic thing about this way of establishing that our names really do refer 
is that the means by which we establish this actually renders the causal chain 
redundant as a means of explaining how these names refer. Once we are in a 
position to point to the actual referent, or a photograph of one, we no longer require 
the causal chain as a means of determining reference (although we are causally 
connected to the referent). As for ‘names ‘ like ‘Thales‘ or ‘Homer’ or ‘Robin 
Hood’ we simply do not know if they refer, and so it may be that we cannot talk 
about reference here. 
There are many other names, however, where things are not quite so 
straightforward. These are names of objects we cannot point to but nevertheless 
there is little doubt as to their existence. A prime example would be the name ‘Julius 
Caesar‘. We cannot point to Julius Caesar, or to a photograph of him, and yet we are 
in a much stronger position regarding his existence than we are with the likes of 
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Thales or Robin Hood. This is because the existence of Julius Caesar is well 
documented. It is this documentation, given in terms of descriptions, that tells us 
that Julius Caesar existed and that therefore ‘Julius Caesar‘ is a genuine name. Now 
of course this documentation could be passed to us through some kind of chain; 
although a chain as such is not necessary. We could for instance discover a written 
account of Caesar’s life written while he was still alive, and so we go straight to the 
source, as it were. We do not need any long chain of communication. Of course we 
still seem to be causally connected to Caesar in some way, but the point is that it is 
the descriptive information in the document that tells us of Caesar’s existence and 
that effects reference for us - if anything does - but this would not be a causal chain 
since the documentation could pass through the hands of people who did not 
understand a single word of it. The documentation therefore not only tells us that 
‘Julius Caesar‘ refers, it is what effects reference for us. If this documentation is not 
sufficient to effect reference then we will simply have to suspend talk of reference in 
cases of this type. 
The causal chain is redundant as far as referring is concerned. Even if it was not, 
it is very difficult to see how it would actually work. Kripke’s basic theory is 
simplistic, even naive, and Evans and Donnellan are of no help. The notion of 
intending to refer is obscure, unnecessary to a genuine causal theory, and irrelevant 
as far as effecting reference is concerned. 
Kripke may, however, have shown that a causal connection to the referent of a 
name is necessary for reference to take place, if only because a causal connection is 
inevitable; albeit that this connection is established by demonstratives rather than 
ordinary proper names. He has not, of course, shown that this causal connection is 
sufficient. We shall deal with the problem of how reference is actually effected in 
chapter 3. 
In the meantime, the notion of a causal connection between name and referent 
once again raises the problem of what a proper name contributes to the content of a 
sentence which contains it; and it is to this that we finally turn. 
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DRT: A REDUCTIO 
As previously mentioned DRT is on shaky ground when it claims that proper names 
are not synonymous with definite descriptions, unless it can be clear about what is to 
count as meaning. It seems that DRT has only two choices here. Either proper 
names have no meaning at all, or their meaning is given by what they refer to. To 
argue that names refer directly but still have a sense which determines their 
propositional content has not been regarded as an attractive possibility by most 
philosophers. (An notable exception is Evans in his (1982) where he argues that 
direct reference need not rule out sense for proper names). For most direct reference 
theorists, however, there seem to be serious problems when we come to consider 
what a proper name contributes to propositional content. In what follows we shall 
consider the contribution made to content of co-referential proper names in 
epistemic and doxastic contexts, which will lead to a reductio ad absurdum of DRT. 
We begin with an example. Take the following sentences: 
(iii) Hesperus is a planet 
(iv) Phosphorus is a planet 
Now if the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' contribute their referents to the 
content of these sentences then (iii) and (iv) should express the same proposition. It 
seems to follow from this that anyone who knows or believes (iii) also and thereby 
knows or believes (iv), regardless of what they may say to the contrary. At the very 
least this is counterintuitive, given the way we speak. It might even be regarded as 
some kmd of reductio ad absurdum of DRT. 
There are two points to be made here. First of all, the foregoing is not the reductio 
we are aiming at. Secondly, it will be argued by some that not all advocates of DRT 
are committed to the view that anyone who knows or believes (i) knows or believes 
(ii). In a footnote to his (1979) Kripke says that DRT is not committed to the 
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substitution of co-referential terms in epistemic contexts, even if it actually does so 
in modal contexts (1 979, Footnote, 10). This is highly questionable, especially since 
Kripke gives us no account whatsoever of content. His “Puzzle About Belief’, 
however, indicates that even he is aware of the potential for serious problems in this 
area. 
Some advocates of DRT see no problem in accepting the foregoing consequences. 
Fitch (1 976) and Salmon (1986) notably defend the claim that (iii) and (iv) express 
the same proposition, which leads them to conclude that we know a priori truths of 
the form a=b - contrary to Kripke’s claim. It also leads Salmon to embrace the 
seemingly counterintuitive claim that anyone who knows or believes (iii) also 
knows or believes (iv). The Description Theory of course concludes the opposite 
since (iii) and (iv) will express different propositions due to the different senses of 
the two names. 
The reductio of DRT stems from the claim that (iii) and (iv) express the same 
proposition. Assuming this to be so, and assuming that we are acquainted in some 
sense with these propositions, then we would know that the names ‘Hesperus‘ and 
‘Phosphorus‘ must make the same contribution to propositional content. The only 
way in which they can make the same contribution is if they are coreferential; which 
means that their referents would be identical. In other words, DRT is committed to 
the view that we would know that Hesperus is Phosphorus because we know that 
Hesperus is a planet and Phosphorus is a planet - or by reason alone, which is 
absurd. This is a reductio ad absurdum of DRT, so long as we accept that we really 
do know these propositions. 
One way in which DRT might reply is to deny that we are acquainted with these 
propositions - or indeed any propositions containing proper names. This is the view 
of John Tienson in his (1984) where he attempts a reductio of what he calls ‘The 
Sophisticated View‘,( the view that anyone who knows or believes (iii) also and 
thereby knows or believes (iv)), while preserving the basic tenets of DRT. For 
Tienson, it is a consequence of DRT that ordinary proper names are to be regarded 
as something like Russell’s logically proper names because they are direct 
designators. But if this is so then surely we must be acquainted, in some sense, with 
their bearers, and hence the appropriate propositions. Whether we accept that 
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reference is direct or indirect we surely are acquainted, in some sense of the word, 
with the propositions expressed by sentences containing most of the proper names 
we know (Otherwise, how do we know that they do actually express propositions?). 
So the reductio still stands. 
One possible response to such an alleged reductio is to argue that although we are 
acquainted with the singular propositions expressed by sentences such as (iii) and 
(iv) we actually grasp the proposition in two different ways; or under two different 
‘guises‘, as Salmon puts it. For Salmon we need a whole new analysis of the belief 
relation in order to make sense of the Sophisticated View. The traditional binary 
relation in which an agent simply grasps a proposition must be replaced by a ternary 
relation in terms of an agent, a proposition, and a guise under which the proposition 
is grasped (1 986, pl  1 1). Unfortunately for Salmon he is unable to tell us what kind 
of things these guises are. He does admit, surprisingly, that they must be something 
like Fregean senses, although guises would not be part of the semantics of the 
sentences in question. We could certainly dispute this last point on the grounds that 
Salmon seems to be committed to the consequence that no-one actually grasps any 
propositions at all .  All that is grasped is the way-of-being-given, the mysterious 
third relatum. If this is correct then we are really dealing with a theory which is 
difficult to distinguish from a Fregean one. The notion of a proposition distinct from 
these ways of being given would be redundant. Even if we do not take this line, we 
can surely ask why it is that these guises are sometimes successful, sometimes not. 
Why is it, for example, that when Lois Lane (to use Salmon’s example) is presented 
with the proposition that Clark Kent can fly through the sentence “Clark Kent can 
fly” she does not recognise the proposition and so does not assent to the sentence, 
even though she actually grasps the proposition? How can we grasp propositions yet 
not recognise them? 
Yet another flaw in Salmon’s theory concerns the possibility of false belief. For 
example, Lois surely believes the proposition that Clark Kent cannot fly since she 
would assent to the appropriate sentence. The Sophisticated View is going to have to 
accuse Lois of knowingly holding logically incompatible beliefs (the belief that 
Clark Kent can fly and the belief that Clark Kent cannot fly), or else maintain that 
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there is something incoherent about speakers holding false beliefs. The 
Sophisticated View can maintain neither option. 
As if the foregoing were not enough we can deal a fatal blow to Salmon’s defence 
of the Sophisticated View in terms of the behaviour of the agent. For example, why 
does Lois behave in a totally different way when she is with the person she calls 
‘Superman’ from the way in which she behaves in the presence of the person she 
calls ‘Clark Kent‘, if she believes the same things of them? Even if we accept 
Salmon’s guises we cannot accept that Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly if she 
does not behave appropriately. What we normally call knowledge and belief have 
the potential, at least, to affect people’s behaviour. They can actually affect 
behaviour in the most profound way. Salmon’s so-called ‘De Re‘ knowledge and 
belief do not even have thepotentiaz to affect behaviour. Consequently, they are no 
kind of knowledge or belief. 
Obviously our reductio requires a premise to the effect that DRT is committed to 
the Sophisticated view. Recently, however, some defenders of DRT, notably John 
Perry and Mark Crimmins, have come to reject such a consequence. In their (1989) 
they make a sophisticated and comprehensive attempt to defend DRT while 
rejecting the Sophisticated View. On the Perry/Crimmins view a speaker can believe 
that Hesperus is a planet while failing to believe that Phosphorus is a planet, even 
though the two sentences involved express, or encode, the same proposition. In 
short, we can get two beliefs out of one proposition. This notable feat is 
accomplished by, first of all, distinguishing between the content of a belief, viz, a 
proposition, and its constituents, which on the Perry/Crimmins view, are concrete 
particulars in the mind of the individual. On this account, beliefs are concrete 
cognitive structures - “things in the head”. They are “particulars that belong to an 
agent, come into existence, endure and go out of existence” (1989, p688). 
Furthermore, a belief comes into existence when an agent forms it; “it is not the sort 
of thing that is around for the agent to adopt”(1bid.) The constituents of beliefs Perry 
and Crimmins call ‘notions‘ and ‘ideas‘. Notions are associated with ideas in 
forming beliefs and are things in the mind that stand for things in the world (p692). 
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To illustrate how Perry and Crimmins get two beliefs fiom one proposition let us 
consider their example of the beliefs of the fictional character Miles Hendon from 
the book The Prince and the Pauper. In the story Miles comes across a boy dressed 
in rags claiming to be the Prince of Wales. Unbeknownst to Miles the boy really is 
Edward Tudor, Prince of Wales. Even so, on the PenylCrimrnins view we are 
entitled to conclude that 
(v) Miles believed that he (the boy in rags) was not of royal blood 
and also 
(vi) Miles believed that Edward Tudor was of royal blood 
We get two beliefs from the one proposition: 
<< Being of royal blood; Edward Tudor >> 
because Miles’ beliefs involve two different notions of Edward Tudor. One is a 
visual notion formed when Miles saw the boy in rags, and is associated by Miles 
with ideas of being a pauper, not being royal, and being insane (since the boy 
claims to be a prince). The other notion need not be a visual one. It is associated 
with ideas of being a prince, being rich, not being a pauper etc. Moreover, when we 
report beliefs such as (v) and (vi), these notions are unarticulated constituents of the 
content of the report. They are propositional constituents that are not explicitly 
mentioned (p697). 
Clearly Perry and Crimmins have developed a much more complex analysis of 
belief ascription than Salmon. Is it any real improvement on Salmon, though? The 
answer has to be in the negative, for the following reasons. First of all Perry and 
Crimmins fail to make an adequate distinction between notions and ideas. They do 
say that the difference is that between ways of thinking of individuals versus 
properties (p690), but surely a way of thinking about an individual must involve 
properties -which blurs the distinction. Whether it does or not is surely one of the 
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things at stake in the debate between DRT and the description theory. Secondly, the 
failure to say exactly what a notion is makes it virtually impossible to understand 
how a notion, which is supposed to be a concrete particular in someone’s mind, can 
be a constituent of an abstract object like a proposition, albeit an unarticulated 
constituent. 
Indeed the whole idea of unarticulated constituency could be seriously 
questioned. It is all very well to say that in a statement like “It is raining” there is an 
unarticulated constituent concerning a certain time and place provided by the 
context; but surely another thing altogether to claim that in reporting a belief like (v) 
the proposition involved has an unarticulated constituent which seems to allow 
Miles to hold a belief which is the exact opposite of its propositional content! 
It is certainly very strange to make a distinction in the first place between 
constituents and contents of propositions, or anything else. Surely the content of 
anything has to be the sum of its constituents, not something actually distinct from 
them. We can also question how beliefs can be concrete when their contents are 
abstract. 
Yet another problem for the PerryKrimmins view concerns what happens when a 
belief ceases to exist. Presumably the proposition does not cease to exist, and the 
two notions could certainly persist. The only way a belief can cease to exist is if the 
relevant notion ceases to be associated with the appropriate ideas. But this requires a 
rigid distinction between notion and idea, which has not been made by Perry and 
Crimmins. 
One final point against Perry and Crimmins, and a crucial one. Again it involves 
the issue of false belief, which troubled Salmon. Quite simply, it seems to be a 
consequence of the PerryKrimmins view that we cannot hold false beliefs. If we 
take, for example, Miles’ belief that the boy in rags is not of royal blood, it can be 
seen that this is a false belief involving the proposition: 
<< Being of royal blood; Edward Tudor >> 
Now if Miles has this belief, and he knows anything about propositions, he must 
also believe that the content of his belief is the proposition: 
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<< Being a pauper; the boy in rags >> 
He cannot believe that the content of his belief is << Being of royal blood; Edward 
Tudor >> because then he would have to give up his belief that the boy in rags is a 
pauper. He can only believe that the content of his belief is the proposition << Being 
a pauper; the boy in rags >>. Now this is a false belief, so Miles has a false belief 
about his belief, and this would appear to be incoherent in the present context. We 
can have false beliefs about the world, but we cannot have false beliefs about our 
beliefs - at least, if we are rational beings and characterise beliefs in the way that 
Crimmins, Perry and Salmon have done. The view that we can get two beliefs fiom 
one proposition leads to the consequence that we cannot hold false beliefs about the 
world without holding false beliefs about the content of those beliefs. Which means 
that we cannot hold false beliefs about the world. But we surely can hold false 
beliefs about the world - therefore we cannot get two beliefs from one proposition. 
The Perry/Crimmins view fails in its attempt to account for the behaviour of 
coreferential terms in belief contexts. It is therefore no threat to our reductio. 
There is perhaps one last chance for DRT to save itself, and that is Kripke’s 
(1979) “Puzzle About Belief’. In this paper Kripke comes the closest he has ever 
come to saying anything about what proper names contribute to content. It is not, 
however, the purpose of his paper to say what names actually contribute, but, rather 
to argue that the situation is more complicated than many philosophers seem to 
think. 
Kripke generates his puzzle in the following way. First of all, he introduces what 
he calls ‘The Disquotational Principle‘, which he formulates thus: 
“If a normal English speaker, on reflection, sincerely assents to ‘p’, then he 
believes that p” (In Salmon and Soames, 1988, pl13) 
This principle is a necessary condition for the puzzle to arise and is regarded by 
Kripke as something of a self-evident truth (Ibid.) Suppose we now consider an 
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example of a rational, competent speaker of English - call him ‘Peter‘ - who 
sincerely assents to the sentence 
(vii) Paderewski had musical talent 
where Paderewski is a famous pianist. Unfortunately Peter also assents to 
(viii) Paderewski had no musical talent 
believing that he is here dealing with a Polish statesman, distinct from the pianist, 
who had no musical talent. Now by the Disquotational Principle we seem to be 
committed to ascribing contradictory beliefs to Peter. But we surely cannot do this 
since Peter would never knowingly hold contradictory beliefs. Hence the puzzle. 
Another way of posing the problem is to say that we cannot answer the question 
“Does Peter, or does he not, believe that Paderewski had musical talent” - a question 
we should be able to answer. According to Kripke we have a situation here where 
our ability to ascribe belief comes under severe strain, and may even break down 
altogether. If this is so then we should not be too quick to come to conclusions about 
what names contribute to content because it is as much a problem for the 
Description Theory as it is for DRT. This is because we cannot take what might 
seem the obvious way out of the difficulty and appeal to a difference in sense 
between the two occurrences of the name ‘Paderewski‘. No substitution of 
coreferential names is involved here. The two occurrences of ‘Paderewski‘ are two 
tokens of the same name, and so there is no appeal to a difference in sense. 
Nevertheless, attempts at solving the puzzle usually take the form of appeals to 
different senses for the two name tokens (E.g. Bach, 1987; Katz, 1990; and Schiffer, 
1977). Peter himself would certainly associate different senses with what he regards 
as different names, but Kripke would not accept this way out because we are simply 
not dealing with two different names, regardless of what Peter believes. There is no 
need to do this, however. The ‘puzzle‘ is quite simply not a genuine puzzle. What 
breaks down in these type of cases is not our ability to ascribe belief but the 
Disquotational Principle. We cannot apply the Principle in the cases where the 
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puzzle is supposed to arise because it requires us to ascribe contradictory beliefs. If 
the Principle cannot be applied in such cases then there is no puzzle because the 
Principle is the necessary condition for the puzzle to arise. So the alleged puzzle has 
been dissolved rather than solved. The irony here is that Kripke has actually made 
too strong a case in the sense that, if it is impossibze to answer the question about 
what Peter believes, then it is just not a proper question. 
Now some people will not accept such an easy way out. They will point out that 
we really could find ourselves in similar situations to the ‘Paderewski’ case. It is not 
some outlandish thought experiment, but a very real possibility, and one which we 
will have to deal with. 
Even if we accept this, though, there is still no real problem. Even if we accept 
that we cannot ascribe belief in this type of case, where the agent has the mistaken 
belief that he is dealing with two people rather than one, what does this tell us about 
our ability to ascribe belief, in general? And what does it tell us about how names 
function, in general; or even in these type of examples? Nothing at all. If someone 
asks us how we are to characterise Peter’s beliefs in such cases we can answer that 
there is no need to, although we can explain why he has them, or seems to have 
them. He holds these beliefs simply because he has the mistaken belief that he is 
dealing with two people rather than one. Kripke’s alleged puzzle is a complete 
failure, as are the arguments advanced by Salmon, Perry and Crimmins. The 
reductio still stands. 
In conclusion, then, we have seen that DRT has failed to show that ordinary proper 
names are not synonymous with definite descriptions. The best it can do is to show 
that names are not synonymous with the attributive use of descriptions; but even this 
can be challenged if we formulate the description in a certain way. In particular, 
Kripke has not shown that names are rigid designators; although it would seem to be 
the case that demonstratives are rigid. He has not succeeded in making a distinction 
between fixing reference and giving a synonym, especially where only one 
description is available. This has serious consequences for his attempt to establish 
the existence of contingent a priori truths. 
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Kripke’s positive thesis fares no better. It simply does not work - although he may 
have shown that a causal connection to the world is necessary for reference to take 
place. 
DRT can in fact be reduced to absurdity on the question of what a proper name 
contributes to the propositional content of a sentence which contains it - especially 
in epistemic and doxastic contexts. 
The failure of DRT to distinguish between a name and a mere sign or utterance 
suggests that Kripke et. al. literally do not know what a name is. This is also a 
problem for the Description Theory. In fact it could be that all theories of naming 
are superfluous since they never tell us whether there are any names or not. We need 
to know this if names are to be used in any way - particularly if we are to conclude 
anything about the necessary a posteriori or the contingent a priori. 
In chapter 3 we shall examine the Direct Reference Theory as applied to general 
terms - specifically, terms for natural kinds. This may seem superfluous if it is 
accepted that DRT has already been reduced to absurdity as regards proper names; 
but this is not so. Because of the totally different nature of general terms and the 
different kinds of properties involved in any alleged sense of a general term, I feel 
that it is necessary to examine the possibility that, although DRT does not apply to 
proper names, it may apply to natural kind terms. 
Chapter 3 will also contain what I think is the true theory of how names, 




In Lecture 111 of Naming and Necessity Kripke extends his theory of direct reference 
to general terms; specifically, natural kind terms like ‘gold‘ and ‘tiger’. The 
arguments used against a sense theory for ordinary proper names are used against a 
sense theory for general terms. It is Kripke’s contention that general terms function 
in a similar way to proper names in that they are rigid designators and do not refer 
by means of a sense. This is where he differs from Mill, who held that general 
terms, unlike proper names, do indeed have a sense. For example, it may seem 
obvious to some that the sense of ‘tiger‘ could be given in terms of a list of 
properties we believe tigers to possess. Such a ‘definition’ could be something like 
“Large carnivorous quadrupedal feline, tawny yellow in colour with blackish 
transverse stripes and white belly” (1980, pl19). Kripke employs his usual anti- 
sense arguments to show that ‘tiger‘ is not short for such a definition. 
First of all, we would not contradict ourselves if we were to declare that we had 
seen a three-legged tiger. Secondly, there is no contradiction in supposing that there 
are creatures having all the phenomenological properties of tigers but which are not 
tigers, but reptiles, for instance (Ibid. p120). A Godel-type argument is also used to 
show that ‘tiger‘ cannot be synonymous with anything like a dictionary definition 
consisting of a list of properties because we could be mistaken about some, or even 
all, of these properties (Ibid. p121). According to Kripke we could discover that 
tigers do not in fact have a particular property we believe them to have; or indeed 
any of the properties we believe tigers to have; which shows that ‘tiger’ cannot be 
associated with a cluster concept. Consequently, natural kind terms like ‘tiger‘ or 
‘gold‘ are not synonymous with any list of properties which give the meaning of 
these terms. A statement like “Tigers are striped” is neither necessary nor analytic in 
Kripke’s view. It is certainly not known a priori, but is an empirical discovery. It 
follows from all this that natural kind terms are rigid designators which leads Kripke 
to conclude that there are necessary a posteriori truths involving natural kind terms - 
the so-called ‘Scientific Identities’, like ‘Water is H20‘ or ‘Heat is the motion of 
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molecules‘. This is equivalent to the claim that science can discover the real essence 
of natural kinds (although it need not know that it has done so) - a very strong claim 
indeed. 
As with many of the claims of Naming and Necessity Kripke does not offer a full- 
blown theory of the semantics of natural kind terms, but rather, an outline of a 
theory. Perhaps he does not think he needs to offer a detailed theory since he has 
already dealt in depth with the semantics of proper names and he considers general 
terms as functioning in a similar way to proper names. The question we must now 
ask is “Has Kripke been too hasty in equating general terms with ordinary proper 
names?’ After all, it is far from obvious that general terms h c t i o n  in anything like 
the same way as ordinary proper names. What is certain is that the putative senses of 
natural kind terms involve properties of a completely different kind from those 
involved in the senses of proper names. For instance, it is one thing to say that 
Nixon might not have been a politician, but another thing entirely to say that tigers 
might not have been carnivorous, or four-legged. These latter are intrinsic to tigers, 
whereas the property of being a politician does not seem to be intrinsic in any way 
to Nixon. So even if Kripke’s anti-sense arguments work against ordinary proper 
names - which is extremely doubtful as we have seen - it is by no means certain that 
they will work in the case of natural kind terms, where the putative sense is given in 
terms of different types of properties. 
Actually Kripke’s arguments are no more effective in the case of natural kind 
terms than they are with proper names. Of course we would not contradict ourselves 
if we declared that we had seen a three-legged tiger, but this is because the 
definition of a tiger applies to normaZ tigers. A three-legged tiger or an albino tiger 
would not be normal tigers. (They are still tigers, however, simply because their 
parents were tigers). As for the possibility of discovering that we were mistaken in 
thinking that tigers had a particular property, this merely shows that we could be 
mistaken about the meaning of the term ‘tiger‘. As with proper names we could 
simply adjust the sense of ‘tiger‘ to read something like ‘Creature which is 
commody believed to normally have such and such properties‘. The linguistic 
/ 
community could not be mistaken about this sense since it is the linguistic 
community that commonly believes. As for Kripke’s other possibilities - the 
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creature which resembles a tiger in all its phenomenological properties but which 
turns out to be a reptile, or the possibility of discovering that tigers never have any 
of the properties we commonly associate with them - it is highly doubtful whether 
these are real possibilities at all. No animal could resemble a tiger and be a reptile 
because, in order to fully resemble a tiger, it would have to have a fur coat. Quite 
simply, no animal with a fur coat could be truly cold-blooded; and therefore could 
not be a reptile. Furthermore, we could not actually discover that tigers had none of 
the properties we believe them to have without doubting the very existence of tigers. 
If, for example, we had a tiger in a cage, and one morning we go to the cage and 
discover a creature with none of the properties we commonly associate with tigers, 
we would probably conclude that someone had stolen our tiger and replaced it with 
this strange creature. It is just unintelligible to argue that tigers could turn out not to 
have any of the properties we believe them to have because if we cannot be 
reasonably sure of at least some of the properties of a natural kind, then we simply 
cannot talk about natural kinds at all. (There is certainly no example of a natural 
kind term where we have been mistaken about all the properties of the kind) 
So it seems that Kripke has been premature in making the transition from proper 
names to general terms. Another major difference between ordinary proper names 
and natural kind terms concerns what it is that they are supposed to refer to. It is 
fairly clear, for example, that the name ‘Nixon’ refers to the man Nixon (multiple 
bearers apart); but to what does the name ‘tiger‘ refer? Does it refer to a particular 
tiger or to the whole species? What is it for a name to designate a whole species 
anyway - and how does a species term like ‘tiger‘ designate the same species across 
possible worlds when the actual individuals who make up the species can vary from 
world to world? These are questions that Kripke does not adequately address in his 
rush to conclude that general terms function in the same way as ordinary proper 
names, but which will have to be dealt with at some point. 
Kripke’s treatment of natural kind terms can be seen as inadequate in many ways. 
It is left to Hilary Putnam to give us a detailed account of the semantics of natural 
kind terms within the framework of DRT, and it is Putnam’s work in this area which 
will be the main concern in this chapter. Although Putnam has changed his mind 
about metaphysical necessity (among other things), preferring physical necessity 
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instead (See Putnam, 1990, Ch 4), he has steadfastly maintained his position on the 
meaning of natural kind terms. Despite Putnam’s divergence from Kripke on the 
topic of necessity, a detailed examination of his theory of meaning may help 
Kripke’s claims about metaphysical necessity, even if that is not what Putnam 
intends. Even if Putnam’s views on meaning cannot be upheld, as I shall maintain, 
they will lead us to an alternative theory of how proper names and natural kind 
terms actually do function. 
Putnam on Meaning 
In works such as “Is Semantics Possible?’ (1970), “The Meaning of Meaning” 
(1975), and Reason, Truth and History (1981), Putnam challenges what might be 
termed ‘The Traditional Theory of Meaning‘ for general terms - specifically, terms 
for natural kinds like substance terms and species terms. The view he wants to 
criticise is characterised by him as follows: 
(I) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain 
psychological state. 
(11) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of ‘intension’) determines its 
extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension). 
[ 1975, p2 191 
‘Intension‘ can be equated with sense or concept, or sometimes with ‘mental 
representation’ (See 1988, Ch.2) which determines what the term refers to. 
‘Intension‘ can also be identified with a list of properties or descriptions which give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for anything to belong in the extension of the 
term, such that, for any natural kind K, the statement “All K’s have property P” or 
“Anythmg with properties P 1 ..... Pn is a K” will be analytic (where P1 ..... Pn are all 
the properties in the intension of ‘K’). 
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It seems to follow from assumptions (I) and (11) that it is something in the mind 
of the speaker that determines the reference of a word. Thus, psychological state 
determines reference, where ‘psychological state‘ is taken to be a ‘narrow‘ state. A 
narrow state is one which, according to Putnam, does not presuppose the existence 
of anyone or anything else (1 975, p220). More importantly, a n  individual does not 
have such states in virtue of any causal connection with his environment. How he 
does come to have these states seems mysterious. Frege, for example, simply says 
that sense is grasped by anyone who is familiar with the language - although it 
should be pointed out that for Frege, grasping sense is not a narrow state. (Fodor and 
Chomsky actually hold that concepts are innate). 
Putnam’s challenge to the Traditional Theory takes the following form: 
(i) There is nothing in the mind of the speaker (in the narrow sense) which has the 
intrinsic ability to determine what a word refers to. This would be a ‘magical 
theory‘ of reference. 
(ii) It is essential that there be a causal, non-conceptual connection between the 
world and the speaker’s use of any term to refer. 
(iii) 
division of linguistic labour) 
Reference is determined partly indexically, partly socially. (There is a 
Putnam begins by attacking the notion of a normal member of a species or kind 
(1975, p 140 ), attempting to show that the properties in the intension of a term do 
not give necessary conditions for anything to be of that kind (His attack on the 
suficiency of the conditions comes with h i s  ‘Twin Earth‘ paradox). Is it not 
possible, he asks, that what we call normal lemons are in fact atypical? He then 
points out that the characteristics of a natural kind could change over time without 
affecting the essence of the kind. Both these considerations undermine the claim that 
a natural kind can be defined in terms of normal members having certain properties. 
If this is correct then we can use it to defend Kripke’s claim that the Traditional 
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Theory is committed to the view that a statement like “Today I saw a three-legged 
tiger” would be a contradiction in terms, from the objection that it is normal tigers 
that have four legs and so we do not contradict ourselves in this way. According to 
Putnam it is simply not clear what is to count as normal. 
Putnam then proceeds to a possible definition of natural kind terms which 
accommodates these points but leads to a reductio ad absurdum of the Traditional 
Theory. The definition goes as follows: 
X is a lemon=df X belongs to a natural kind whose normal members have 
yellow peel, tart taste etc. OR X belongs to a natural kind whose normal 
members used to have these properties OR X belongs to a natural kind whose 
members were formerly believed to, or are now incorrectly believed to have 
these properties. (1975, p143) 
Now suppose that a long time ago, before lemons were known, people found a few 
atypical oranges which had all the phenomenological properties of lemons. If these 
people took these objects to be normal members of a species, then they thought that 
oranges have the properties that lemons in fact have. It would follow from this and 
the above definition that all now existing oranges would be lemons! Hence, reductio 
ad absurdum. 
The notion of a normal member of a species is a crucial one because if it makes 
no sense to talk of normal members of a kind it would seem to be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to talk about kinds at all. It seems that Putnam has not realised this. 
(Of course it may be that we cannot talk about natural kinds but that would be to 
shift the debate to a different area. In the present context we are assuming that there 
are such things as natural kinds and that we can make empirical discoveries about 
them. Kripke and Putnam certainly make this assumption). In fact there is much 
about natural kinds that Putnam has not realised. To begin with, how can the 
members of a species we regard as normal actually be atypical? The things we call 
normal lemons, for example, number billions and make up the vast majority of the 
species ‘lemon‘. How can the vast majority be atypical of a species? They are surely 
typical by definition - simply in virtue of being the majority. We have nothing else 
to go by. The only way these lemons could be atypical would be if there was some 
standard of normality to which they might fail to conform. But what could this 
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standard be? As far as we know at the moment it could only be the DNA of lemons: 
but would this be the DNA of our ‘normal‘ lemons, or would it be the DNA of our 
‘abnormal‘ lemons? The problem as posed by Putnam, still stands. 
Actually there is no problem here because the only way to define a normal lemon 
is in terms of the majority of lemons. If the abnormal ones increased in number to 
the point where they became a sizeable minority, we would simply conclude that we 
were dealing with two species of lemon. Likewise, if we discovered that our 
‘normal‘ lemons which number billions here on Earth were actually a tiny minority 
of all the lemons in the universe and that the majority in the universe were like our 
‘abnormal‘ lemons, we still need not conclude that we were mistaken in thinking 
that our lemons are normal members of a species. There would just be more than 
one species of lemon. Putnam simply does not understand the concepts of ‘typical’ 
or ‘normal‘ as applied to natural kinds. In attacking these notions he undermines his 
own position. 
Putnam’s second point is that the characteristics of a natural kind could change in 
some ways without the kind ceasing to be the same kind. This is true, although it is 
debatable to what extent these characteristics could change - or how many of them 
could change - without the kind ceasing to be the same kind. Putnam’s example in 
“Is Semantics Possible” is not a good one. He considers the possibility of lemons 
changing their colour because of a change in atmospheric conditions which does not 
affect the essence of lemons. Again, though, this is easily accommodated into the 
Traditional Theory. The simple fact is, that if some of the characteristics of a kind 
did change, the meaning or concept of the kind term would change accordingly. 
This would be no different from the way in which a term like ‘solicitor‘ could 
change its meaning (up to a point) if the hnction of solicitors changed. Furthermore, 
a normal member of a kind can be, and probably should be, defined by its apparent 
properties in standard conditions. 
As for the alleged reductio of the Traditional Theory, it is no reductio, for the 
following reasons. First of all, these people surely do not have the right to conclude 
that a few samples are typical of a species. Secondly, if these few samples have all 
the phenomenological properties of lemons, even down to the taste, by virtue of 
what would they actually be oranges? It could only be in virtue of their DNA 
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structure. But then we would have a situation where two completely different types 
of samples, normal oranges and these lemon-resembling oranges, would be 
members of the same species. How is this possible if normal oranges and the 
atypical oranges are so completely different, not only in phenomenological 
properties, but even down to their DNA? If they do not differ in their DNA then we 
would have a situation where the same DNA can make some oranges look and taste 
like oranges, and make some look and taste like lemons! This either undermines the 
whole concept of a species or it questions the connection between DNA and 
phenomenological properties, neither of which we want to do in the context of the 
present discussion. Once again Putnam undermines the very scientific enterprise in 
which he is supposed to have such confidence by calling into question one of its 
basic tenets - namely the belief that microstructure determines macrostructure in a 
law-like manner. 
Finally, if we return to Putnam’s ‘definition’ at the start of his reductio we can 
see that we do not need to accept it . We especially do not need to accept that 
lemons, or anything else, would ever be defined as that kind of thing whose normal 
members were formerly believed to have a particular set of properties. We can be 
mistaken about one, or maybe two, properties, but not all the properties of a natural 
kind. Putnam’s requirements are too strong here. He asks us to consider what is 
logically possible in situations where we are dealing with natural languages and how 
they actually function. No-one would claim that it is a logical truth that lemons have 
the properties they in fact have so why do we need to consider what is logically 
possible here? Putnam’s definition does not work because there has never been a 
single case of a natural kind term in a language whose meaning has been based on 
entirely mistaken beliefs. Nor could there be. Such a situation is unintelligible. 
Putnam has not succeeded in undermining the notions of being normal or typical. 
In fact we could question whether he even understands these notions. We could also 
question the motivation for undermining these concepts, because if we cannot make 
sense of something being a normal member of a species, then we simply cannot 
make sense of a species. That there are such things as species and natural kinds is 
not in question in the present discussion. 
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TWIN EARTH 
That psychological state (in the narrow sense) does not determine extension Putnam 
seeks to show with his famous ‘Twin Earth‘ argument. Twin Earth is just like Earth 
except that the liquid called ‘water‘ on Twin Earth is not what we call water (it is 
not H20), but a completely different chemical compound, which Putnam calls 
‘XYZ’. XYZ has all the phenomenological properties of water but is in fact a 
different substance (because it has a different chemical composition). According to 
Putnam the people on Twin Earth even speak English, or a dialect of English, to be 
more precise, since their word ‘water‘ has a different reference from our word 
‘water‘. Now imagine two hypothetical typical speakers, Oscarl , who lives on Earth 
and speaks English; and Oscar2, who lives on Twin Earth and speaks Twin Earth 
English. Suppose further that Oscarl and Oscar2 are qualitatively identical to each 
other, including their respective psychological states. If we imagine that they lived 
at a time before the chemical composition of water was discovered, then, according 
to Putnam, Oscarl and Oscar2 would understand the term ‘water‘ differently, even 
though they were in the same (narrow) psychological state. This shows that the 
extension of the term ‘water‘ is not a function of psychological state by itself. 
(1975a, p224) [It also shows, according to Putnam, that what is included in the 
intension of a term is not suficient to determine the extension] 
The case against the traditional theory is compounded by two more ‘Twin Earth‘ 
examples. First of all we are asked to imagine that aluminium is as rare on Twin 
Earth as it is common on Earth, and that molybdenum is as common on Twin Earth 
as it is rare on Earth and that typical speakers on both planets cannot tell the 
difference between aluminium and molybdenum. Furthermore, the words 
‘aluminium‘ and ‘molybdenum’ are switched on Twin Earth so that ‘aluminium’ is 
the name of molybdenum and ‘molybdenum‘ is the name for aluminium. Once 
again Putnam holds the psychological state of the speakers on both planets constant 
while varying the extensions of the relevant terms, thus showing that psychological 
state does not determine extension. When Oscarl and Oscar2 use the name 
‘aluminium‘, for example, it will have a different extension in the two idiolects. If 
this is not enough then Putnam asks us to consider the concepts ‘elm‘ and ‘beech‘, 
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which he thinks will be the same for most people; just that of a common deciduous 
tree. For Putnam “....‘elm‘ in my idiolect has a different extension from ‘beech‘ in 
your idiolect ... Is it really credible that this difference in extension is brought about 
by some difference in our concepts?” We could reinforce this point by imagining 
another Twin Earth example where the terms ‘elm‘ and ‘beech‘ are switched on 
Twin Earth. Thus, when Oscarl says ‘elm‘ he means elm, whereas Oscar2 means 
beech when he says ‘elm‘. Thus Putnam famously concludes: “Cut the pie anyway 
you like, ‘meanings‘ just ain’t in the head.” (Ibid. p226) 
One obvious criticism at this stage is that Putnam is begging the question against 
the view he claims to be criticising when he says that Oscarl and Oscar2 understood 
the word ‘water‘ differently in 1750. After all, if meanings are in the head then they 
understood it in exactly the same way. This would be supported by the fact that the 
two speakers would use the words in the same way and behave in the same way 
towards the stuff they both call ‘water‘. However, Putnam is not actually begging 
the question here. What he is trying to show is that it is a mistake to conjoin the 
claims: 
( 1 ) Sense determines reference 
and 
(2) Knowledge of sense is a narrow mental state 
A less obvious but potentially damaging criticism of the Twin Earth situation is 
that Putnam is guilty of a ‘use/mention‘ confusion, especially regarding the words 
‘elm‘ and ‘beech‘, If he knows hardly anything about elms and beeches, and cannot 
tell them apart, then perhaps he can only mention the words and not actually use 
them. Elsewhere in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning”’ Putnam is undoubtedly guilty of 
the most blatant ‘use/mention‘ confusion involving proper names when he says the 
following : 
81 
One can use the proper name ‘Sanders’ correctly without knowing anything 
about the referent except that he is called ‘Sanders‘ - and even that may not be 
correct. (‘Once upon a time, ...... Winnie-the-Pooh lived in a forest all by 
himself under the name of Sanders‘) (1975, p247) 
Now, although Putnam goes on to make it quite clear that natural kind terms do not 
function in this way, this passage does show that he is prone to the ‘use/mention‘ 
confusion, as is Kripke with his ‘Feynman‘ example. If he is guilty of the conhsion 
as regards the words ‘elm’ and ‘beech‘ or ‘aluminium‘ and ‘molybdenum’ then 
obviously these examples are of no use. 
Actually it seems that Putnam does not have the concept of an elm or a beech. 
All he knows is that there are trees called ‘elms’ and trees called ‘beeches’. The 
truth is that the concepts ‘elm’ and ‘beech‘ are two dzgerent concepts. Putnam 
surely knows this, so why does he claim that his concepts are the same? If he thinks 
they are the same then he simply does not have the concepts of an elm or a beech. 
(He certainly does not have the concept of an elm as opposed to a beech). 
As for switching the names ‘elm‘ and ‘beech‘ on Twin Earth, what does this 
show? Either Oscar2 has a different word for beeches (he calls them ‘elms‘) which 
is harmless because anything can be called anything, and Oscar 2 is only speaking a 
dialect of English, remember; or Oscar2 calls beeches ‘elms‘ because he thinks that 
beeches are elms, in which case he is mistaken and therefore not in the same 
psychological state as Oscarl.(The same argument goes for the 
aluminiudmolybdenum case, and of course the ‘water’ case) Either way nothing 
can be concluded from this example about whether or not meanings are in the head 
or whether intension determines extension. Putnam’s attempt to show that the 
properties in the intension of a term are neither necessary nor sufficient for anything 
to fall within the extension of the term has failed. What we must do now is examine 
his more positive thesis about how the reference of natural kind terms are actually 
fixed - the socio-linguistic hypothesis. 
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A SOCIO-LINGUISTIC HYPOTHESIS 
Putnam defends his claim that he has the concept of an elm simply by possessing 
the word ‘elm‘, together with the knowledge that elms are trees, with his socio- 
linguistic hypothesis - the division of linguistic labour in society. For Putnam, 
reference is fixed partly indexically, partly socially. The idea is that reference is 
fixed for the community as a whole by experts who possess the relevant identifying 
knowledge to be able to tell if a particular tree is an elm or if something is gold, or 
whatever. It is a very important part of Putnam’s thesis that knowing the meaning of 
a word is not a matter of knowing that at all, but of knowing how - i.e. how to play 
your part in a system of social co-operation. According to Putnam most people do 
not possess the specialised knowledge enabling them to distinguish, say, aluminium 
from molybdenum or even gold from brass, nor do they need to, just so long as 
someone in the community does. As Putnam says in “The Meaning of Meaning”: 
“He (the speaker) can rely on a special sub-class of speakers. The features that are 
generally thought to be present in connection with a general name - necessary and 
sufficient conditions for membership in the extension, ways of recognising if 
something is in the extension (criteria) etc. - are all present in the linguistic body 
considered as a collective body ...” (1 975a, p 228). Thus the speaker does not need to 
know how to identify elms or gold etc., so long as someone does. 
This social dimension to reference fixing is supposed to count against the 
Traditional View which seems to require that, since it is by virtue of something in 
the mind of the speaker that words refer, the act of referring must be individual, not 
social. If Putnam is correct about the division of linguistic labour he will have dealt 
a serious blow to the Traditional View that meanings are in the head - or so he 
believes. 
The division of linguistic labour is a departure from Kripke’s theory of how 
general terms refer, which seems to deal more with individual acts of reference. 
Another major difference between Putnam and Kripke is Putnam’s attempt to deal 
with linguistic competence concerning natural kind terms - or any terms, come to 
that! For Putnam, being able to refer to a natural kind is one thing; acquiring 
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linguistic competence with the appropriate term, another thing entirely. In order to 
tell someone what I mean by a natural kind term, or in order to communicate using 
such a term, it is necessary that I acquire what Putnam calls a stereotype of the kind 
in question. A stereotype, according to Putnam, is 
“ ... a standardized description of features of the kind that are typical, or 
‘normal‘, or at any rate stereotypical. The central features of the stereotype 
generally are criteria -...ways of recognising if a thing belongs to a kind, or, at 
least, necessary conditions (or probabilistic necessary conditions) for 
membership in the kind.” (Ibid. p230) 
by which he means something like ‘defeasible criteria’. 
As it turns out, some stereotypes can be more detailed than others. Some, for 
example ‘elm‘, will merely contain the fact that elms are a common deciduous tree; 
whereas others, like ‘tiger‘, will contain a lot of information about tigers. In fact, 
according to Putnam, a speaker would not count as knowing the meaning of ‘tiger’ 
unless he knows a good deal about tigers. Speakers are required by the community 
to know something about (stereotypical) tigers in order to count as having acquired 
the word ‘tiger‘ (p248). The same goes for all natural kind words; although for some 
words, ‘elm‘ for example, we are not required to know as much as we are required 
to know about tigers, for ‘cultural reasons‘ (whatever that means). Putnam even 
goes so far as to say that it is part of the meaning, in some sense, of the word ‘tiger’ 
that tigers are striped. It is just not analytic that tigers are striped (~256).  On 
Putnam’s view: “Linguistic obligatoriness is not supposed to be an index of 
unrevisability or even of truth; thus we can hold that ‘tigers are striped‘ is part of the 
meaning of ‘tiger‘ without being trapped in the problems of analyticity.” (Ibid.) We 
may not be trapped in the problems of analyticity but nevertheless “Most stereotypes 
do in fact capture features possessed by paradigmatic members of the class in 
question” (p25 0). 
Presumably they do not always capture all of the features all of the time, and we 
cannot say in advance which ones will be captured. This is not a notion of meaning 
that determines reference, at least in the traditional sense. 
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Towards the end of “The Meaning of Meaning”, Putnam attempts to ‘reconstruct‘ 
the notion of meaning by specifying what he calls a ‘normal form‘, or, rather a type 
of normal form for the description of meaning (p296). According to Putnam, if we 
know what a normal form description of a word should be, then we know what 
meaning is in any scientifically interesting sense (Ibid.) Such a description would be 
a finite sequence or ‘vector‘, the components of which would represent a hypothesis 
about the individual speaker’s linguistic competence - except the extension. The 
normal form description for water might be: 
SYNTACTIC MARKER SEMANTIC MARKERS STEREOTYPE EXTENSION 
mass noun, concrete natural kind; liquid col0 ur less; H 2 0  
transparent; (give or take 
taste less, etc. impurities) 
According to this schema, the representations of ‘water‘ on Earth and Twin Earth 
would be the same, except for the extension. So Oscar1 and Oscar2 would have the 
same linguistic competence, but a different extension (p270). Once again we must 
ask in what sense they understood the word differently? Obviously Putnam makes 
no connection between linguistic competence and understanding. 
On the basis of this ‘meaning vector‘ Putnam concludes that meaning does 
determine extension - “by construction, so to speak”; although he gives up 
assumption (I) that meanings are in the head (Ibid.) 
Exactly what kind of meaning this is is not clear. (After all, if we are not ‘trapped 
in the problems of analyticity‘ perhaps we are not trapped in the problems of 
meaning either). We might agree with Searle (1983) when he claims that the socio- 
linguistic hypothesis does not show that intension does not determine extension 
because Putnam merely replaces the intension of the average speaker with the 
intension of the experts which determines reference. As Searle puts it in 
Intentionality: 
The thesis that meaning determines reference can hardly be refuted by 
considering cases of speakers who don’t even know the meaning or know it 
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only imperfectly. Or to put it another way, the notions of intension and 
extension are not defined relative to idiolect. (P201) 
(Bach, 1987, ~289,290 makes a similar point) 
This is a valid point against Putnam unless he can be more precise as to how the 
experts fix reference for the ordinary speaker, who lacks the reference-fixing 
knowledge, simply by being part of the same community. Presumably Putnam 
would give some kind of causal explanation of this, but as we have already seen this 
would be of no use since the causal theory of reference really does not work. 
Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario has impressed many philosophers of the extemalist 
variety. Not surprisingly, however, there has been a robust Fregean response, which 
could be characterised in two ways. First of all there is the intemalist view of John 
Searle’s (1 983) where he steadfastly maintains that meanings are indeed in the head 
by questioning whether Oscar1 and Oscar2 are in the same psychological state. 
Secondly there is the challenge to the claim that the word ‘water‘ really does have 
different extensions on Earth and Twin Earth, coming notably from Eddy Zemach 
(1976), D.H. Mellor (1977) and Nathan Salmon (1981). In his (1977, p302-4) 
Mellor claims that the extension of the term ‘water‘ on the two planets in 1750 and 
1950 is the same, viz. H20 v XYZ. This is supported by Zemach (1976) and by 
John Dupre who argues in his (1993) that natural kinds could encompass different 
microstructures, in which case the word ‘water’ would have H20 and XYZ as its 
extension on both planets. For Dupre what counts as a natural kind will depend on 
our interests. This is a strong point and will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6. 
In the meantime it counts against Sterelny’s (1 983) where the claim is made that it is 
obviously not true that XYZ and H20 would be regarded as the same substance 
following the discovery of their respective chemical structures. 
The main criticism of Putnam by Zemach, Mellor and Dupre is that it is the 
Fregean account that accords best with our actual use of natural kind terms - and not 
only the use by ordinary speakers, but also of the experts. For instance, even if we 
accept that there is a division of linguistic labour and that there are experts who fix 
reference paradigmatically, we are still involved in a Fregean labour. This point is 
86 
made particularly by Mellor, who argues that even where an ostensive definition of 
a paradigm is involved, the paradigm is designated on the basis of certain theoretical 
beliefs we have. This is surely correct in the sense that even if we do fix reference 
using a paradigm, we can only be in a position to choose the paradigm because we 
are aware, or believe we are aware, of a set of properties, we take to delineate a 
natural kind. We have nothing else to go by. This seems to be in opposition to 
Putnam’s claim in his (1 983) that paradigms are 
. . .given existentially and not by criteria.. . . Actual things, whatever their 
description, which have played a certain causal role in our acquisition and use 
of terms determine what the terms refer to (1 983, p73) 
If Putnam means by this that properties are in no way involved in choosing our 
paradigms then this is just a naive claim. It also contradicts h is  earlier view that we 
rely on what he calls ‘operational definitions‘. An operational definition for Putnam 
is a way of pointing out a standard so that we can investigate its properties (1975a 
p232). Before discovering the microstructure or other important properties of, say, 
water, we can, according to Putnam, identify water by the operational definition. 
Now this obviously involves properties, but not, in Putnam’s view, an analytical 
specification of what it is to be water (Ibid.). These properties would be similar to 
Kripke’s descriptions that fix reference without giving a synonym. It is Putnam’s 
way of “loosening up” the meanings of general terms. The problem with this has 
already been mentioned. Properties are all we have to go by. These properties 
constitute the intensions of our terms. Of course we can be mistaken about the 
properties of a natural kind, but then we can be mistaken about the meaning of a 
natural kind term. 
Of course we do not need to accept the claim at all that the reference of natural 
kind terms is fixed by paradigms. Both Mellor (1995 p74) and Zemach (1976 p123- 
4) make the simple point that we do not know what sample our use stems fiom. For 
Mellor this means that “our most authoritative specimens of a kind may not even be 
of that kind”. If this is correct then Putnam’s theory appears downright fanciful - 
although in fairness to Putnam, he does, as we have seen, grant that the properties 
which go to make up a stereotype are represented by defeasible criteria. Then of 
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course there are undoubtedly cases where no paradigms are involved - the case of 
theoretical particles, or elements high in the periodic table - where only some kind 
of Fregean theory will do. However, these latter seem to be special cases, and so 
perhaps Putnam still has a point to make about the general case. 
Searle (1 983) answers the Twin Earth paradox in terms of the Intentional contents 
of mental states and questions Putnam’s assertion that Oscarl and Oscar2 are in the 
same mental state as regards the word ‘water‘. In Searle’s view two speakers can 
have the same, i.e. type-identical, mental states and yet the Intentional contents of 
the two states can be different. This is partly because Putnam replaces the definition 
of water in terms of phenomenological properties with an indexical definition in 
terms of a hidden microstructure. If the substance is different then the Intentional 
content of the mental state is different. Even indexical contents are in the head, 
according to Searle (1983, ~206,207).  So the Twin Earthers may not be in the same 
psychological state, in some sense; although Putnam would no doubt reply at this 
point that we are still dealing with intrinsic properties of mental states to refer, and 
hence still involved with magical theories of reference. He would also deny that he 
is defining the term ‘water‘ at all - at least in the traditional sense. 
Putnam also takes issue with the claim that the intentional contents of the mental 
states of Oscarl and Oscar2 are different. In the introduction to Pessin and 
Goldberg (1996) Putnam argues that if Searle were correct on this point then the 
intentional contents of speakers of different languages would be different even when 
using words that are translatable fiom one language to the other. For example, on 
Searle’s theory, according to Putnam, what an English speaker means by the word 
‘elm‘ would be the kind of tree that experts upon whom I rely refer to by the name 
‘elm‘, whereas what German speakers mean by the word ‘Ulme‘ is the kind of tree 
that experts upon whom I rely refer to by the name ‘Ulme‘ I.e. we seem to have two 
different intentional contents and yet we are dealing with the same extension and 
two words that are inter-translatable! However, this is not a strong point against 
Searle, precisely because the terms ‘elm’ and ‘ulme’ are intertranslatable. Given that 
it is experts who determine reference on Putnam’s view, we could ask him how 
correctness of translation is established in such a case. At any rate, Searle is surely 
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correct when he claims that Putnam replaces the intension of the ordinary speaker 
with that of the expert, which severely weakens Putnam’s case. 
We can also question Putnam’s division of linguistic labour and the way he wants 
to separate reference from linguistic competence (1975a, p246). On the one hand, 
according to Putnam, if gold, for example, is important to a speaker he has to 
acquire the word ‘gold’ (1 975a, p227), (which is not true for a start); but he does not 
need to acquire a way of recognising gold, and he does not acquire a way of fixing 
the reference of ‘gold‘. (We might wonder why gold is so important to this person if 
he does not know how to recognise it). This is done for the community as a whole 
by the experts. On the other hand the speaker is obliged to acquire a stereotype of 
gold, or whatever, which does provide ‘criteria‘, or probabilistic necessary 
conditions for anything to be gold. Without this stereotype the speaker cannot 
achieve linguistic competence with the word. In fact, according to Putnam, (p247) 
the speaker cannot be counted as having acquired the word at all, unless he acquires 
a stereotype. If all he has is the word and perhaps the knowledge that it has an 
extension, he can only be regarded as having partial& acquired the word. (How can 
anyone partially acquire a word? This seems to be another case of DRT confusing a 
word with the concept that goes with it). So the speaker does not need a way of 
recognising gold but he does need to have a way of probably recognising gold, viz. 
the stereotype. Where stereotypes come from Putnam does not say. Are they the 
same things as operational definitions? Are they passed from speaker to speaker in 
the causal chain? Do they originate with the experts; and if not, what exactly is the 
role of the experts in the semantics of general terms? 
Actually it seems that if there are such things as stereotypes, then they will 
ultimately come from these experts. They surely cannot contain information that 
would take precedence over the knowledge of the experts. Although we may get by 
for a while with what we might term ‘folk stereotypes‘, ultimately we will rely on 
verbal and ostensive definitions in dictionaries and encyclopaedias - written by the 
experts, or with the help of experts. This is where we acquire linguistic competence. 
This is where the stereotypes are to be located. 
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As for the ‘reconstruction’ of meaning in the form of a meaning vector, this 
would seem to be a rather trivial analysis of the determination of reference, since the 
extension of the term is contained within the vector itself (or, rather, a description of 
the extension). On page 246 of “The Meaning of Meaning” Putnam anticipates the 
meaning vector in principle but not in great detail, and admits that an analysis of 
meaning in terms of the vector would make it trivially true that meaning determines 
extension, in the sense that difference in extension is ipso facto difference in 
meaning. We shall see below that a non-trivial analysis of meaning would require 
that knowing the meaning of a term, or acquiring linguistic competence with a term, 
would determine reference for speakers of the language. Putnam shies away from 
such an analysis for fear of having to locate meanings in the head. I shall argue 
below that there is an analysis of meaning where meanings are in the head and 
determine reference, but not in any ‘magical‘ way. 
BRAINS IN A VAT 
Putnam argues for the necessity of a causal connection between language and the 
world in his treatment of the famous ‘Brain-in-a-vat‘ problem. In chapter 1 of 
Reason, Truth and History, Putnam considers the possibility that we could be 
disembodied brains kept alive in a vat of nutrients and programmed by a computer 
to have the illusion that we are solid flesh and blood beings living in a world of 
physical objects, which we can see, touch, etc. and, crucially, refer to using a 
language. In short, the question is: Could all the experiences we regard as ‘real‘ 
actually be computer-generated illusions? Could we be brains in a vat? 
The problem is usually posed as an epistemological one; viz. “How do we know 
that we are not in this situation?’ Putnam seeks to show (1981, p7) that the 
supposition that we are actually brains in a vat cannot possibly be true because it is 
self-refuting, or necessarily false (Ibid. P15). This he attempts to show by exploring 
the preconditions for reference, from which he concludes that reference is 
conditional upon causal connection to the world. It follows from this, once again, 
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that there is nothing intrinsic to any mental representation which can reach out to the 
world and refer to it. 
Putnam begins by asking if there could be a definitive Turing Test for reference. 
Suppose, for instance, we have a machine that has been programmed to answer 
questions put to it by a human being. It can produce discourse about things with 
which we are familiar and so might seem to be referring to these things. However, 
this ability to refer to actual things is an illusion created by our ability to refer to 
such things. The machine may seem to be referring but is not actually doing so 
because it does not have the kind of relation to actual objects that we do. 
Specifically it lacks what Putnam calls ‘language entry rules‘, which take us from 
experiences of actual things in the world to such utterances as “I see a such-and- 
such”, and ‘language exit rules‘, which take us from decisions expressed in 
linguistic form (“I desire a such-and-such”, for example) to extra-linguistic acts 
(Ibid. pl l ) .  There is therefore no definitive Turing Test for reference because there 
is always the possibility that someone could pass the Turing Test for reference and 
still not be referring to anything. (I shall argue below that there is a definitive Turing 
test for sense) 
This would be the situation if we imagine some brains in a vat. Although the ‘vat- 
people‘, as I shall call them, could say things like “I see a tree”, they would not be 
talking about actual trees, although someone might take them to be so doing. If they 
are referring at all, they are referring to computer-generated illusions or simulations 
of trees - and the same goes for all of their words. None of the vat-people’s words 
ever refer to anything outside the vat because they lack the necessary causal 
connection to those things. It follows from this that the vat-people could not say or 
think that they were brains in a vat because, if they uttered the sentence “We are 
brains in a vat”, it would be automatically false, since the words ‘brain‘ and ‘vat‘, 
as uttered by the vat-people, would not refer to an actual brain or an actual vat. The 
sentence “We are brains in a vat” as uttered by the vat-people, would actually mean 
“We are computer-generated illusions of brains in a computer-generated illusion of a 
vat”, which is false. In short, the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis is self-refuting in the 
sense that, if we are brains in a vat, then “We are brains in a vat” is false. So it is 
necessarily false. Just to entertain the hypothesis is to imply its falsity. 
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Notice here that the word ‘we‘ is translated homophonically, from “We are brains 
in a vat” to “We are computer-generated illusions of brains in a computer-generated 
illusion of a vat”. This is because ‘we‘, or ‘I., are the only words in the ‘vat - 
language‘ that actually refer to anything. The word ‘I‘ in the sentence “I am a brain 
in a vat” refers to the actual brain in the vat, whereas all the other ‘words‘ either 
only refer to illusions of things, or, to nothing. We could conclude that the words of 
the vat-language do not refer at all since there is nothing for them to refer to. They 
do not refer to anything outside the vat and there is nothing inside the vat for them 
to refer to. The irony here is that the brains would never realise that the word ‘I‘ 
(‘we‘) refers to a brain. They think they know what all their other ‘words‘ refer to 
(or most of them) and could be embroiled in a debate about what the word ‘I‘ refers 
to. Does it refer to a Cartesian self, or is it just an imposition of grammar? They’ll 
never know. 
The other point to note here is that Putnam is wrong in claiming that a sentence 
like “I am a brain in a vat” is necessarily false. If it is false it is not necessarily so. 
Actually it may not be false at all in the sense that we cannot know that it is. I.e. on 
Putnam’s view the sentence “I am a brain in a vat” is false as uttered by anyone who 
can entertain the thought it expresses. But since we could never know that we are 
entertaining the thought, there is no refutation of scepticism here - which may mean 
that if causal connection to the world is necessary for reference, then we simply 
don’t know what we are talking about! 
What, then, does Putnam’s attack on the Traditional View amount to, and how 
successful has it been? We have seen that it has been limited in its success. Putnam 
seems to beg the question against the Traditional View when he claims that Oscar1 
and Oscar2 understand the word ‘water’ differently in 1750. There may even be a 
‘use/mention’ confusion in his thinking concerning the words ‘elm‘ and ‘beech’, as 
there seems to be throughout DRT in general (For example, Kripke’s ‘Feynman’ 
example, and Evans’ ‘Louis‘ example). We might also agree with Searle’s claim 
that the two Oscars are not in the same psychological state and that Putnam merely 
replaces the intension of the ordinary speaker with that of the expert. Certainly there 
seems to be a strong case put forward by Zemach, Mellor and Dupre that the 
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extension of the word ‘water‘ in 1750, as now, includes XYZ and H20. It may even 
be that the Twin Earth situation is incommensurable with the situation on Earth 
because the Twin Earthers do not have our word ‘water‘ but merely a word that has 
“the same spelling and pronunciation” (1 975a, p248). After all, consider what 
Putnam is saying here. He wants to argue against the claim that it is by virtue of a 
sense in the minds of speakers that the word ‘water‘ refers. He does this by 
considering a possible, though highly unlikely, situation where the people do not 
possess our word ‘water‘ - neither do they have a name for water ; because there 
isn’t any water in this situation! What can we conclude from this? 
Putnam is quite clear (1975a, p247) that as far the word ‘tiger‘ is concerned the 
Twin Earth people only count as having the word ‘tiger‘ if it has as extension the set 
of tigers. For Putnam, “If Twin Earth organisms have a silicon chemistry, for 
example, then their ‘tigers’ aren’t really tigers, even if they look like 
tigers .... Thus .... we have decided to say that Twin Earth speakers have not acquired 
our word ‘tiger‘ (although they have acquired another word with the same spelling 
and pronunciation) [Ibid]. Surely the same applies to the ‘water‘ case. The Twin 
Earthers simply have a different term, and so the two situations cannot be compared. 
We are not in the same situation whereby a word is translated from, say, English 
into German. In such a situation the word ‘water‘ can be translated as ‘wasser‘ 
because the two words have the same extension. In the Twin Earth scenario the earth 
word ‘water‘ and the Twin Earth word ‘water‘ have different extensions (according 
to Putnam) and so we are not dealing with a straightforward translation of one 
language into another. The charge of incommensurability stands. 
The charge of incommensurability may be even stronger in the Brain-in-a-vat 
case. That is, we cannot conclude anything about what the brains can or cannot refer 
to because they do not actually refer. They only have the illusion of referring. The 
very word ‘refer‘ has a different meaning inside the vat (if it has any meaning at all) 
and so the situation inside the vat is incommensurable with the situation outside the 
vat. Similarly, if we take a word like ‘brain’ as used inside the vat, we cannot 
conclude anything about what it can or cannot refer to because the brains in the vat 
do not have the word ‘brain’. They certainly do not have our word (or term) ‘brain‘ 
since it does not have the set of brains as its extension. In fact we could say that they 
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do not have words at all - only the illusion of words. Nevertheless, as we have seen, 
we would seem to understand the brains, even though they do not refer to anything. 
At any rate, we would not be able to tell whether we were listening to brains in a vat 
or real people referring to actual objects. In short, there is a Turing Test for sense - 
i.e. sense as understanding. This shows either that sense is independent of reference 
in some sense, or that reference is inscrutable. 
This brings us to the crux of the matter. Just what exactly is the relation between 
sense and reference and between what is in the minds of speakers and what their 
words refer to? One thing that is certain and that is that sense is necessary for 
reference. It is necessary because reference only takes place within a language, and 
there can only be language if there is understanding - which means speakers 
grasping senses in their minds. I.e. a word like ‘water’ or ‘gold‘, or whatever, only 
refers if it contributes to what speakers of the language understand by these words 
(in any sentence which uses them). Understanding is the single most important 
concept in the philosophy of language because without understanding, or the 
possibility of understanding, there is no language. DRT fails as a semantic theory 
because it either deals inadequately with understanding, as Putnam does; or not at 
all, as in Kripke ’s work. 
So understanding is necessary for reference and understanding consists in 
speakers grasping senses in their minds. Sense, therefore, is necessary for reference. 
Furthermore, something in the minds of speakers is necessary for reference because 
understanding is a mental act. Even Putnam might accept this (at least concerning 
general terms) - although Kripke probably would not. What Putnam tries to do is to 
show that sense is not suficient for reference. We may reject Putnam’s arguments 
but nevertheless it will be more difficult to argue for the sufficiency of sense than 
for its necessity. 
Nevertheless, the necessity of sense in determining reference is crucial to the 
debate over the existence of necessary a posteriori truths. It means that even if 
microstructure is necessary for something to be a member of a natural kind, then so 
is macrostructure, because it is the macrostructure, i.e. phenomenological properties 
of the kind, that constitute the sense of the natural kind term. For example, if it is 
necessary that water is H20, it will be just as necessary that it have the 
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phenomenological properties it has (or seems to have) in the actual world. Of course 
we must remember that we are dealing with a qualified notion of sense. For 
instance, the sense of the word 'water' is not 
Naturally occurring substance with properties P 1.. . . .Pn 
but, rather: 
Naturally occurring substance that is commonly believed to have properties P 1.- .Pn 
If this is our notion of sense then it makes a great difference to what we regard as a 
priori, analytic and necessary. Take, for example, the sentence 
(a) Lemons have P1 .... Pn 
If 'lemon' has the sense of 
That which is commonly believed to have P1 .... Pn 
then (a) will mean 
That which is commonly believed to have P 1 .... Pn have P1 .... Pn 
Clearly this may not even be true, so the question of its a priority, analyticity or 
necessity will simply not arise (Although some may claim that it is contingent a 
priori). However, these questions do seem to arise with 
(b) Lemons are commonly believed to have P1 ... Pn 
since, on the present view, this will mean 
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That which is commonly believed to have P 1 ... Pn are commonly believed to have 
P1 ... Pn 
The charge could be made here that (b) appears to be analytic but not a priori or 
necessary; although it is doubtful whether someone like Kripke could make such a 
charge. After all, if he wants to claim that there are necessary truths which are not 
analytic, then why can he not accept that there could be analytic truths that are not 
necessary? Certainly (b) is not necessary de re. It is of course necessary de dicto, 
and there is also a sense in which it is a priori, once we know what the terms mean. 
One thing we know for sure is that sense is necessary for reference. What we 
must do now is analyse why it does not seem to be suflcient for reference. This will 
lead us to examine just what is meant by reference. First of all, we have seen that 
Putnam has not succeeded in showing that sense is not sufficient for reference with 
his Twin Earth experiment, especially if we accept that the extension of ‘water‘ is, 
or could be, H20 v XYZ. Even if we do not take this line it could be argued that 
sense determines reference in general, although there may be highly specialised 
cases, such as the Twin Earth case, where the relation comes under strain. But if this 
is so, then the Twin Earth example also presents problems for Putnam’s view of 
reference fixing by experts. This is because the experts can be wrong, and also 
because what counts as an expert will change over time. For instance, in the 
example of water and Twin water, the sense of the earth term ‘water‘ will be 
something like: 
Stuff which is commonly believed to have such-and-such properties 
In 1750 this will have only H20 as its extension because speakers on Earth have no 
beliefs about Twin Earth. They don’t even know that it exists. However, the liquid 
on Twin Earth that resembles water would be part of the extension of ‘water‘ if this 
is determined by experts on Earth because in 1750 what counts as an expert on Earth 
would judge that XYZ is water. Once again it is the (qualified) Fregean theory that 
works best - at least before the discovery of chemistry. Once the microstructure of 
the two substances is discovered (if they are two substances) then the Fregean theory 
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will come under strain, at least as far as common usage is concerned. As far as the 
scientific usage is concerned, however, the sense of ‘water‘ will be adjusted to 
accommodate the new information that distinguishes H20 from XYZ. This may 
eventually become part of common usage or it may not. At any rate, if there is a 
problem with the Fregean determination of reference, there is also a problem with 
Putnam’s view. It could be that we simply cannot talk about reference. At the very 
least we should be very carekl about reference talk. 
This last point is supported by the argument made above that sense is necessary 
for reference, combined with the fact that sense is very often indeterminate. In fact, 
strictly speaking, sense is always indeterminate in that we can never really know if 
we are in possession of the correct sense of a word. Hence the need to qualify our 
senses in terms of speakers’ beliefs. What this amounts to is that if sense is 
necessary for reference and sense is indeterminate, then reference is indeterminate. 
To put it bluntly, we literally don’t know what we are talking about. If this is all 
there is to be said about reference then questions about essentialism derivedpom a 
semantic theory would hardly arise! 
There may be more to be said about the relation between sense and reference, 
however. So far we have spoken as if reference is something that is effected by 
language. This is true, but it is equally true that there is no language without 
speakers, or potential speakers, to understand the language. We must therefore 
examine the relation between speakers and the mechanism by which their words 
refer. 
What I propose is that it is really speakers who refer when they communicate with 
other language users. I.e. speakers refer each other to what they take to be things in 
the world. This they do by evoking concepts in the minds of other speakers causing 
them to think about whatever is being referred to. For example, if I say to you: 
Kripke has just published a new book 
I am referring you to a certain person who has just done something. The sound of 
these words evoke certain concepts in your mind thus enabling you to understand 
what I am saying. If these words did not evoke these concepts in your mind you 
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would not know what or who I was talking about - or referring to. If no-one in the 
linguistic community was affected by these words in the appropriate way, or in any 
way, then this would not be a sentence in our language. It would be nonsense. It 
does not matter how we characterise this understanding for the present purpose. As 
far as the determination of reference is concerned understanding can be taken for 
granted. We can start with the assumption that language exists - which means that 
understanding, or the possibility of understanding, exists. So it is speakers who refer 
by referring other speakers by causing them to have certain thoughts. The contents 
of these thoughts are conceptual. Sometimes these concepts correspond to things in 
the world and sometimes they do not. This is a matter of empirical investigation. 
This latter point answers Kripke’s circularity objection mentioned at the end of 
chapter one where he claims that the sense of a name cannot be given in terms of 
what is commonly believed by the community because we must say what it is that is 
commonly believed without circularity. This is easily done. The content of the 
thoughts expressed by sentences containing the relevant name is given in terms of 
concepts in the minds of speakers, which may turn out to be concepts of actual 
things and may not be. 
A few points of clarification are necessary at this point. First of all, it could be 
argued that this is merely Locke’s largely discredited theory (Le discredited by 
Wittgenstein’s Private Language argument). It is true that the above theory is similar 
to Locke’s but there are important differences, the main one being that, on Locke’s 
theory words stand for ideas in people’s minds; whereas, on the present view, words 
can quite legitimately be regarded as ‘standing for ’ things in the world by means of 
evoking concepts in the minds of other speakers - or by causing them to grasp 
senses in their minds. 
Secondly, it could be argued that surely a sentence such as 
Kripke has just published a new book 
will refer to Kripke and books etc. Even if it is never communicated to anyone. For 
example, I could simply write it down in a diary and never show it to anyone. This 
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is indeed the case. The word ‘Kripke‘ will refer to Kripke even if the sentence is 
never actually communicated to anyone - but only in the sense that it has the 
potential to cause other speakers to have certain thoughts, or to grasp certain senses. 
[The Private Language objection will be dealt with below] 
The third point of clarification is an important one. It is that, although I am 
proposing that it is speakers who refer, I am not making the distinction between 
speaker’s reference and semantic reference drawn by Kripke in his (1977). On the 
current view there is no such distinction. 
Kripke begins his 1977 paper by examining Donnellan’s distinction between the 
referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions in order to see whether the 
distinction really does count against Russell’s treatment of descriptions in his 
Theory of Descriptions. Although Kripke decides that Donnellan’ s distinction 
probably does not count against Russell he nevertheless accepts that it is a genuine 
distinction and that it can be used to illustrate a difference between what Kripke 
terms ‘speaker’s reference‘ and ‘semantic reference‘. The background to the 
distinction is Grice’s work on implicature - i.e saying one thing but meaning 
something else. The classic example is the situation where one burglar says to 
another, “The cops have arrived”, but actually means something else, such as “Let’s 
get out of here!”. In a similar fashion Donnellan cites the now famous example of 
the man in the dock accused of the brutal murder of Smith when he is in fact 
innocent of the crime. According to Donnellan, someone present in the courtroom 
could refer to this man using the description “Smith’s murderer”, as in “Smith’s 
murderer is insane”, even though the man in the dock does not fit the description. 
This is the referential use of a definite description. 
Kripke proposes his own example involving proper names rather than 
descriptions which is supposed to illustrate the distinction between speaker’s 
reference and semantic reference. Suppose, says Kripke (1 977, p257) two people see 
Smith in the distance raking leaves and mistake him for Jones. They have a brief 
colloquy: “What is Jones doing?’ “Raking leaves”. “Jones” in the common language 
of both is a name of Jones; it never names Smith. Yet, in some sense, on this 
occasion, clearly both participants in the dialogue have referred to Smith, and the 
second participant has said something true about the man he referred to if and only 
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if Smith was raking leaves (whether or not Jones was). Thus, for Kripke, the 
semantic referent of a designator is given by certain conventions of the speaker’s 
idiolect (given various facts about the world). The speaker’s referent on the other 
hand, will be that object which the speaker wishes to talk about, on a given 
occasion, and believes fulfils the conditions for being the semantic referent (Ibid.) In 
the above example, Jones is the semantic referent, while Smith is the speaker’s 
referent. 
In what follows I shall argue that what Kripke calls semantic reference is actually 
speaker’s reference, and what he calls speaker’s reference is not really reference at 
all. To see this, consider again the example of Smith raking leaves and being 
mistaken for Jones by two speakers, call them A and B. Now Kripke (and probably 
Donnellan) thinks it obvious that when A says to B: 
(i) Jones is raking leaves 
that A is referring to Smith (on this occasion) and has said something true about 
Smith. But there is reason to doubt this, because if A reports what he believes he 
has witnessed, he will say something false, as in: 
(ii) Today I saw Jones raking leaves 
or 
(iii) Jones was raking leaves in the park 
Even if he reports in the present tense, as in 
(iv) I am watching Jones raking leaves 
what he is saying is false. So if (ii), (iii) and (iv) are false, how can (i) be true? And 
if (i) is not true, how can A be referring to the man raking leaves? Of course A 
believes that he has referred to Jones and that he has said something true about 
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Jones, but he has failed to do so. I.e. he has failed to utter a truth and he has failed to 
refer to the person he intended to refer to. Seen in this way there is no such 
phenomenon as speaker’s reference in Kripke’ s sense. 
Another way of looking at the problem is to consider what is understood by the 
name ‘ Jones‘ . Suppose it has a sense something like: 
The man commonly believed to be the Dean of the Faculty 
then A is really saying to B 
The man who is commonly believed to be Dean of the Faculty is raking leaves 
which is, again, just false. 
As far as the so-called ‘Gricean Implicature‘ is concerned, such a phenomenon 
need not trouble us. When the burglar says “The cops have arrived”, if he means 
something else by this then he is not speaking English. At least he is not speaking 
literally. He is speaking figuratively, or euphemistically - which is fine, so long as 
other people are privy to the fact that the literal use is not intended. If other speakers 
are not privy to this then the burglar will be talking to himself. The non-literal use of 
expressions in a language such as English is really a separate language because a 
literal speaker of English would misunderstand such a language unless someone lets 
him in on the secret - for example, that “The cops have arrived” really means “Let’s 
get out of here”, or “Let’s give ourselves up”, or whatever. Thus the expression 
“The cops have arrived” is really being used as a kind of code, or perhaps a 
euphemism. This is fine but it is not a literal use of English and so need not trouble 
any general theory of the semantics of English. 
Reference consists in speakers referring each other to what they take to be things 
in the world. This requires speakers to grasp senses in their minds. In this sense 
meanings are in the head and sense does determine reference, since it determines 
what the speakers are talking about. 
Another way of looking at the problem is as follows. Suppose that ‘NN‘ is a name 
for something; then its correct use in a language will be necessary for it to refer. 
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This correct use involves speakers grasping senses in their minds. But not only is 
correct use necessary for reference, it is surely sufficient. If I use a name correctly 
then I will be referring to its referent. So not only can we say that meaning is use, 
we can also say that reference is use - where use involves understanding - i.e. 
speakers grasping senses in their minds - or the potential for this to happen. This 
also counts against any causal theory of reference since correct use does not seem to 
presuppose any causal connection to a mind-independent external world. 
There are still problems, however. The main problem is where senses come fiom. 
They are surely not innate as Chomsky and Fodor claim, and we must say more than 
Frege when he says that senses are grasped by anyone who is familiar with the 
language. It is at this point that DRT seems to have the advantage over the 
Traditional View in its insistence on the contribution from the environment because 
if senses are not innate then where else could they come fiom? And if the meanings 
of our terms do depend on some kind of causal connection with the environment 
then meanings would definitely not be in the head. This is what Putnam tries to 
establish with his Brain-in-a-vat argument. We have seen that this does not work in 
the way Putnam wants, and also that it can be turned on its head to show the 
opposite of what he claims. What also counts against the claim that it is the external 
world that determines the reference of our terms is quite simply that there may not 
be a mind-independent external world. In other words, meanings could be in the 
head for the simple reason that what we regard as the external world could be in the 
head. DRT and the scientific realism that underlies it is guilty of making the same 
unjustified assumptions about reality that metaphysical realists have been accused of 
making since at least the time of Locke and Berkeley. What Locke and Berkeley did 
agree on is that the meanings of our terms come from our experience. Whether this 
is experience of a mind-independent reality is debatable, but it seems clear that the 
senses of our words are indeed derived fiom experience. We experience, or believe 
we experience, such things as water, gold and tigers and from this experience we 
invent names for these things and associate senses with the names, in our minds. 
These senses (suitably qualified in terms of what the linguistic community believes) 
then determine reference for the speakers of the language; where reference is 
construed as consisting in speakers causing other speakers to have certain thoughts, 
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which may be thoughts about an external mind-independent reality, or may not be. 
That is a metaphysical claim beyond the scope of semantics. The Private Language 
objection can be answered at this point because the senses of our words are derived 
from experience of publicly observable things, or, in the case of mental terms, 
publicly observable behaviour. So meaning is public because senses are derived 
from what we take to be a publicly observable world. 
Another possible difficulty with the present theory is that it would seem to be 
difficult to say whether the beliefs of speakers which constitute the senses of terms 
are de re or de dicto. It could be that they are de dicto, in the first instance, and 
possibly de re on further investigation. Or it could simply be that the de re/de dicto 
distinction becomes blurred here - if not untenable. What is clear is that speakers do 
have beliefs and it is these beliefs that constitute the senses of their terms. 
In summary, then, sense is at the very least necessary for reference. This in itself 
is significant for any study of the supposed necessary a posteriori statements. 
Putnam and Kripke have failed to show that sense is not sufficient for reference, 
especially if we deal with the qualified notion of sense outlined above. Sense is 
sufficient for reference if we take reference to be the capacity for a word to be used 
and understood by speakers, which involves them referring each other to what they 
take to be the world. Of course we can be mistaken about senses, but once the 
mistake has been discovered the meaning of the word changes. Not only does sense 
determine reference (in a sense) but meanings are in the head, in the sense that it is 
something in the minds of speakers which determines what they are referring to - 
but not in any magical way. I.e. we are not dealing with narrow states. 
Even if Kripke and Putnam do not accept the sufficiency of sense in determining 
reference, they cannot deny its necessity. If they wish to argue that sense is 
indeterminate in some way then they must accept that reference is indeterminate 
because sense is a necessary condition for reference. Ironically, when Putnam tries 
to loosen up the criteria by which reference is determined he does not give us a 
better way of determining reference, but merely makes it more difficult, if not 
impossible, to talk about reference at all. But this is something we must live with. It 
is a consequence of the limits of our knowledge of the world. 
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As far as the claims about necessary a posteriori truths, or whether such 
statements as ‘Water is H20’ are analytic are concerned, we shall deal with these in 
chapter 6.  In the meantime, however, we should remember the kind of language we 
are dealing with. We are dealing with what we could term a ‘Scientific Language’; 
not the language of the man in the street. In the scientific language, strictly 
speaking, we should not make such statements as ‘Water is H20‘ but only such 
statements as 
Water appears to be H20 
The substance that is commonly believed to have properties P1 .... Pn appears to have 
chemical composition H20 
Seen in this way, questions of necessity, a priority and analyticity hardly seem 
appropriate. Ironically, such questions only arise for language as used by the man in 
the street and not for the scientist. Such use is, strictly speaking, incorrect. It is not 
the language of science. 
One final point about whether names have sense which determine their reference 
and whether we need to possess senses in order to refer is that, strictly speaking, we 
do not need proper names, or even natural kind terms like ‘water‘ and ‘gold‘ at all. 
We could simply use descriptions instead. We could get rid of all proper names, and 
most natural kind terms and replace them with descriptions - not in the abstract and 
artificial way advocated by Quine, but just as we sometimes do in ordinary speech 
when we forget a name. We cannot do things the other way round. We cannot get 
rid of descriptions and simply rely on ‘mere tags‘ because there would be no 
understanding - and hence no language. Of course I am not suggesting that for 
ordinary use we should do this; but for the scientific language we could and indeed 
should. There is certainly nothing to prevent it logically. We would still need 
general terms such as ‘liquid’ and ‘metal‘, but we do not need names like ‘water‘ 
and, ‘gold‘. These ‘mere tags‘ are just that without a descriptive sense which allows 
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their participation in the language. If we accept that we do not really need proper 
names or the type of natural kind terms dealt with by Kripke and Putnam then DRT 




In “Identity and Necessity” and Naming and Necessity Kripke makes many bold 
claims about the existence of necessary a posteriori truths. This is a consequence of 
his thesis that proper names and even names for natural kinds are rigid designators, 
in conjunction with his claim that identity statements involving rigid designators are 
necessary. This latter is derived from the metaphysical thesis that any pair of 
objects, x and y, if they are identical, then they are necessarily identical. 
Kripke’s alleged examples of the necessary a posteriori are by now well known. 
They include such statements as: 
(i) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
(ii) Water is H20 
(iii) Nixon is the offspring of gametes G 
This claim to the necessity of identity is explicated in terms of possible worlds. For 
example, if Hesperus is Phosphorus in the actual world and ‘Hesperus‘ and 
‘Phosphorus‘ are rigid designators then there will be no possible worlds where the 
planet Venus exists and Hesperus is not Phosphorus since the names ‘Hesperus‘ and 
‘Phosphorus‘ designate the same object in all worlds where the relevant object 
exists. This is what Kripke calls ‘weak necessity‘ or metaphysical necessity. Such 
claims were originally regarded as outrageous by many philosophers who 
maintained that an empirical discovery must be contingent. Kripke did not falter in 
the face of such opposition but insisted that some empirical discoveries are indeed 
necessary, because identity statements are necessary. 
In the present chapter we will be concerned with this claim to the necessity of 
identity which has become the orthodox view in philosophy. Few philosophers 
would now argue with Kripke’s claim that identity statements are necessary. (One 
who does is Ian Hacking whose views we shall consider later). Not all would agree 
with Kripke that statements such as (i) - (iii) are examples of non-trivial essentialism 
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(E.g. Salmon, 198 1). Not all would even grant that they are a posteriori (Fitch, 1976 
and Salmon,1986, as we have seen, argue that statements like (i), at least, are a 
priori); and not all would concur with the Kripkean view that the necessity of such 
statements has anything to do with the rigidity of names or that their modality can 
be explicated in terms of possible worlds (E.g. Wiggins, 1976). On the necessity of 
identity, however, there is broad agreement. The initial shock has subsided and 
faded into an admiring acquiescence. The case is closed. 
In what follows I shall present a simple, and I believe novel, argument, which 
although not entirely conclusive, amounts to at least primafacie evidence for the re- 
opening of the debate, and at most to a serious challenge which undermines the 
claim that identity statements are necessary. If this challenge is successhl then 
serious damage will have been inflicted on the claim that ordinary proper names or 
names for natural kinds are rigid designators, and even on the claim that expressions 
of the form a=b make genuine statements at all. This would vindicate Wittgenstein’s 
position in the Tractatus where he describes identity statements as “expedients in 
presentation” (4.242, 5.535). Of course if statements of the form a=b do not make 
genuine statements we must ask how it is that we seem to understand them. This 
question will also be dealt with in the present chapter. Before proceeding to the 
question of the modality of identity statements, however, we must be clear as to 
what sort of thing we are supposed to be dealing with. In other words, what does a 
so-called ‘ identity statement‘ actually state? 
To simplify matters we shall deal initially with identity statements involving 
ordinary proper names rather than general terms - statements like: 
‘ Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ and ‘Cicero is Tully‘ 
These are examples of what is usually termed synchronic identity, or identity at the 
same time; to distinguish it from diachronic identity, or identity over time, or 
through time, as in the case of personal identity. Later in the chapter we will 
question this distinction between synchronic and diachronic identity, but for the 
time being we shall let it stand. 
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Within the category of synchronic identity there are traditionally two opposing 
theories concerning the meaning or content of identity statements. These are the 
objectual analysis, which holds that it is the objects x and y, or a and b, that are 
identical; and the meta-linguistic analysis, which says that an identity statement is 
about the co-referentiality of linguistic items. For example, according to the meta- 
linguistic analysis the statement “Hesperus is Phosphorus” just means, or has as 
content, that the names ‘Hesperus‘ and ‘Phosphorus‘ are co-referential. In the light 
of Frege’s work on identity the meta-linguistic analysis could be divided into a 
simple analysis, like that found in The Begriffsschrift (1879); and a sophisticated 
analysis, such as the one posited in Frege’s (1892) where he introduces the notion of 
sense as a mediator of reference in order to solve the problem about the difference in 
cognitive value between statements of the form a=a, and those of the form a=b. On 
the other hand, Frege’s later view may actually be a form of the objectual analysis 
(This is how it is usually taken). 
Clearly the objectual and the meta-linguistic analyses are two very different 
analyses of identity statements which will have different consequences for the 
modality of such statements. Although Frege himself was not concerned with 
modality it is obvious that any meta-linguistic analysis of identity statements has the 
consequence that they are contingent since it is a contingent matter whether an 
object is known by two names or referred to in two different ways (This is one of 
the reasons that Frege abandoned the Begrzffshrzp account of identity). The 
objectual analysis, on the other hand, would seem to have the consequence that true 
identity statements are necessary. Although Kripke does not say what an identity 
statement actually means it is clear that he must opt for the objectual analysis. This 
is supported by what he says on page 3 of (1 980): 
.... identity is an ‘internal‘ relation: (x) (y) (x=y) + 0 (x=y) .... If ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ are 
rigid designators, it follows that ‘a=b‘, if true, is a necessary truth. If ‘a‘ and 
’b’ are not rigid designators, no such conclusion follows about the statement 
‘a=b‘ (though the objects designated by ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ will be necessarily 
identical) 
And again on page 4: 
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,“* 
We must distinguish three distinct theses: (i) that identical objects are 
necessarily identical; (ii) that true identity statements between rigid 
designators are necessary; (iii) that identity statements between what we call 
‘names‘ in actual language are necessary. (i) and (ii) are (self-evident) theses 
of philosophical logic independent of natural language. They are related to 
each other though (i) is about objects and (ii) is meta-linguistic. 
By ‘meta-linguistic‘ of course Kripke does not mean what we have termed the meta- 
linguistic analysis of identity statements. What is clear from the above quotes is that 
if we accept that identity statements between ordinary names are necessary then we 
need the objectual analysis of identity statements to be the true analysis. 
The main problem with the objectual analysis is how to account for the difference 
in cognitive value between trivial a priori statements of the form a=a, and 
informative, empirically discoverable truths of the form a=b. This is just the sort of 
problem that the meta-linguistic analysis deals with so well. The problem for the 
objectual analysis is that sentences of the form a=a and a=b seem to express the 
same proposition; in which case how can one be a priori and necessary while the 
other is a posteriori and contingent? Actually it is rather remarkable that the 
fundamental difference in the modal and epistemic status of these two types of 
statement, together with their potential to affect behaviour, or not as the case may 
be, has not been taken as evidence for the fact that statements of the form a=a and 
a=b have absolutely nothing to do with one another. They do not express the same 
proposition. They do not say the same thing; nor do they deal in the same properties 
or relations because one is a priori, trivial and necessary, while the other is a 
posteriori, contingent, and has the potential to profoundly affect behaviour. The 
objectual analysis either ignores this considerable body of evidence or it has to 
invent some rather tortuous and profoundly counter-intuitive ways of accounting for 
the modal and epistemic differences. 
Attempted solutions of the problem of the informativeness of identity statements 
take many forms within the objectual analysis. Some we have already encountered, 
such as Salmon’s view that statements of the form a=b are actually a priori, since 
they express the same proposition as those of the form a=a; or Kripke’s claim that 
we must distinguish between the epistemological claim that a statement is a priori or 
a posteriori, and the metaphysical claim that it is necessary or contingent. Since we 
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have already seen that Salmon’s views are incoherent and since Kripke’s claims 
involve the claim to the necessity of identity - the subject of this chapter - we shall 
leave them for the time being. 
In his book on identity statements Thomas Morris (1984) offers two more 
arguments which are supposed to reconcile the informativeness of identity 
statements with the objectual analysis. These come from Plantinga (1974) and 
Stalnaker (1972, 1976) and are typical of the response put forward by advocates of 
the objectual analysis. Basically Plantinga and Stalnaker seek to explain the 
informativeness of a statement like “Hesperus is Phosphorus” by arguing that when 
we discover the identity we are discovering the contingent fact that this sentence 
expresses the necessary proposition that Hesperus is Hesperus. This is supposed to 
explain how the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus can be empirical when the 
core content of the sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is a necessary proposition. 
The empirical discovery is that a certain sentence expresses a necessary proposition. 
Actually Stalnaker goes further, suggesting that there are two propositions involved 
in our understanding of a statement like “Hesperus is Phosphorus” (1976, p88-89). 
First of all there is the contingent proposition that the sentence “Hesperus is 
Phosphorus” expresses the proposition that Venus is self-identical, and secondly, 
there is the necessary proposition about self-identity that it does express. 
The most obvious objection to this line of argument is that it makes empirical 
discoveries like the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus into linguistic 
discoveries - discoveries about what propositions are expressed by certain sentences 
- and this surely cannot be correct. When we discover that Hesperus is Phosphorus 
we surely make a discovery about extra-linguistic reality, not about language. 
Furthermore, if the likes of Plantinga are to be believed, then it seems that we can 
only discover that Hesperus is Phosphorus if we first have the appropriate sentence 
in our vocabulary. This would rule out an accidental discovery of this type of 
identity. We can surely discover that Hesperus is Phosphorus even if no-one has 
ever formulated the appropriate sentence or ever suggested or suspected that 
Hesperus might be Phosphorus. The theories of Plantinga and Stalnaker also lead to 
the conclusion that we can understand sentences without knowing what propositions 
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they express. If propositions do not contribute to understanding then what exactly 
are they supposed to contribute to? 
In his (1984) Moms highlights an even more fundamental flaw in Plantinga’s 
argument, and that is that it leads to an infinite regress. On page 10 of (1984) Morris 
characterises Plantinga’s argument in the following way (where S stands for the 
sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus”, and (1) for the sentence “Hesperus is 
Hesperus”): 
(i) S expresses some proposition P 
(ii) (1) expresses some proposition PI 
(iii) P ‘is the same as‘ P1 
(iv) (iii) was discovered to be true 
According to Plantinga, the ancient astronomers discovered (iii), that P is P1. Now, 
Morris argues, if this is regarded as a sentence in our language, then it expresses a 
proposition, the same proposition as the sentence ‘P1 is Pl‘. And so we have the 
same problem again of how ‘P is P 1 ‘ can be informative when ‘P1 is P 1 ‘ is not - ad 
infinitum; and so Plantinga’s analysis fails. 
As for Stalnaker’s claim that we are dealing with two propositions, one 
contingent, the other necessary, this fares no better according to Moms. On page 21 
of his (1984) Moms highlights an admission by Stalnaker to the effect that anyone 
who asserts a statement like “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is really only asserting the 
contingent proposition that the sentence expresses a necessary proposition. In 
Stalnakers view this person does not, and need not, assert the necessary proposition 
itself (1976, p88-89). For Morris, this admission by Stalnaker amounts to an 
admission that statements of the form a=b do not assert necessary propositions 
dealing in self-identity. As Moms himself puts it: 
By Stalnaker’s admission, the necessary statement of self-identity does not 
figure in the empirical role of any identity statement. Why then should any 
such necessary statement be accepted as the correct analysis of an identity 
statement of the form of S in the first place? (1 984, p22) 
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The failure of the objectual analysis in itself is enough to falsify the claim that 
identity statements are necessary, since the necessity of identity statements of the 
form a=b seem to derive their claim to necessity from the fact that at the core of 
such statements lies the necessary truth that one object is self-identical. I am not 
denying that the self-identity of an object is necessary, provided we can make sense 
of the concept of self-identity. What I do deny is that statements of the form a=b 
have anything to do with self-identity. The above arguments bear this out. 
What also bears this out is the meta-linguistic analysis of identity statements. 
According to this analysis, remember, a statement of the form a=b is not about any 
objects which are designated by ‘a‘ and ’b‘, but about the linguistic items ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ 
themselves. In other words the meta-linguistic analysis says that ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ are co- 
referential. Now as we have already seen, it may be that there are two versions of the 
meta-linguistic thesis. There is that dealt with by Frege in his early work, where he 
deals with the simple co-referentiality thesis; and then there is Frege’s later work on 
sense and reference which advances an analysis of identity statements according to 
which ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ are not simply co-referential but have senses which contain 
different modes of presentation of the same object. 
Of course Frege’s later work may not be any kind of meta-linguistic thesis; and 
even if it is, it is not straightforwardly so because of the introduction of these modes 
of presentation which do not seem straightforwardly linguistic. Dummett (1 973) 
certainly regards Frege’s later theory as an objectual one. As he says on page 544: 
In Begriflsschrij? Frege held that identity was a relation between names not 
between things. His motive for this view was to give an explanation of the 
informativeness of a true identity statement: but it makes nonsense of the use 
of bound variables on either side of the sign of identity. 
On the other hand, Linsky (in his 1977) takes Frege’s (1892) to be an analysis of 
identity which is neither straightforwardly obj ectual nor straightforwardly meta- 
linguistic (1 977, p22). This is certainly preferable to Dummett’s view since 
Dummett is surely mistaken in claiming that Frege rejected the meta-linguistic 
thesis because of its inability to cope with bound variables on either sign of the 
identity sign. As Moms rightly points out: “The occurrence of the sign ‘=‘ between 
bound variables does not make an identity statement, it constitutes a statementform 
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for an identity statement.” (1 984, p41). Once we assign values to the variables we 
have an identity statement, but not before then. 
Whether Frege’s later thesis is meta-linguistic or not, it is clear that he rejects his 
early analysis of identity - what we have been calling the simple meta-linguistic 
thesis. We shall see below that Frege may have been too hasty in his rejection of his 
early work on identity. 
Frege apart, there are two classic objections to the simple meta-linguistic thesis. 
The first of these is that such an analysis leads to an infinite regress. David Wiggins 
explains perfectly how the regress is supposed arise in his (1 965) thus: 
The regress which the two signs theory causes, at least in Frege’s 
formulation, arises in the following way. Asking for the sense of ‘a=b‘ I am 
told ‘a‘ and ‘b’ have the same content, or designate only one thing. Unless 
something is said to justify calling a halt here, the explanation generates a 
new statement of the same form as the original explicandum - ‘The content 
or designatum of “a” = the content or designatum of “b”.’ Applying the 
same explanation to this we get ‘The content or designatum of “the content 
or designatum of ‘a”’ = the content or designatum of “the content or 
designatum of ‘b”’.’ But evidently we never can reach in this way what 
seems to be needed to carry the explanation through a statement only about 
signs. (1 965, In Butler (Ed.), p5 1) 
It seems to me, however, that the simple meta-linguistic thesis does not, or need not, 
lead to an infinite regress if it is formulated in the correct way. If we take the general 
statement form ‘a=b‘, then instead of explicating it by simply saying that ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ 
are co-referential, or have the same content, as Wiggins does, we formulate it in the 
following way: 
(3x) (‘a‘ designates x & ‘b‘ designates x) 
This does not lead to an infinite regress because the sign for identity does not even 
appear. This is a perfectly reasonable formulation of the meta-linguistic thesis 
(Although Frege would probably object to it. [See (1 892,pl)I 
The other classic objection to the meta-linguistic thesis is simpler than the above 
but every bit as devastating if upheld. The objection is quite simply that the meta- 
linguistic analysis reduces what is supposed to be a discovery about the world to one 
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about how two names have been used, which is surely wrong. Furthermore, it seems 
that on this analysis, someone who discovers that Hesperus is Phosphorus, for 
example, makes a different discovery from the person who discovers that the 
evening star is the morning star, or the person who uses names other than 
‘Hesperus‘ and ‘Phosphorus’ for the planet Venus; whereas, intuitively, these people 
make the same discovery that we do. 
These objections do seem to tell heavily against the meta-linguistic thesis, but we 
must not be too hasty here. Although it is true that the person who discovers that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus makes the same discovery as the person who discovers that 
the evening star is the morning star, this is because the name ‘Hesperus’ has the 
same sense as the expression ‘evening star‘, while the name ‘Phosphorus‘ has the 
same sense as the expression ‘morning star‘. 
As for the objection that the meta-linguistic analysis fails to account for the fact 
that we are dealing with an empirical discovery about the world and not a discovery 
about language use, this takes us to the very heart of the problem about what it is 
that an identity statement actually states. Of course it is true that in discovering that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus we are discovering something about the world; although we 
do make a linguistic discovery at the same time. We could say that we are 
discovering that two names we previously believed to refer to two distinct objects 
actually refer to the same object. One of the features of the meta-linguistic analysis 
which no doubt cornmends it to many people is that it is in fact true. The items ‘a‘ 
and ‘b‘ really are co-referential, and this is at least part of what we are discovering. 
It can certainly be informative to tell someone that ‘a‘ and ‘b’ refer to the same thing 
if that person has hitherto believed that they refer to different things. 
The problem for Frege, of course, is that, as far as the meta-linguistic analysis is 
concerned, a=b would only be informative about the language in question, not the 
ostensible subject matter. As he says in his (1892): 
..The sentence a=b would no longer refer to the subject matter, but only to its 
mode of designation; we would express no proper knowledge by its means ... If 
the sign ‘a‘ is distinguished from the sign ‘b’ only as object (here, by means of 
its shape) and not as sign (i.e. not by the manner in which it designates 
something), the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of 
a=b, provided a=b is true. A difference can arise only if the difference between 
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the signs corresponds to a difference in the mode of presentation of that which 
is designated. (In Moore, Ed. 199 , p23,24) 
The mode of presentation is of course equivalent to the sense of the name in 
question - or is contained within the sense of the name. 
The meta-linguistic theory does eventually fail on the point that it does not take 
into account that the discovery being expressed here is a discovery about the world 
and not purely a discovery about language use. We may be discovering something 
about language when we discover that Hesperus is Phosphorus but basically we are 
making a discovery about the heavens. Although I think that the meta-linguistic 
analysis is preferable to the objectual analysis because it is not nearly so deficient as 
most commentators claim, it is ultimately a failure as an analysis of the content of 
identity statements of the form a=b. 
So if the objectual and the meta-linguistic analyses both fail where does it leave 
us with respect to the content of identity statements? According to Morris we are left 
with a third analysis - a functional analysis - in which we make a fundamental 
switch of emphasis from asking what an identity statement informs us of, to asking 
how it informs us. The theory is not well known, and it is Morris’ intention to 
remedy this. It does have a strong pedigree, however, in the sense that it originates 
with P.F. Strawson (1974) and A.J.Ayer (1975), as well as being advocated by 
Michael Lockwood (1 971) and possibly Butchvarov (1 979). The central tenet of the 
functional analysis of identity statements is that such statements are to be 
characterised in terms of their cognitive role or function. In Strawson’s words, we 
cease to treat identity statements as predications and concentrate on how they inform 
us. The cognitive role of identity statements is neatly characterised by Morris as 
follows : 
According to a functional analysis an identity licenses or warrants the 
collating of bodies of information, both previously acquired and yet to be 
obtained. It does not predicate any particular property of any object or objects. 
Specifically, it does not attribute a logically simple, essential metaphysical 
property of synchronic self-identity to any object, nor does it assert any 
relation to hold between any two linguistic items. (1 984, p68) 
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This is the epistemic function of identity statements. There is also an ontological 
function, which is to simplify our view of the world by reducing the number of 
entities in our ontology. For example, prior to the discovery that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, we have two bodies of information which we associate with the two 
names - one body of information per name. On discovering that Hesperus is 
identical with Phosphorus we are licensed to merge the two bodies into one and thus 
reduce the number of entities in our ontology by one. This is the cognitive function 
of identity statements. 
The functional analysis of identity statements is fundamentally flawed, however. 
It does not work either in detail or in principle. In fact in its abandonment of the 
search for the content of identity statements it simply gives up on the concept of 
identity altogether. The main reason for its failure lies in its inability to say how an 
identity statement licenses the collating of bodies of information. For example, if an 
identity statement is to license anything at all, it must be true - and presumably the 
people who are being informed must know that it is true. This of course leads to all 
sorts of problems about what is to count as knowledge. We might, for instance, have 
good reason to believe something to be true and thereby believe that we are being 
licensed to collate two bodies of information when actually the identity in question 
is false. Even if the identity statement in question is true and we do collate two 
bodies of information into one, this might not be informative. Take, for example, the 
following statement: 
Clark Kent is Superman 
If the functional analysis is correct then this should license the collation of the 











able to leap 
tall buildings 
with a single bound 
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This would allow us to conclude that one person is called ‘Clark Kent‘ and also 
called ‘Superman‘, and is a mild-mannered, meek, newspaper reporter, and also a 
brave daring, superhero etc. This is not informative, but downright confusing. 
These last two points of criticism are only problems with the detail of the 
functional analysis, however. The main objection concerns a problem with the 
analysis, inprincipze - and this is the problem of how an identity statement licenses 
the collation of bodies of information. As already mentioned, the statement in 
question would have to be true, and we would have to know that it was true. But 
how can we know that a statement is true unless we know what its content is - i.e. 
unless we know what it is a statement o p  The functional analysis fails because it is 
designed to avoid the problem of content, but it cannot do so. No sooner does it try 
to side-step the question of content than it is pulled straight back to it. It is therefore 
of no use as an analysis of identity statements. Even if we weaken the knowledge 
requirement and substitute justified belief or something similar for certain 
knowledge, we still have the same fundamental flaw. For instance, we might want to 
say that an identity statement licenses the collating of two bodies of information if 
people have good reason to accept the statement, or are justified in believing the 
statement. But this still involves us in the problem of content - i.e. what is it that 
these people are justified in believing? That a=b? Fine, but what exactly is that? We 
are back to square one. The functional analysis is a complete failure. 
So far, then, we have seen that the traditional analyses, and not so traditional 
analyses of identity statements have failed to provide us with an adequate 
characterisation of what it is that an identity statement actually says. We have seen 
that the objectual analysis fails because of its inability to make sense of the 
difference in informativeness between statements of the form ‘a=a‘ and those of the 
form ‘a=b‘. The meta-linguistic thesis, although not nearly as inadequate as some 
would claim, cannot account for the fact that an identity statement is supposed to 
deal with an empirical discovery about the world and not just a discovery about the 
use of two linguistic items. Frege’s later work on the sensekeference distinction 
provides no real improvement on his earlier meta-linguistic thesis for various 
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reasons. First of all, it may be that it is really a version of the objectual analysis 
where, instead of simply talking about the objects a and b, he talks about those 
objects in a certain way; or as presented to the mind in a certain way. According to 
Frege, this analysis resolves the difficulty of explaining the difference in cognitive 
value between ‘a=a‘ and ‘a=b’ because of the difference in the senses of ‘a‘ and ‘b‘, 
which contain different modes of presentation of a and b. But this is no 
improvement on the early theory because the names involved in this early theory 
would have to have senses anyway, in order to be names. Secondly, if Frege’s later 
theory is an objectual theory then it fails because he still has to talk about two 
objects being identical. How exactly can two objects be identical? In the case of the 
identity ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ why do we talk about the objects Hesperus and 
Phosphorus being identical? Are we dealing with two objects, one called ‘Hesperus’ 
and one called ‘Phosphorus‘? Surely not; although this may depend on how we are 
to define an object. [ See e.g. Butchvarov (1979 ) who distinguishes between objects 
and entities in order to deal with the identity puzzle 3 This alone should tell us that 
there is something wrong with the objectual analysis. 
The StrawsodAyerhdorris functional analysis, as we have seen, is hopefully 
flawed and therefore no alternative to the traditional analyses. This seems to lead to 
the conclusion that there is no adequate way in which we can make sense of so- 
called identity statements of the form ‘a=b‘. If the above-mentioned analyses 
exhaust the possibilities then we must conclude with Wittgenstein that expressions 
of the form ‘a=b’ are only expedients in presentation (Tractatus 4.242) and even that 
the identity sign is not an essential constituent of logical notation (Ibid. 5.533); 
although we should also remember that in the Investigations Wittgenstein seems to 
retreat from the certainty of the Tractatus when he says at 2 1 5 : 
But isn’t the same at least the same? 
We seem to have an infallible paradigm of identity of a thing with itself. ... If you are 
seeing a thing you are seeing identity. 
This is clearly a departure from the Tractatus view where Wittgenstein says that to 
say of two things that they are identical is nonsense whereas to say that a thing is 
identical with itself is to say nothing (5.5303) 
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Obviously Wittgenstein like everyone else who has written on the subject of 
identity, sees little or no difference between statements of the form ‘a=a‘ and those 
of the form ‘a=b’. Here we must be clear about the purpose of the present chapter. 
Our intention is not to challenge the validity or legitimacy of statements of the form 
‘a=a‘, or self-identity, but to question the necessity, and even the legitimacy of 
statements of the form ‘a=b‘; what Butchvarov calls ‘material identity’, as opposed 
to the formal identity statements ‘a=a‘. It is a contention of the present chapter that 
statements of the form ‘a=b‘ have nothing whatsoever to do with self-identity 
because they are, or can be, empirical discoveries, whereas self-identity cannot be 
an empirical discovery. So far we have seen that all the traditional analyses of 
material synchronic identities have failed. If we are to conclude from this that such 
expressions do not make genuine statements then obviously they cannot be 
necessary truths, and so we have succeeded in showing that there are no necessary a 
posteriori truths involving identity statements. 
If the foregoing is not conclusive then there are other ways in which we can 
question the necessity of identity. First of all, consider the alleged proof of the 
necessity of identity fi-om Marcus (1947) which goes something like the following: 













Quantifying over x and y we get 
7. (Vx) (Vy) (x=y + CI (x=y)) 
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In other words, if necessary identity with x is a property of x, and x=y, then by 
Leibniz’ Law, it must be a property of y. When we substitute proper names for x and 
y we get the necessity of statements like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’. That is, we get: 
8. (a=b) +U (a=b) where ‘a‘ and ‘b’ are proper names 
Responses to this proof are varied, ranging from the Russellian response which 
claims that a statement like, for example, ‘Cicero is Tully‘ is not a genuine identity 
statement (because it does not involve what Russell regards as logically proper 
names) but a disguised existential statement, to Quine’s retort that substitution of 
co-referential terms fails to preserve truth in modal contexts. More recently there has 
been the response of Hacking (1 976) who argues that the Marcus proof fails because 
identity is not a relation between individuals. Taking his definition of identity from 
Principia Mathernatica, where identity for individuals must be defined in terms of 
predicates of Type I and Level I (in Church’s terminology), Hacking claims that 
identity of an individual, and hence necessary identity of an individual, is of Type I, 
Level 2 (1976, p153). I shall not deal with these views here but merely mention 
them as an indication of the controversy that has arisen in the past over the question 
of the necessity of identity. 
In recent times this controversy seems to have been resolved by Kripke in 
“Identity and Necessity” and Naming and Necessity. Kripke’s response to (8) is to 
accept it so long as ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ are rigid designators - i.e. they designate the same 
object in all possible worlds where the relevant object exists. In “Identity and 
Necessity” Kripke argues as follows: 
If names are rigid designators then there can be no question about identities 
being necessary, because ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ will both refer to this same object x, and 
to no other, and so there will be no situation where a might not have been b. 
That would have been a situation in which the object we are now calling ‘x’ 
would not have been identical with itself. ... One could not possibly have a 
situation where Cicero would not have been Tully or Hesperus would not have 
been Phosphorus (p 154) 
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He goes on to claim that anyone who thinks he can imagine a situation where the 
identity would not hold is deluding himself. According to Kripke any supposed 
counter-example to the necessity of identity involving proper names trades on the 
confusion between descriptions which merely fix the reference for us in the actual 
world and descriptions which are synonymous with the names. Indeed Kripke has 
become so adept at rebuffing alleged counter-examples to his thesis that most 
philosophers have given up trying to think of counter-examples. Kripke’s view has 
become the orthodoxy. 
In “Identity and Necessity” Kripke imagines a possible counter-example to the 
claim that Hesperus is necessarily identical to Phosphorus and that is the possible 
situation (possible world) where a planet other than Venus is visible in the morning 
and is called ‘Phosphorus‘. Venus is still visible in the evening and is called 
‘Hesperus‘; and, so the argument goes, this would be a world where Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus. But this is just a mistake, in Kripke’s view. Although the people in this 
other world would be able to say, truly, “Hesperus is not Phosphorus” that is 
irrelevant. It does not matter how names are used in other possible worlds, but only 
how we use them in the actual world (even though we could be the people in these 
other worlds). What is important is that we use the names ‘Hesperus‘ and 
‘Phosphorus‘ in the actual world as rigid designators of the planet Venus in all 
possible worlds where it exists; and so it is necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus, 
in Kripke’s special sense of ‘weak necessity‘. The alleged counter-example fails 
because it mistakes a reference-fixing description such as ‘The heavenly body in 
such-and-such a position in the evening/morning sky‘ for a description which gives 
the meaning of the name. If the names in question were synonymous with 
descriptions then, according to Kripke, the identity would be contingent since there 
are possible worlds where the heavenly body in such-and-such position in the 
evening sky is not the same as the heavenly body in such-and-such position in the 
morning sky. 
Before proceeding to the question of whether or not there are counter-examples to 
Kripke’s claims I wish to examine more closely the formal proof, particularly the 
claim that there is such a property as being necessarily identical with x, or even 
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being identical with x. I shall also question the substitution of identicals in modal 
contexts, but for reasons other than those given by Quine. 
As is well known, Quine (1961) blocks the proof of the necessity of identity by 
rejecting the claim that co-referential terms are always and everywhere 
intersubstitutable salva veritate. In intensional contexts such as epistemic, doxastic 
and modal contexts, substitution fails to preserve truth. For example, John may 
believe that Cicero denounced Catiline but not that Tully did so; even though the 
names ‘Cicero‘ and ‘Tully’ are co-referential. These are Quine’s famous 
referentially opaque contexts, according to which he would not allow the 
substitution of ‘y‘ for ‘x‘ in line (4) of the Marcus proof, thus blocking it. 
Whatever the merits or deficiencies of Quine’s argument I shall not follow his 
example, but nevertheless I do wish to question the substitution of ‘y‘ for ‘x’ in line 
(4). My criticism is simpler than Quine’s. I do not contend that Marcus goes too far 
in her substitution, but rather that she does not go far enough. What I mean by this is 
that, if we are to substitute ‘y‘ for ‘x.’ in the formula 
0 (x=x) 
then, quite simply, we must substitute for both occurrences of ‘x‘. If we do this, all 
we can conclude is the formula 
which is uncontroversial because it is trivial. 
It seems to be generally accepted that substitution of identicals in formulae need 
not take place for every occurrence of the proposed substituend. If this is the case 
then it is wholly unjustified. If we are to substitute ‘y‘ for ‘x‘ in any formula, we 
must surely substitute for all occurrences of ‘x’ because there is no difference 
between them. They are all the same object, or term, or whatever. 
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The other way in which we can look at the Marcus proof is in terms of properties 
rather than substitution. Seen in terms of properties the Marcus proof would go as 
fo 11 0 ws : 
x has the property of necessary identity with x 
x=y 
Ergo y has the property of necessary identity with x (by Leibniz’ Law) 
This is argued for by Wiggins (1 976) using the Lambda Calculus, thus: 
Of course we could also express the proof thus: 
x has the property of necessary self-identity 
x=y 
Ergo y has the property of necessary self-identity 
But this is trivial and does not require any kind of proof. If we want the substantial 
result we must adopt the first version where we talk of the property of identity with 
x, rather than self-identity. But this requires that we distinguish between these two 
properties. But what exactly is the difference between x’s being self-identical and 
x7s being identical with x? 
One obvious line of reply is that whereas all objects have self-identity, only x has 
the property of identity with x; but this would be to miss the point of the criticism. 
What we really want to know is what is the difference between x’s self-identity and 
x7s being identical with x? Unless this question can be answered the proof of the 
necessity of identity fails in this form. 
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Again we can cite Wiggins’ (1976) on the difference between the property ‘a is 
identical with a’ and the property ‘a is self-identical‘. As Wiggins explains 
(p 1 65,166): 
That hx(x=a) and hx(x=x) are different properties can be explained by tracing 
their actual relationship, which may be displayed as follows. Start with the 
primitive predicable ‘x=y‘ and abstract the property (hx)(hy) (x=y). That this 
is satisfied by a pair is recorded in our notation by (hx)(hy)(x=y),[w,z]. To get 
a’s own peculiar predicate (hx)(x=a) or (hw)[(hx,hy(x=y)),[w,a]] substitute a 
designation of a for z in the second free argument place in (hx)(hy)(x=y),[w,z] 
and bind the only free variable with h. Or to get the simpler designation 
(hx)(x=a), take the constant a as a value of z in (hx)(hy)(x=y),[w,z] and apply 
h-conversion to get ‘ F a ‘ .  Replace the variable w by the variable x and 
abstract on x to get (hx)(x=a). To get the universal predicate (hx)(x=x) or 
(hw)[(hx)(hy)(x=y),[w,w]] substitute the first argument for the second 
argument place in (hx)(hy)(x=y),[w,z] to get (hx)(hy)(x=y),[w,w] and bind the 
free variable with h. To get the simpler formula put t for both w and z in 
(hx)(hy)(x=y),[w,z], apply h-conversion to get ‘t=t‘, replace t by x to get 
‘x=x’ and abstract on x to get (hx)(x=x). 
The problem with the Marcus proof (and also the Wiggins version) is that it assumes 
a reading of O(x=x) which it does not justify. That is, O(x=x) must be read as 
attributing the property ‘necessary identity-with x‘ to x, rather than the property 
‘necessary self-identity‘ to x. In h-abstraction terms the logical truth 0 (x=x) is most 
easily and naturally seen as instantiation by x of the property of necesssary self- 
identity: hy. 0 (y=y) [XI. But then Leibniz’s Law yields only the trivial result 
x=y + (0 (X‘X) +U (y=y)) 
If U(x=x) is read as either attribution to x of the property of necessary identity with 
x, viz. hz. 0 (FX) [XI, or as attribution to the pair x,y of the property of necessary 
self-identity, hzhw. 0 (FW) [x,y], then in both cases it is being presupposed that x 
(or x and y) has th is  property. But this is just begging the question. There is no 
reason to read 0 (x=x) in this way, rather than simply as an attribution of self- 
identity. The Marcus/Wiggins ‘proof fails without M e r  justification of their 
particular reading of O(x=x). 
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Marcus regards the formula 
as a theorem which falls out naturally from her treatment of quantified modal logic; 
but this is just wrong. (7) is not a natural result but a wholly artificial one arising 
from an illegitimate and unjustified move. I am not of course accusing Marcus of 
any kind of gerrymandering or logical sleight of hand because the move in question 
is quite open; but I do claim that she must justify what seems an arbitrary move if 
the proof is to be accepted. This, I maintain, she cannot do. There is no way in 
which anyone can justify this picking and choosing among the occurrences of ‘x‘ in 
the formula 0 (x=x) when we are supposed to be substituting ‘y‘ for ‘x‘. To 
substitute only one occurrence rather than both must be justified because of the 
considerable difference in the result. Marcus must explain why her move is not 
arbitrary if we are to accept her substantial result. I see no way in which this can be 
done, and there is no use in appealing to precedent here. This is supposed to be a 
logical proof, not a legal case. I maintain, then, that if we are to substitute ‘y‘ for ‘x‘ 
in any formula we must substitute for all occurrences of ‘x’, and so in the present 
case, all we can conclude is that it is necessary that y=y, which is trivial. 
So far, then, we have seen that the claim to the necessity of identity fails for the 
following reasons: 
1. Names may not be rigid designators, or indeed any kind of designators 
2. The failure of the objectual, meta-linguistic and hc t iona l  analyses to give an 
acceptable account of what identity really is 
3. The failure of the Marcus ‘proof on two counts 
(i) The illegitimate substitution of only one occurrence of ‘x’ in 0 (x-x) 
(ii) The failure to explicate the difference between the properties ‘necessary 
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self -identity‘ and ‘necessary identity with x‘ 
What remains is to challenge Kripke’s claim that there are no counter-examples to 
his alleged examples of the necessary a posteriori - worlds where Hesperus is not 
Phosphorus and Cicero is not Tully etc. - and also to give an account of why it is 
that we use such statements and seem to understand them if they are not genuine 
statements. 
I shall maintain that there are indeed counter-examples to Kripke’s alleged 
necessary a posteriori truths - at least where ordinary proper names are concerned. If 
we take the stock example: 
Hesperus is Phosphorus 
I contend that there is a possible world where the planet Venus exists and yet it is 
not the case in that world that Hesperus is Phosphorus - or, at least it does not make 
sense to say that Hesperus is Phosphorus. Such a world could be the following (call 
it W): 
The possible world where Venus exists and is visible from Earth, but only in 
the evening - never in the morning - and is called simply ‘Hesperus‘ 
Now primafacie this would seem no different from the worlds already dealt with by 
Kripke where he points out that it is irrelevant what the object in question is called 
in another possible world or how the people in that world use names. As Kripke is at 
great pains to emphasize, it is how we use the names in question in the actual world 
that is important. In the HesperusRhosphorus case we use the names ‘Hesperus’ and 
‘Phosphorus‘ as rigid designators of the planet Venus, which means that there is no 
possible world where Venus exists and Hesperus is not Phosphorus since the planet 
will be designated by the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ in all worlds where it 
exists. It will be the case that Hesperus is Phosphorus in any arbitrarily chosen 
world simply if the planet Venus exists in that world. What the inhabitants of the 
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world say, or how they use certain names, is totally irrelevant to the question of 
whether it is true in that world that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
This has become a fairly standard view in philosophy, but nevertheless I maintain 
that it is mistaken. It is important what people say in other worlds; or rather, it is 
important what they are in a position to say, in principle. In the above example, for 
instance, it seems that the inhabitants of W could not make the empirical discovery 
that Hesperus is Phosphorus. The same people who discover that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus in the actual world cannot make this discovery by any means 
whatsoever in W; so of course they will never be in the position to assert that 
Hesperus is Phosphorus in W. This failure to be able to discover what is supposed to 
be uncontroversially true in certain worlds is the essence of my criticism of Kripke 
here. The question we must answer is 'Why is it that people cannot discover that, 
say, Hesperus is Phosphorus in a certain world, when they can discover it in other 
possible worlds?' This is a type of counter-example which Kripke has not 
considered, but which seriously undermines his claim to the necessity of identity 
because there does not seem to be any explanation of why it is that there are some 
worlds where certain things are supposed to be the case and yet it is totally beyond 
the powers of the inhabitants of that world to discover these things. 
To make the point clearer, suppose we imagine a possible world, again call it W, 
where Dr Jekyll exists but does not drink a potion which turns him into a hideous 
creature called 'Mr. Hyde', or anything else. He simply lives a quiet, respectable and 
unremarkable life. Moreover, there is no-one in W called Mr. Hyde. Now if we want 
to say that this is a world where Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde (which Kripke undoubtedly 
would) then what I want to know is this. Could the people in W ever make the 
empirical discovery that Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde? It seems to me that they could not. 
They certainly could not discover it in the way in which it is discovered in the actual 
world (or thefictional actual world) - i.e. by discovering that Dr. Jekyll has drunk a 
potion which transforms him into a hideous creature - so how exactly would they 
make the discovery? Remember, these could be the same people who make the 
discovery in the actual world - the same people with the same means at their 
disposal for making discoveries about the world - so they should be able to discover 
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that Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde, if it is true in W. They need not actuaZZy make the 
discovery of course; but they should be able to - in principle. Furthermore, they 
should be able to express this discovery, in a non-trivial way, in whatever language 
they speak. And yet there does not seem to be any way in which they could do this. 
It is not just very difficult for them to make the discovery. Neither is it a case of 
them having to make the discovery in a different way. It is quite simply beyond 
these people to discover empirically something they can discover in other worlds. 
This is very strange, considering that the only difference between W and the actual 
world is a difference that Kripke, and just about everyone else, would regard as 
irrelevant to the question of whether W is a world where Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde. 
Now this inability to make the discovery that Dr.Jekyl1 is Mr. Hyde in W does not 
in itself show that this is not true in W, but it does require an explanation. If this fact 
can be discovered in the actual world then why can it not be discovered by the same 
people in W? One possible answer to this question is that it is simply not true in W 
that Dr.Jekyl1 is Mr. Hyde. That is why these people cannot make the discovery. W 
is a world where Dr. Jekyll exists but is not identical with Mr. Hyde; and so (7) is 
not true. Identities involving ordinary proper names are not necessary. 
Before dealing with possible objections to this counter-example there is another 
way in which we could argue the point, and that is in terms of behaviour. In the 
actual world, when people discover that Dr.Jekyl1 is Mr. Hyde, the discovery is 
shocking and outrageous, and profoundly affects people’s behaviour. In W, on the 
other hand, there is nothing that these people can discover about Dr. Jekyll that is 
remotely shocking or outrageous; and so we can conclude that they cannot discover 
the same piece of knowledge. 
To the objections, then. I shall consider three. 
(i) The people in W cannot discover that Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde because they 
lack the concept of being Mr. Hyde 
(ii) The behavioural analysis fails because the reason that the discovery is so 
shocking in the actual world is that it is made against a certain background, 
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where a hideous creature has been terrorising the streets of London - a 
background that does not exist in W 
(iii) There is nothing to prevent names from being rigid designators and having 
sense given by a definite description, so long as the description is made 
rigid. 
Given this, the reason the inhabitants of W cannot discover that Dr. Jekyll is 
Mr. Hyde is simply that they lack the necessary name with the necessary sense. 
To deal with (i) first of all, it really just shifts the problem. If we cannot explain 
why people in W cannot discover that Dr. Jekyll is Mr. Hyde it is just as difficult to 
explain why they do not have the concept of being identical to Mr. Hyde, because it 
seems that they never could have the concept of being Mr. Hyde. This means that 
they can never conceive of the possibility of the identity, or conjecture about the 
identity, the way they can do in the actual world. Again this must be explained. 
(ii) and (iii) can be answered in the following way. Suppose that there is someone 
in W called ‘Mr. Hyde‘, who looks like the Mr. Hyde of the actual world, and 
behaves in the same way, but he is not Dr. Jekyll. Now it seems that qualitatively, or 
epistemically, these people would have the necessary name with the necessary 
sense, plus the necessary background against which the discovery could be made. 
They are in the same epistemic state that they would be in the actual world prior to 
the discovery that Dr. Jekyll is Mr Hyde, and yet nothing they can discover 
empirically about Dr. Jekyll in W would count as the discovery that he is Hyde - so 
the problem remains. 
If I am right about the Dr. Jekyll and HesperusPhosphorus cases then they 
represent a whole class of counter-examples to Kripke’s claims. All we have to do is 
imagine a world where a=b is supposed to be true and yet the inhabitants of this 
world cannot make the discovery by any means whatsoever. This requires an 
explanation, and one possible explanation is that a=b is not true in that world after 
all. In the absence of any other explanation I feel entitled to propose this. 
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The foregoing argument trades on a phenomenon that Kripke regards as 
irrelevant; namely, what the inhabitants of other worlds say, or are able to say. More 
precisely, it is concerned with what these people could discover, in principle. This is 
the novelty of the argument. It is a way of opposing the claim that identities are 
necessary that Kripke has not had to deal with before, and it would be interesting to 
see how he would deal with it. 
It should also be pointed out here that the meta-linguistic analysis of identity 
explains perfectly why the inhabitants of W cannot make the same discovery they 
make in the actual world. It also gives a straightforward reason to reject the 
necessity of identity. 
If identities of the form a=b are not necessary, then, what are the consequences 
for Kripke or anyone who holds similar views? The main consequence is that he 
cannot cite statements like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ or ‘Cicero is Tully‘ as 
examples of the necessary a posteriori - although the so-called scientific identities 
may be different (More of this in the next chapters). Secondly, we could have here a 
reductio ad absurdum of the claim that ordinary proper names are rigid designators 
as follows. Kripke argues that if proper names are rigid designators then identities of 
the form a=b involving proper names will be necessary. Well if these statements are 
not necessary, then proper names are not rigid designators, by Modus Tollens. And 
if names are not rigid designators then Kripke’s whole philosophy is in serious 
trouble. The only way to rescue the thesis that names are rigid is to blame the 
reductio on identity statements themselves. That is, to agree with the early 
Wittgenstein that identity statements make no sense - or at least we do not really 
know what they mean. Again, though, Kripke is in serious trouble because most, if 
not all, of his examples of the necessary a posteriori seem to be in the form of 
identity statements. 
Before concluding, there are still a couple of objections to be dealt with. First of 
all, it might be objected that the claim that statements of the form a=b are not 
necessary does not count against the metaphysical view: 
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Actually I think it does, indirectly, in that (7) could never be instantiated. There 
could never be a particular instance of (7) substituting singular terms for x and y. 
Another possible objection to the necessity of identity concerns statements of 
arithmetic. Surely we have here the very paradigm of necessary identity statements. 
This objection can be answered in the following way. Although statements of 
arithmetic are undoubtedly necessary truths, they are not identities. Take, for 
example, the statement: 
2+2=4 
This is not an identity because the left hand side of the statement, namely ‘2+2‘ is an 
operation, whereas the right hand side is not an operation. By Leibniz’ Law, 
therefore, the statement ‘2+2=4‘ cannot be an identity. It is still a genuine statement 
of course, but it is not an identity. Instead of saying that 2+2 equaZs 4 we must say 
something like “2+2 results in 4 ”. Or, the operation of adding 2 to 2 results in 4. 
This would seem to be necessary, but it is not an identity. At the very least, 
statements of arithmetic need not be regarded as identity statements. 
In conclusion, then, there is a strong case to be made against the necessity of 
identity - even against the very legitimacy of expressions of the form a=b or x=y. It 
is very difficult to find a way of analysing what an identity statement is supposed to 
mean, and Kripke certainly does not say what they are supposed to mean. There are 
also basic problems with the Marcus ‘proof of the necessity of identity, and also, as 
we have seen, the real possibility of counter-examples in terms of possible worlds 
where a certain identity is supposed to hold but no-one in that world can make the 
discovery. This makes it very difficult to claim that the identity actually holds in that 
world. At the very least it becomes difficult to see what it means to say that the 
identity holds in that world. 
There is one final point to be made, and it concerns the question of why we use 
statements of the form a=b and seem to understand them, if they are not genuine 
statements. The first point to make about this is that I do not believe that we really 
do understand such statements at face value. I contend that it is impossible to 
understand a statement like ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ without also understanding 
the situation it stands for; namely the situation whereby one planet is visible at two 
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different times of the day. In other words, so-called identity statements may state 
that what could be taken to be two objects are really one, but they do not state how 
they could appear to be two. In order to be understood an expression of the form a=b 
must not only say that ‘a‘ and ‘b‘ are identical, but also how they are identical. The 
bare expression ‘a=b‘ does not do this, and so it is not a genuine statement. Once 
again understanding is the key concept here. If statements of the form a=b make 
genuine statements they must be understood in a certain way - otherwise they would 
not even be part of a language. Now the key question becomes: “What must be 
understood by sentences of the form a=b?” Are we to understand them as making 
statements of self-identity? I .e. trivial uninformative statements whose content can 
only be known a priori? Surely not, since such statements can be the subject of 
serious speculation, conjecture and debate - debate which can be resolved 
empirically. They must, therefore be understood in a different way. The reason we 
use such expressions I suggest comes from a confusion between synchronic and 
diachronic identity. When we say, for example, that Hesperus is identical with 
Phosphorus, what we are really saying is that the same object which we identify at 
one time (and in a certain way) as Hesperus can be re-identified, at a later time 
(and in a different way) as Phosphorus - which is contingent because we might not 
have identified the planet Venus in these ways. This also applies to other examples, 
such as the Cicero/Tully example and the JekyllMyde example. So-called 
‘synchronic identity‘ of the form a=b is really an illegitimate form of diachronic 
identity, and so not really a distinct form of identity at all. However we regard 
identity statements involving ordinary proper names, they are not necessary truths. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF NECESSITY 
I 
The Contingent A Priori 
We come now to the crux of the matter. Are there, as Kripke and others claim, 
contingent a priori truths and necessary a posteriori truths, and can we establish 
their existence from a theory of how names function in ordinary languages? The 
necessary a posteriori will be the subject of Chapter 6. In the meantime we turn our 
attention to the claim that there are contingent a priori truths, a claim that, not 
surprisingly, has lead to considerable debate among analytic philosophers. 
Forbes (1 989) distinguishes two categories of the alleged contingent a priori. The 
first involves indexicals such as: 
1. I am here now 
and are due to Kaplan (1979). The second concerns the more familiar examples of 
what Evans (1979) calls ‘descriptive names‘, and are mostly associated with 
Kripke’s work in Naming and Necessity. These would include such examples as 
Kripke’s standard metre case and his claim that the astronomer Levemer could have 
known a priori that Neptune was the cause of certain perturbations in the orbit of 
Uranus if he introduced the name ‘Neptune’ into the language via the description 
‘The planet that is causing the perturbations in the orbit of Uranus‘, or something 
similar. We may also add Evans’ example of the name ‘Julius’ which is introduced 
into the language as a rigid designator of whoever invented the zip, such that the 
statement 
2. If anyone invented the zip, Julius did 
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would have the status of a contingent a priori truth (Evans, 1979). Crucial to the 
success of the examples involving names is Kripke’s distinction between 
descriptions that give a synonym and those that merely fix a reference. Kripke 
introduces the distinction on page 14 of (1 980) as follows: 
Let “a” (rigidly) denote the unique object that actually has property F, when 
talking about any situation, actual or counterfactual. It seemed clear that if a 
speaker did introduce a designator into a language that way, then in virtue of 
this very linguistic act, he would be in a position to say ‘I know Fa‘ but 
nevertheless ‘Fa‘ would express a contingent truth. 
Donnellan provides us with a neat summary of Kripke’s position in his (1979) 
where he says: 
.... suppose we propose to introduce the term “t” as the name of the denotation, 
if there is one, of the definite description “the @.” And we do not intend that 
“t” shall mean “the Q” or be a mere abbreviation for it. Rather “t” is to 
designate whatever happens to be the 4; the definite description serves solely 
to fix the reference. If our procedure serves to introduce “t” as a rigid 
designator, “t” will designate the same entity in all possible worlds (in which 
it designates anything at all). It will designate the same thing that it does in 
this, the actual world. But there will be possible worlds in which what is the @ 
in the actual world, that which “t” designates, is not the @ in that world. Thus 
the statement that if the @ exists, t is the @ is merely contingently true, because 
there are possible worlds where it is false. Yet, if the reference of “t” has been 
fixed solely by being the denotation of the description “the $” it looks like it 
can be known a priori that if the @ exists, “t” is the @ (1 979, p45) 
Kripke’s most famous example of the contingent a priori concerns the standard 
metre stick near Paris. In (1980, p54) he imagines a situation where a certain person 
fixes the reference of the term ‘one metre‘ by stipulating that it is to be the length of 
a certain stick, S, at a definite time, to. The description ‘The length of S at to‘ is not 
synonymous with the term ‘one metre‘, but rather fixes its reference as a rigid 
designator of the length of S at that moment in time. According to Kripke, anyone 
who fixes the reference of the term ‘one metre‘ in this way would know a priori, or 
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‘without hrther investigation‘, that S is one metre long at to even though it will be 
contingent that S has this length at that time. 
In what follows I shall differ slightly from Forbes in identifying three categories 
of purported contingent a priori truths rather than two. That is, the examples 
involving indexicals (Type 1); the so-called ‘descriptive names‘ like ‘Julius‘ and 
‘Neptune‘ (Type 2); and a third category consisting of definitions of units of 
measurement such as Kripke’s Standard Metre example (Type 3). These latter form 
a category distinct from Type 2 because whoever fixes the reference of the 
measurement term is in a position to actually baptise the standard and have causal 
contact with it, unlike the ‘Julius‘ case, for example, where we could question 
whether we really are able to name anything. Consequently we must evaluate the 
various categories differently - at least in some respects. We will not spend too 
much time on the Type 1s since they do not involve names. 
How we evaluate the claims to the existence of the contingent a priori will 
involve us in answering the following question. Can we really come to know 
something contingent about the world purely as a consequence of a linguistic act - 
namely, the act of introducing a name into the language by means of a non- 
synonymous reference-fixing definite description? Another way of posing the 
question is this. When we introduce a name like ‘Julius‘ or ‘Neptune‘ or ‘One 
Metre‘ into the language in the way Kripke suggests, have we really come to know 
anything that we did not already know? For example, before we introduce the name 
‘Julius‘ as a name for whoever invented the zip, we already know 
3. The inventor of the zip invented the zip (if anyone did) 
Furthermore, and assuming that there are any contingent truths at all, we know 
4. The inventor of the zip might not have invented the zip 
So what new piece of knowledge do we acquire when we are in a position to say 
5. Julius invented the zip, although Julius might not have invented the zip 
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What Kripke must do is show that (5) is an improvement or advance on (3) and (4) 
in terms of furnishing us with new knowledge, and it is very difficult to see how this 
can be done, especially with the Type 2 examples. If this cannot be done then the 
contingent a priori would seem to be no more than an illusion, the result of some 
logical sleight of hand. 
That the claims to contingent a priori knowledge are indeed based on some 
logico-semantic delusion which does not give us any real knowledge about the 
world is supported by the fact that we seem to be able to introduce names into the 
language which give us contingent a priori knowledge of almost anything. For 
example, if there is a car parked outside my house I can reason that someone must 
have put it there. It did not get there by itself. I do not know who actually did put 
the car there, however, although I could follow Kripke’s procedure and introduce a 
name into the language as a name for whoever put the car outside my house. Do I 
thereby come to know a priori some contingent truth such as : 
If anyone parked this car outside my house, N did 
where “N” is the name I have introduced into my language via the appropriate 
reference-fixing description? If I do then it is surely a cheap way of acquiring 
knowledge and the contingent a priori would not amount to much. Indeed it does 
not amount to much because I still don’t know who parked the car outside my 
house. That is something I can only come to know a posteriori. 
Another possible example will indicate more dramatically the difficulty Kripke 
has in establishing his position. Suppose, for instance, that I don’t know who 
invented bi-focals but I want to introduce a name into the language in the reference- 
fixing Kripkean manner as a name for whoever has this distinction. Suppose further, 
that by pure chance I decide to use the name ‘Benjamin Franklin’ as a name for 
whoever invented bi-focals. According to Kripke I would be in a position to know a 
priori: 
6. If anyone invented bi-focals, Benjamin Franklin did 
136 
Now intuitively this cannot be the same piece of knowledge as the a posteriori 
knowledge that Benjamin Franklin invented bi-focals and the difference can only be 
traced to the way in which the name ‘Benjamin Franklin‘ is being used in the two 
cases. In (6) the name does not give us access to any particular person but merely 
abbreviates the description “The inventor of bi-focals, whoever that may be”. (6) 
does not allow us to conclude anything beyond the knowledge that whoever 
invented bi-focals, the inventor of bi-focals did. 
One obvious difference between the a priori (6) and the a posteriori knowledge 
that Benjamin Franklin invented bi-focals is that the latter does not need to be 
existentially quantified in the manner of (6). This quantification is thought 
necessary as an answer to what has been termed ‘The Existential Complaint‘, one of 
the earliest criticisms of Kripke’s claims. (See especially Carter, 1976; also Ray, 
1994; and Cowles, 1994). 
The Existential Complaint is quite simply the claim that we cannot know a priori 
a truth like 
Julius invented the zip 
unless we first know that there is such an inventor, which is something we can only 
know a posteriori. As Carter (1 976) says concerning the standard metre stick: 
One of the things that must be true if it is to be true that S has the property of 
being one metre long is that there exists such an object as S..... But our 
knowledge that there is such an object is clearly not a priori. (1976, p105) 
Not only does this make Kripke’s claim to the contingent a priori depend on an a 
posteriori premise, it makes such examples trivial according to Carter. To say that S 
is one metre long is as trivial as saying that I know a priori that my fountain pen is 
on my desk once I have observed it to be there. (Ibid. p106) 
So conditionalising the target sentences in the manner of (2) is supposed to avoid 
the existential complaint and has become the standard way of formulating the 
puzzle about the contingent a priori. It is certainly the form adopted by Donnellan 
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(1979), Forbes (1989) and even Kripke himself, at least with respect to the 
‘Neptune’ example where he makes the following qualified claim: 
If the perturbations of Uranus are caused by a planet, they are caused by 
Neptune (1 980, p79n) 
Actually this needs to be firther conditionalised since there may not be any 
perturbations of Uranus, and even if there are, we certainly cannot know this a 
priori. This can easily be done, however. 
Be that as it may, the existential complaint has been subjected to a fair amount of 
criticism by at least some commentators. David Cowles in his (1 994) argues that the 
‘Existential Worry‘, as he calls it, is not a telling objection to Kripke’s examples 
because there could be examples free from existential worry. Such an example, 
according to Cowles, must not involve the name in question in existential 
commitment to any contingently existing thing. The example used by Cowles is that 
of a name introduced as a name of a number - for example, the number of planets. If 
we introduce the name ‘alpha‘ as a rigid designator of the actual number of planets, 
whatever it is, then we would know a priori 
(7) Alpha numbers the planets 
or 
(7*) There are alpha planets 
There is no existential worry here because ‘alpha‘ gets a reference even if there are 
no planets. We can know a priori that numbers exist and also that the definite 
description ‘The number of planets‘ will be satisfied, so we know (7*) a priori. 
(1994, p140). Curiously Cowles does not take this to show that it is possible to have 
a priori knowledge of contingent truths, but he does claim that it shows that the 
existential worry is not a telling objection to Kripke’s examples (Ibid). 
Cowles is surely correct in arguing that his example is free from existential 
worry, and also that it does not show that there are contingent a priori truths, since 
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we do not know what number alpha is. But if this is so, then what is the point of the 
example? And how does it show that the existential worry does not arise for the 
examples we have already encountered? Cowles’ examples involving numbers are 
surely a special case where it is built in to the example that there will be no 
existential worry. The Existential Complaint still stands for the other examples. 
Evans (1979) also argues that the Existential Complaint does not count against 
the puzzle but for reasons very different from Cowles. Quite simply, Evans regards 
it as irrelevant to the puzzle since the puzzle can only arise if the use of free logic is 
accepted. As he says in his (1 979) 
Unless a sentence containing ‘Julius‘ can be formulated which is free of 
existential commitment there is not even a candidate for the status of the 
contingent a priori .... No matter how a name may be embedded in a sentence, 
in a classical language that name is accessible to existential quantification and 
the truth of the whole sentence requires that the name refer. (pl72) 
Consequently, in Evans’ view, conditionalising the sentence in question is “quite 
pointless” (Ibid). Evans’ main target here is Donnellan’s (1979) treatment of the 
puzzle where it is argued that the person who knows only the reference-fixing 
description does not understand the name (in this case ‘Julius‘) nor sentences 
containing it. In Donnellan’s view, we can only understand a name like ‘Julius’ if 
we know ofsome object that it is the referent of the name. Consequently Donnellan 
seeks to show that the contingent a priori is uncontroversial because it does not give 
us any knowledge of the world. Donnellan’s main contention is that we must 
distinguish between knowing that a certain sentence expresses a truth and knowing 
the truth of what is expressed by the sentence (1979, p51). With a sentence such as 
(2) we know a priori that it is true, but we do not know a priori the truth that it 
expresses. 
Intuitively this is a very promising line of argument and has echoes in the work of 
other writers. Salmon (1986), for example, argues that a priority applies primarily to 
propositions or the contents of sentences (1986, p133). Thus, an agent could know a 
priori that the sentence ‘Stick S, if it exists, is exactly one metre long at t‘ is true, 
but not the content of the sentence - i.e. the fact that this stick is a certain length at a 
certain time. This could only be a posteriori, in Salmon’s view (More of this later). 
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Along similar lines, Kaplan, in “Quantifying In” (1968), contends that in order to 
have a de re propositional attitude toward an entity an agent must be en rapport 
with it (In Linsky, Ed., 1971, p131) which would not seem to be the case with the 
‘Julius’ example, or the Type 2 examples in general. Consequently, Kaplan goes on 
to state: 
... I am unwilling to adopt any theory of proper names which permits me to 
perform a dubbing, in absentia, as by solemnly declaring ‘I hereby dub the 
first child to be born in the twenty-second century “Newman l”‘, and thus 
grant myself standing to have beliefs about that as yet unborn child (Ibid. 
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Clearly, Kaplan, Donnellan, and Salmon are on a similar track here. as we might 
expect from such adherents to the direct reference theory. Despite the plausibility of 
these views, however, there are objections. 
Returning to Evans, first of all, he agrees with Donnellan’s claim that the sort of 
statements we have been dealing with do not say anything informative about the 
world; but this is not the point for Evans, according to whom a knowledge of the 
reference-fixing description in these cases is sufficient for understanding the name 
in question. Consequently Donnellan misses the point of the puzzle, which is not 
how we can know a priori something informative or interesting about the world, but 
how we can know a priori something contingent, and hence, how something 
contingent can be uninformative (0p.Cit. pl74). 
Actually I don’t think Donnellan does misconstrue the puzzle - at least not as it is 
characterised by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. Although Kripke does seem to 
have second thoughts about the standard metre case on the question of whether it 
furnishes us with any information about the world (See 1980. p63n), when it comes 
to the ‘Neptune‘ example (1 980,p79n), which is more like the kind of example used 
by Donnellan and Evans, he definitely seems to hold the view that Leverrier could 
have known a priori that Neptune was the cause of certain perturbations, and it is 
this sort of claim against which Donnellan is arguing. 
Forbes (1989) also takes issue with the KaplardDonnellan view that there is not 
one thing that is both contingent and known a priori. In the final chapter of his book 
Forbes objects to Donnellan’s treatment of the Type 2 examples as well as Kaplan’s 
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early view on the Type 1 example (“I am here now’‘). According to Forbes if we 
cannot know a priori the proposition expressed by the sentence “I am here now” 
because we cannot know a priori where ‘here‘ is and what time it is, then an agent 
who is, say, lost in the jungle and does not know what time it is, would not express 
any thought if, on seeing an elephant charging toward him, were to think ‘I’m in 
danger here, right now‘. Furthermore, if the agent were a radical amnesiac, then, 
according to Forbes, he would not even be able to grasp the proposition expressed 
by the sentence ‘I am the subject of this context‘, which would be clearly absurd. 
(0p.Cit. p154). In Forbes’ view the agent would grasp these propositions, and in a 
de re sense, because the indexicals involved make these propositions or thoughts 
about the agent himself, his location, and the present time (Ibid’p 155). As for the 
Type 2 examples, Forbes concedes that the propositions in question are not de re 
with respect to whoever invented the zip. Nevertheless, knowledge of the reference- 
fixing definite description does enable one to express a non-metalinguistic thought 
with a sentence like (2). albeit a de dicto thought (Ibid.) Consequently, (2) will be 
contingent a priori according to Forbes. 
Plausible though Forbes’ position may seem, I shall argue that he is mistaken on 
these points. It is just not true that on the so-called KapladDonnellan account of the 
contingent a priori the agent in the jungle would not express any thought by ‘I’m in 
danger here right now‘ or ‘I am the subject of this context‘, for the following 
reasons. First of all, in the sentence ‘I’m in danger here right now‘, the words ‘here‘ 
and ‘now‘ are strictly speaking redundant. All the agent need be aware of is the fact 
that he is in danger. This thought can easily be expressed, even by a radical 
amnesiac. Likewise with the thought expressed by ‘I am the subject of this context‘. 
As far as the Type 1 examples are concerned Forbes has completely misunderstood 
the situation. Ironically, so has Kaplan, if he thinks that a statement like 
(1) I am here now 
could present us with a genuine example of the contingent a priori. This is not a 
genuine example because the words ‘here‘ and ’now’ are redundant. They are 
redundant because (1) uses the present tense. When using the present tense there is 
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no need to use the word ‘now’. The present tense does not need to be augmented in 
this way. In fact the word ’here‘ is also redundant because (1) uses the present tense. 
Strictly speaking, (1) is no different from the statement “I am” or “I exist”, because 
to say that I am is to say that I am or I exist at a place and at a time - i.e. we exist in 
space and time. We add nothing to the statement “I am” by adding the words ‘here‘ 
and ‘now‘, just as the person in the jungle adds nothing to the statement “I’m in 
danger” by adding the words ‘here‘ and ‘now‘. Thus the Type 1 example reduces to 
the statement “I am” (or ‘I exist‘). But now we have to decide if this is a genuine 
example of a contingent a priori truth. 
There are several ways in which we might proceed here. First of all, we might 
consider the claim that statements such as “I am here now” and “I exist” may not 
even be true - for example, when recorded on a tape recorder or when written on a 
piece of paper. Stephano Predelli (1998) makes a convincing case for just such a 
claim. Obviously if this is correct then we cannot know these truths a priori since 
they may not be true at all. One may wonder if some trick is being used in these 
cases, but it is difficult to see what this trick could be. We could question whether a 
recording of an utterance is a genuine utterance; or, even if it is, whether the word 
“I” is serving as a genuine indexical in these cases, and doesn’t take on a sense 
something like “The person who made this recording” or “The person who wrote 
this note”, but apart from this, there would seem to be examples of the Type 1 
statements which we do not know a priori because they may not be true at all. 
Another tack would be to look again at the claim made by Donnellan and Kaplan 
that there is not one thing that is both contingent and known a priori. This would 
seem to be more promising with the Type 2 and Type 3 cases that with the Type 1s 
but nevertheless it may have some application to the Type 1s. If we consider the 
statement “I exist”, for example, we may well ask what it is that we know a priori 
(if anything). What we seem to know a priori is that, pace Predelli, the statement “I 
exist” is true, or will always be true on any occasion of utterance. But this could be 
seen as necessary. I.e. it will always be true - so long as the meanings of the words 
remain constant; and this is a qualification that must be made with any necessary 
truth. What is contingent here is that the particular person who makes the utterance 
exists. But we do not know a priori that any particular person exists, and so we do 
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not have a genuine example of the contingent a priori with the Type 1 cases. 
Against this it could be argued that surely I know a priori that I exist; but this is not 
so obvious. Perhaps I only know that I exist through experience; although, again, 
this does not seem to be straightforwardly the case either. Perhaps a statement like 
“I exist” is neither a priori nor a posteriori, but in a class of its own. 
Forbes’ treatment of the Type 2 examples is more interesting and deserves 
detailed examination. First of all, it is not propositions or thoughts that are the 
primary bearers of modality in Forbes’ view, but states of affairs, where a state of 
affairs is defined as consisting in certain objects having particular properties and 
standing in particular relations (1989, p131). Propositions, which are ways of 
thinking of states of affairs, are primarily a priori or a posteriori and only 
derivatively necessary or contingent (Ibid.). Another way of putting this is to say 
that states of affairs are the referents of sentences, with propositions containing the 
mode of presentation of the states of affairs (pl37). Thus with the sentences 
Hesperus is a planet 
Phosphorus is a planet 
Forbes agrees with the Fregean that two propositions are involved, one of which 
could be believed while the other is disbelieved, but only one state of affairs, that of 
Venus being a planet. This furnishes Forbes with a neat way of avoiding Kripke‘s 
modal objections to the description theory of proper names as follows. If we take 
for example, the sentences 
(A) Aristotle was a teacher 
(B) The teacher of Alexander was a teacher 
we can see that (A) is not a necessary truth because it involves a contingent state of 
affairs, viz, Aristotle being the teacher of Alexander. This is the case even if 
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‘Aristotle’ has the sense of ‘The teacher of Alexander‘ so long as the sense of the 
description is not identical with the sense of the name but merely “articulates its 
cognitive significance” (p133). (B) on the other hand, is necessary so long as the 
necessity operator is given the widest possible scope. This is because, according to 
Forbes, (B) involves a necessary state of affairs - that of someone’s being the 
teacher of Alexander. This is necessary in the weak sense that it obtains in every 
world where Alexander has a teacher - regardless of who that teacher is. The same 
state of affairs obtains. 
So far Forbes’ position seems quite reasonable, but things are not so 
straightforward when he comes to deal with the problem of the contingent a priori, 
especially the Type 2 examples. Once again let us consider the ‘Julius‘ sentences 
[using Forbes’ numbering] 
(3) If anyone invented the zip, Julius did 
(7) If anyone invented the zip, the zip-inventor did 
For Forbes, the necessitation of (3) fails while the necessitation of (7) succeeds, 
though both are a priori, and it is the purpose of his semantics to account for this. 
What makes Forbes’ position especially difficult is the fact that he agrees with 
Evans that (3) and (7) have the same sense since (3) cannot be understood without 
‘Julius‘ having the sense of ‘The inventor of the zip‘. The problem is to explain how 
two expressions which have the same sense can differ in their modal properties. 
Forbes does not regard this as a problem because, in his system, modality is a 
function of reference not sense. But now he does have a problem because, if (3) and 
(7) have the same sense, and sense determines reference (as a Fregean should 
accept) then the sense of (3) and (7) should determine the same reference - in this 
case the same state of affairs. But if states of affairs are the bearers of modality then 
(3) and (7) should have the same modality. Forbes, however, wants to argue that (3) 
is contingent and (7) necessary (on a wide scope reading). 
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Clearly (3) and (7) must have a different reference, and this Forbes accomplishes 
by abandoning the traditional Fregean mechanism whereby sense determines 
reference, in the case of descriptive names like 'Julius'. According to Forbes: 
When we stipulate that a name is to have such and such a reference 
descriptively specified , we are associating the name with a reference of the 
kind ordinary names have by bestowing a descriptive (that is, non-de re ) 
sense on it .....[ I]f descriptive stipulation is in fact one of the ways in which the 
reference relation can be extended there is no need to have a de re sense 
associated with the name to provide its reference. So we can allow for a name 
whose reference is not the reference of its sense (0p.Cit. p161-162) 
The upshot of all this is that the sentence (3) does not have the same reference as the 
sense of that sentence since the name 'Julius' has a different reference from that of 
the sense of 'Julius' (i.e. 'The individual, whoever it is, who invented the zip'). 
Consequently, while the proposition expressed by (3) is necessary and a priori, by 
virtue of the fact that it presents a necessary state of affairs (the same state of affairs 
as that presented by the proposition expressed by (7)), the sentence (3) is contingent 
and a priori because it refers to a contingent state of affairs, namely the state of 
affairs where a particular person invents the zip. 
Clearly this is not a mechanism with which Frege would be familiar. In fact he 
might even regard it as perverse. It is certainly very odd to talk about the reference 
of a sentence or a name as distinct from the reference of the sense of the sentence or 
name. Sense is supposed to determine reference not have a reference. Indeed, how is 
reference determined here? Is the reference of the sense of (3) determined by 
another sense? And, if so, what would that sense be? It would have to be different 
from the sense that determines the reference of the sentence (3) if it is to determine 
a different state of affairs - but how could it be? It seems that if the senses of (3) and 
(7) are the same then we cannot escape the Fregean conclusion that they determine 
the same reference; in which case either both or neither is contingent. 
Of course Forbes would reply that the strange mechanism he employs here only 
arises for the special case of descriptive names where a name is introduced into a 
language using a definite description to fix its reference. The fact that we are forced 
into this bizarre manoeuvre of having to distinguish between the reference of a 
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sentence and the reference of the sense of the sentence should tell us that we cannot 
really introduce a name into our language in this way. (More of this below) 
Forbes seeks to dissolve the puzzle of the contingent a priori and demonstrate that 
it constitutes no threat to an empiricist concept of how knowledge is acquired by 
maintaining that while the proposition expressed by a sentence like (3) is a priori 
and necessary, the sentence itself is contingent and a priori - the contingency being 
due to the special way in which the name is introduced into the language. 
This Forbes contrasts with Donnellan’s claim that there is not one thing that is 
both contingent and known a priori, and also with Evans’ contention that a 
statement like (3) is contingent ( and a priori ) but only ‘superficially‘ contingent as 
opposed to ‘deeply‘ contingent. According to Evans the puzzle of the contingent a 
priori arises due to our failure to distinguish these two types of contingency which 
normally coincide but which can diverge. A statement is deeply contingent if its 
truth depends on some feature of the actual world, and merely superficially 
contingent if it is true at some worlds and false at others - or, depending on how it 
embeds inside the scope of modal operators (Evans, 1979, p161). According to 
Evans, although (3) and (7) have the same sense, the necessitation of (3) would fail, 
making it contingent but only superficially so. As Evans explains on p185 of his 
(1 979): 
A deeply contingent statement is one for which there is no guarantee that there 
exists a verifying state of affairs. If a deeply contingent statement is true there 
will exist some state of affairs of which we can say both that had it not existed 
the sentence would not have been true, and that it might not have existed. The 
truth of the sentence will thus depend upon some contingent feature of reality. 
(3) will be merely superficially contingent according to Evans, because its truth 
depends on the set of states of affairs 
{ x’s being the inventor of the zip; y’s being the inventor of the zip; z’s being the 
inventor of the zip.. . 
(3) is made true by the absence of every member of this set (which falsifies the 
antecedent), or by the presence of any member of the set (which verifies the 
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consequent). But this demands nothing of the actual world which is why knowing it 
to be true constitutes no paradox (Ibid.) 
Forbes rejects Evans’ distinction between these two types of contingency as a 
solution to the present puzzle. For Forbes there is no difference between the type of 
contingency exhibited by 
(3) If anyone invented the zip, Julius did 
and 
(14) If anyone invented the zip, a did 
where ‘a’ is the zip-inventor’s real name. In both cases it seems clear that 
contingency traces to the fact that who invents a certain thing is a contingent 
property (Op. Cit. p166). 
Some might object here that Forbes is missing the point about how the name 
‘Julius‘ is introduced into the language but actually I think he does not; especially 
when we consider that in order to explain how (3) and (7) embed differently in 
modal contexts (while having the same sense) Evans supposes that ‘Julius‘ is really 
behaving like ‘The actual inventor of the zip’ in (3), which gives him 
(13) If some one person invented the zip, the actual zip-inventor did 
It is indeed difficult, as Forbes says, to see how (13) involves a different kind of 
contingency from that of (14). So it seems that Evans’ distinction is of no use in the 
present puzzle. 
Is Forbes’ position any better? We could certainly question his distinction 
between a proposition and a state of affairs, as well as his claim that states of affairs 
are the bearers of modalities. We must be careful when trying to decide what is to 
be regarded as necessary or contingent. For Salmon, for example, it is propositions 
that are contingent. For Kripke on the other hand ( who does not want to deal with 
propositions), it is simply statements that are necessary or contingent - i.e. 
147 
necessarily true or contingently true. For Forbes it is states of affairs that are 
contingent in the sense that some states of affairs will obtain at some worlds and fail 
to obtain at other worlds. This is all very well, but we must surely avoid saying that 
states of affairs might have been different. All we can say is that a state of affairs 
might not have obtained. Another state of affairs might have obtained in its place. 
This suggests that states of affairs cannot be said to be contingent, just as they 
cannot be said to be true or false. They simply obtain or fail to obtain at any world. 
As for the claim that propositions derive their modal status from states of affairs, 
let us once again consider the sentences 
(a) Hesperus is a planet 
(b) Phosphorus is a planet 
According to Forbes we have two propositions here, since a speaker could believe 
(a) and fail to believe (b) (0p.Cit. p 130). There is, however, only one state of 
affairs involved, namely, the state of affairs of Venus being a planet. But consider 
Forbes’ definition of a state of affairs on p l3  1 of (1 989) as consisting in ”certain 
objects having particular properties and standing in particular relations”. There may 
be only one object involved but there is more than one property since the property 
of being visible in the evening is different from the property of being visible in the 
morning. So we could actually have two states of affairs here; namely, that of Venus 
appearing in the evening and that of Venus appearing in the morning. On the other 
hand, if we accept Forbes’ claim on pl37 that states of affairs need not be static but 
can include processes, then perhaps there is just one state of affairs here; viz, the 
state of affairs whereby the planet Venus appears sometimes in the evening and 
sometimes in the morning. Certainly Forbes wants to claim that the sentences (a) 
and (b) involve one state of affairs - that of Venus being a planet; but this is not 
good enough, because, while it explains why (a) and (b) are contingent (in Forbes’ 
terms) it does not explain why (a) and (b) can express different thoughts. Only the 
involvement of different properties can do this. If we accept this then we may as 
well simply talk about general propositions rather than states of affairs. In fact to 
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talk of only one state of affairs here is too redolent of Kaplan’s notion of a singular 
proposition, or even of Salmon’s idea of one proposition and two guises - views a 
Fregean like Forbes must surely avoid. 
The difficulty in talking about states of affairs in connection with the present 
puzzle is further compounded by Forbes’ distinction between static states (such as 
Venus being a planet) and processes ( such as my crossing the street). Is a process, 
for instance, not merely a sequence of static states? If not, can we not simply claim 
that there is only one state of affairs - namely the process of the entire history of the 
universe? The individuation of states of affairs remains a difficult problem. As far 
as Forbes is concerned, we may as well abandon talk of states of affairs and return 
to the Fregean idea of a general proposition. 
The consensus among philosophers is that the contingent a priori does not stand 
up to scrutiny. Even if there are examples of statements which are contingent yet 
known a priori they are harmless. Either they don’t give us de re knowledge 
(Donnellan) or they trade on some innocuous notion of contingency like Evans’ 
superficial contingency. 
A slightly different approach to the problem is that taken by Bostock in his 
(1 988). Although Bostock argues that Kripke’s examples do not work, he wants to 
claim that there are, or could be, examples of the contingent a priori - albeit of a 
special kind. Bostock begins by pointing out that if Kripkean rigid names are 
admissible then there must be rigid predicates, even rigid sentences (1988, p351- 
354). ‘Cordate‘, for example, could be a rigid predicate if it is introduced into the 
language as designating in all possible worlds only those objects which have hearts 
in the actual world. The description ‘creature with a heart‘ would merely fix the 
extension of the term ‘cordate‘, and not be synonymous with it. As Bostock says, 
“There is nothing which a thing must be if it is to be a cordate, other than simply to 
be one of the objects in question’’ (Op. Cit. p353). Armed with such rigid predicates 
we can apparently know a priori a conditional something like 
If there is exactly one object that falls under the predicate, then it is necessary 
that there is no more than one 
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And yet, according to Bostock, this is not a necessary truth for it is guaranteed to be 
true only when evaluated with respect to the actual world and with respect to other 
possible worlds it will be false. It will be contingent when its antecedent is false, 
and yet anyone who understands the predicate in question surely must assent to the 
conditional statement (~378,379). It would seem, therefore, to be a priori. 
This is clearly a different sort of example from Kripke’s in that it involves 
predicates rather than names. It is also more ‘artificial‘ than Kripke’s examples. 
That is, Kripke’s position seems to be that it would be quite natural for a name to be 
introduced into a language via a reference-fixing description. Bostock’s move is not 
a natural one, but it would seem to be a theoretical possibility, and that is what 
concerns Bostock. 
Prima facie, at least, Bostock seems to have a point here. It does seem possible 
that we could introduce a rigid predicate into our language using a description 
which fixes its extension but is not synonymous with it. Certainly we may want to 
talk about counter-factual situations where the creatures with hearts in the actual 
world lack this property or have some other property. I.e. we want to designate only 
those objects in another world who are cordates in the actual world. Problems arise, 
however, if we consider a world where there are creatures with hearts who do not 
exist in the actual world. According to our definition of the rigid predicate ‘cordate‘ 
these creatures would not belong in the extension of ‘cordate‘. How, then, are we to 
designate these creatures? We cannot call them ‘cordates‘ on the present view 
because ‘cordate‘ does not mean ‘creature with a heart’. Yet what else are we to call 
them? We could of course invent some other word to mean ‘creature with a heart‘, 
but what is the point of that? Surely the thing to do would be to call creatures with 
hearts ‘cordates‘ in any world, and use some other word for our rigid predicate. 
Even if we did this, though, things would not work in the way envisaged by 
Bostock. Whatever word we use as our predicate it would not simply have its 
extension fixed by the description ‘creatures with hearts in the actual world‘. As we 
have already seen in earlier chapters, any word that is part of our language must 
contribute to what speakers understand by any sentence containing that word. What 
else could our predicate contribute to understanding but the description which is 
supposed to merely fix its extension? There is no doubt that the predicate would be 
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synonymous with this description. What this means for Bostock’s example of the 
word ‘cordate‘ is that there is something that an object has to be in any world in 
order to belong to the extension of ‘cordate‘. It has to be one of the creatures who 
have hearts in the actual world. This simply re-introduces the ‘actually’ operator 
into the puzzle, which Bostock is supposed to have eliminated (p360-364) by 
treating it, not as a new modal operator, but as a device for indicating relative scope 
(p360). This re-emergence of the ‘actually‘ operator means that we must return to 
either Davies and Humberstone’s two notions of necessity or Donnellan’s two types 
of contingency - both of which Bostock rejects. It also means that unless we get rid 
of the ‘actually‘ operator we once again have the problem of having to say that, 
although ‘p‘ is contingent, ‘Actually p‘ is necessary - a view we have already 
rejected. 
Bostock’s argument fails, then, but it does bring us to another much simpler 
criticism of the attempt to generate contingent a priori truths. The criticism is 
simply that the distinction between descriptions which give a synonym and those 
that merely fix a reference cannot be made. As with a proper name, any word in our 
language must have a sense if it is to contribute to understanding. In the Type 2 
examples the only sense available is that of the description which is supposed to be 
fixing reference. The putative name will be synonymous with the description. But 
we must be careful here. Remember our definition of a genuine name as that which 
actually names something. Remember also how Kripke has forced us to qualify the 
sense of a proper name - not ‘The F’, but ‘That which is commonly believed to be 
The F‘. We must conclude from this that the so-called ‘names‘ in the Type 2 
examples are not functioning as genuine names at all. This is because, first of all, 
the descriptions used by Kripke, Evans etc. must be conditionalized to avoid the 
Existential Complaint. By our definition of a genuine name the description which 
gives the sense of the name simply cannot be existentially conditionalized in this 
way. If we don’t know if there is anything to be named here, then we do not know if 
our ‘name‘ really is a genuine name. Secondly, it is at least highly suspect to give a 
sense to a word like ‘Julius’ of ‘The person who is commonly believed to be The F’. 
The so-called ‘names‘ in the Type 2 need not be regarded as genuine names at all, 
since we don’t know if they really name anything; although we could regard them 
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as conditional names, or provisional names. Donnellan is wrong, therefore, when 
he argues at p57 of (1  979) that “we are in the somewhat odd position of possessing 
a mechanism for introducing a name that rigidly designates something, but a 
mechanism that is not powerful enough to allow us to use the name!” 
Actually Donnellan has things the wrong way round here. We can use these 
‘names‘ but only as abbreviations of descriptions, the way in which the police, for 
instance, might use a name like ‘The Jackal‘ as a name for a criminal whose identity 
is unknown to them. This would simply make it easier to talk about whoever is 
responsible for the crimes in question. Such a ‘name‘ would undoubtedly be an 
abbreviation of the definite description and would therefore have to be regarded as 
synonymous with it. It would certainly not be a name in the same way that ‘Kripke‘ 
or ‘Nixon‘ would be, because we know that we are designating something with 
these words, but we are not sure what, or even if, we are designating anything in the 
Type 2 cases. We are certainly not in a position to claim to have baptised anything 
in such cases, and so Kripke seems to be stretching the definition of a name too far 
here. 
Although the Type 1 and Type 2 examples have failed to provide examples of the 
contingent a priori we are not yet finished with the puzzle. We have still to deal 
with the Type 3 examples involving measurement terms like ‘metre‘. These form a 
separate class from the Type 2 cases for two reasons. First of all, when we introduce 
a term like ‘one metre‘ into our language, we do not do it ‘blind‘, so-to-speak, the 
way we do with ‘Julius‘. That is, we can see that the object which is to serve as the 
standard for our system exists. We can therefore perform a straightforward dubbing 
ceremony which we cannot do with ‘Julius‘. There is no doubt that we are causally 
connected to some object, although there may be problems with naming a length in 
all possible worlds rather than simply an object. Secondly, words like ‘metre‘ or 
‘kilogram’ are not obviously similar to proper names in the way that ‘Julius‘ is. 
They are more like predicates and so the argument against the Type 1 and Type 2 
examples may not apply to the Type 3 cases. 
The passage in Naming and Necessity where Kripke introduces his standard 
metre example is by now well known. He begins on page 54 with a passage from 
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Wittgenstein where Wittgenstein claims that we cannot say of the standard metre 
stick either that it is a metre in length nor that it is not a metre in length because of 
its “peculiar role in the language game of measuring with a metre rule” (p54). 
Kripke finds this claim strange. He thinks the standard metre stick is obviously a 
metre in length, although it might not have been. It is surely a contingent truth that 
this object (which Kripke calls ‘S‘ ) is one metre in length. Specifically, it is 
contingent that S is one metre in length at a particular moment in time - the moment 
when the term ‘one metre‘ was first introduced into the language via the description 
‘the length of S at to‘. However, according to Kripke, the person who performs this 
reference-fixing ceremony is in a position to know a priori the contingent truth that 
S is a metre long at to - simply by his reference-fixing act; and so we have an 
example of a contingent a priori truth. 
Once again we have the crucial distinction between a definite description which 
does not give a synonym but merely fixes a reference, as well as the distinction 
between epistemology and metaphysics. The statement 
(8) Stick S is one metre long at to 
has the metaphysical status of a contingent truth because the stick’s length might 
have been different at to. Its epistemological status is that of an a priori truth. Kripke 
further argues that, although (8) may look like a definition of the term ‘one metre’, 
it is only a definition in a special sense. That is, the term ‘one metre‘ is not 
synonymous with the reference-fixing description ‘the length of S at to‘. As Kripke 
puts it in Naming and Necessity, the person who performs such a ceremony is 
... using this definition not to give the meaning of what he called the ‘meter’, 
but to fix the reference. (For such an abstract thing as a unit of length, the 
notion of reference may be unclear. But let’s suppose it’s clear enough for the 
present purposes). He uses it to fix a reference. There is a certain length which 
he wants to mark out. He marks it out by an accidental property, namely that 
there is a stick of that length ... (p55) 
This is a curious passage in that the person who introduces the term ‘one metre‘ into 
the language seems to know what a metre is before he discovers the stick that is to 
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serve as the standard. There is no question of this happening, and the fact that 
Kripke thinks that it could shows that his example is probably misconceived from 
the start. But we must not be too hasty. Kripke’s claims here are not obviously 
specious and we must examine them in detail. 
Once again we begin with the distinction between descriptions that fix a reference 
and those that give a synonym, and once again Kripke must show that this method 
of introducing a term into the language furnishes us with knowledge that we did not 
already possess. For example, we already know a priori that stick S had whatever 
length it had at to even though it might have had a different length from its actual 
length at that moment. What Kripke must do is show why introducing the term ‘one 
metre‘ in the way he suggests gives us any knowledge beyond that. 
The Type 3 examples have certain advantages over the other types as well as 
suffering disadvantages. To begin with, the Existential Complaint does not seem to 
be as strong with the Type 3 cases since there is no reasonable doubt as to the 
existence of our standard. Also, there is no doubt that we are en rapport with the 
object (to use Kaplan’s term) and so, if we have knowledge here, it would be 
knowledge of some object. Donncllan’s criticisms of Type 2 cases would therefore 
not apply. Furthermore, it would seem that we cannot argue that the contingency 
involved here is merely superficial - i.e. that it does not depend on the way the 
world is, which would rule out Evans’ critique. The major disadvantage of the Type 
3 cases, and one which Kripke seems to acknowledge (1980,p63n) is that, even if 
we are dealing with a contingent a priori truth here, it would be relativised to a 
particular agent at a particular moment in time. No-one not present at the naming 
ceremony would know a priori that S is a meter in length at to - although they might 
know that it was a metre in length at to, after the event. 
Perhaps a more serious problem with the Type 3 examples ( and again one which 
Kripke concedes) is that we could seriously question whether we have acquired any 
genuine knowledge by merely stipulating that a certain length is to be a metre, or a 
certain mass is to be a kilogram. We certainly have not discovered anything here, 
and this in itself may be enough to dismiss the Type 3 cases as of no real 
consequence. The fact that a statement like (8) seems to be guaranteed to be true 
probably works against the Type 3 cases rather than for them. Wittgenstein’s point 
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here could be that, if there is no possibility of a mistake here, then we cannot talk 
about knowledge. At any rate, I shall argue that Wittgenstein’s analysis of the 
standard metre example, strange though it may seem to many, is in fact correct. 
Another interesting difference between the Type 3 cases and the Type 2 cases lies 
in the way they have been treated by commentators. Where the treatment of the 
Type 2 cases is, on the whole, characterised by sophisticated and rather ingenious 
mechanisms for explaining the phenomenon of the contingent a priori, the treatment 
of the Type 3 examples betrays mostly confusion on the part of philosophers. Not 
only confusion as to how a name functions, but confusion as to the very concept of 
measurement. 
Not surprisingly the confusion begins with Kripke in his original (1 980) example. 
As already mentioned, Kripke seems to think that the person who fixes the reference 
of the metric system by stipulating that ‘one metre‘ is to refer rigidly to the length 
of S at to, knows what a metre is before he comes across the stick that is to serve as 
the standard. There is no question of this being the case. The closest we could come 
to such a situation would be if people are already using something called a metre 
but the length varies slightly in different parts of the country. Our agent merely 
wants to standardise the unit of length, and so he has some idea of the length he is 
looking for. He does not, indeed cannot, know exactly what a metre is prior to 
choosing the standard. 
Van Brake1 (1 990,p300) highlights another major confusion, which originates 
with Kripke, but also pervades the commentaries of many other philosophers, such 
as Salmon (1 986); Harrison (1 987); Kennedy (1987); and Bostock (1 988, 0p.Cit.) 
The confusion involves the difference between knowing that S is exactly a metre in 
length and knowing that it is approximately a metre in length. If we are to know a 
priori that S is a metre in length then surely we must mean exactly a metre in length, 
not approximately. Measurements on the other hand are merely approximations. 
There is always a degree of tolerance in a measurement, which rules out our 
knowing that S is a metre in length by measurement because it surely makes no 
sense to say that the standard metre is a metre in length plus or minus a certain 
degree of tolerance. This rules out Salmon’s (1 986) argument where he claims that 
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we could only know the length of S by measurement. It also highlights a confusion 
in Kripke’s original account where he asks “If the stick is, for example, 39.37 
inches long, why isn’t it one metre long?” If we are to go down this road then we 
introduce a posteriori knowledge into the puzzle because we can only know that S is 
39.37 inches long by measurement. 
Bostock (1988) fares no better. He claims (p373) that Kripke’s metre example is 
not a case of a contingent a priori truth because someone could understand the 
description ‘the length of that stick‘ and also know what is meant by ‘one metre‘, 
based on a different standard from S, and yet not know that S is a metre long. This 
is a bad analysis of the puzzle for various reasons. First of all, we cannot have two 
standards for a system of measurement. Secondly, even if we count this second stick 
as a standard, we cannot know that it is exactly the same length as S - only 
approximately. And thirdly, the introduction of this other stick simply shifts the 
problem. That is, how do we know that the other stick is a metre in length? 
Van Brakel’s main thesis in his (1990) is an interesting one. It is that the 
statement 
( 9) One metre is the length o f S  
is a priori but necessary. He begins (p305) by dismissing the attempt to relativise 
the claim that S is a metre long to a particular moment in time as a useless way of 
defining a unit of measurement. We cannot restrict our unit to a single moment in 
time. He then goes on to claim that a statement like (9) is necessary because, not 
only is the term ‘one metre‘ rigid, but so also is the reference-fixing description ‘the 
length of S‘ (p307). According to Van Brakel such descriptions refer rigidly to a 
natural kind property such as 
solid metallic rods of constant temperature and submitted to constant external 
forces have constant length. (p3 1 1) 
Consequently, “Definitions of units of measurement are like Kripke’s examples of 
theoretical identities, except that the identity of two rigid designators is stipulated a 
priori instead of discovered a posteriori” (p307,308). Thus Van Brakel uses 
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Kripke’s own ideas on the necessity of scientific identities against his claims that 
statements such as (8) are contingent a priori. 
In my opinion Van Brakel’s analysis is a convincing one but it leaves untouched 
the question of whether our agent could know a priori that S is a metre long at to. 
(Presumably Van Brakel would say that he could but it would be of no 
consequence) Also, Van Brakel, along with just about everyone else, has 
misunderstood Wittgenstein on the question of whether or not we can attribute 
length to the standard metre. On page 302 of (1 990), while castigating Kripke for 
misunderstanding Wittgenstein on this point, Van Brakel also seems to miss the 
point when he says: “Wittgenstein means that in the practice of measuring in metres 
it does not make sense to start measuring S”. I think it clear from the original 
passage in Philosophical Investigations that Wittgenstein means something more 
than this. What he means is that it does not make sense to ascribe length to the 
standard metre in the metric system because of its special role in that system. We 
can of course attribute length to it in some other system, but certainly not a priori. 
There is more to the puzzle of the standard metre, then, than whether or not we 
can know its length by measurement. Even Salmon concedes this in his (1988) 
where he makes some concessions to Wittgenstein while realising that his earlier 
(1986) treatment of the problem may have been inadequate. In an appendix to his 
(1986) Salmon thinks it straightforwardly the case that to know that the standard 
metre is a metre in length is a posteriori - in fact he describes it as a paradigm of a 
posteriori knowledge, discoverable only by measurement ( 1986, p 142). In the 
(1 988) paper Salmon abandons this view, conceding that physical measurement is 
not only unnecessary but “is in some sense inapplicable to this case” (p207). 
Salmon then goes on to claim that a hypothetical agent who has randomly chosen S 
as his standard for measurement would know that S is exactly one metre long 
“simply by looking at it” (Ibid). This makes S “epistemically unique” (p209) and 
leads, according to Salmon, to an epistemological paradox as follows. 
... as soon as we say that the reference-fixer knows that S is one metre long, we 
are embroiled in a paradox. The language-game of measuring with a metre 
rule involves a simple criterion for knowing how long something is. In order 
for the reference-fixer to know how long anything is, he must be able to 
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specify its length in metres and he must know how long the Standard Metre 
is. Saying that he knows that S is exactly one metre long attributes to him 
knowledge of exactly how long the Standard Metre is. But he could not have 
acquired this knowledge through measurement. If he has such knowledge, he 
can only have acquired it by simply looking at S. This would require S to be 
what it cannot be: knowable in a unique way in which no other object is 
knowable and in which it itself would not be knowable if it had not been 
arbitrarily selected as the standard. These considerations invite the sceptical 
conclusion that the reference-fixer does not know after all that S is exactly one 
metre long. This, in turn, leads to an even stronger sceptical conclusion. For if 
the reference-fixer does not know how long S is, he cannot know, and cannot 
even discover, how long anything is. Measuring an object’s length using S 
only tells him the ratio of that object’s length to the length of S. (p210) 
The key word here is ‘only‘, as in “only tells him the ratio of that object’s length to 
the length of S”. This passage shows that Salmon, in common with perhaps the vast 
majority of philosophers, simply does not understand the concept of measurement. 
This lack of understanding is presaged in a passage on p208 where Salmon argues: 
... knowing that a given object’s length is exactly n times that of another object 
(the standard) cannot give one knowledge of how long the first object is 
unless one already knows how long the second object is. If one knows only 
that the length of the first is n times that of the second without knowing how 
long the second object is, one knows only the proportion between the lengths 
of the two objects without knowing how long either object is. 
What Salmon fails to understand here is that measurement simply consists in 
determining (within a degree of tolerance) the ratio of one object’s length to the 
length of some standard. To say that an agent onZy knows the proportion of the 
length of two objects (one of which is a standard), or that he can onZy determine the 
ratio of an object’s length to the length of S, is to fail to grasp the concept of 
measurement. Measurement consists in nothing more than the comparison of the 
object of measurement with some standard. The very question 
How long is x ? 
presupposes a unit of length and a standard of length. If there were no standards of 
length we could not ask how long anything is. (This standard need not be a very 
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accurate one like the standard metre stick. It can actually be quite crude. For 
example, if I say that a certain object is about three times my height then I use my 
body as a crude standard in order to give people some idea of the length of the 
object in question. The standard metre stick may be more accurate as a standard but 
the principle is basically the same). The question ‘How long is x?‘ literally means 
‘How does x compare with some standard (within a certain degree of tolerance)?’ 
The answer to the question, viz. 
x is n units long 
literally means 
x compares n times with some standard (within a degree of error) 
This standard is arbitrarily chosen and agreed upon by the community. Only 
practical considerations bar us from using anything at all as a standard. If we had 
chosen a different stick as our standard metre, as we might have done, then a metre 
would be a different length. This arbitrary nature of standards of measurement 
seems to be lost on many philosophers. 
At this point we can give an argument in support of Wittgenstein by asking if it 
really makes any sense to ask how the Standard Metre stick compares with itself - 
within a certain degree of tolerance. It would seem that it does not and so it makes 
no sense to say of the standard metre either that it is or that it is not a metre in 
length. 
~ Not only is the standard of measurement arbitrarily chosen but standards of 
measurement are ‘artificial‘ concepts - as opposed to ‘natural‘ concepts like ‘tiger‘ 
or ’dog‘. Although we invented the word ‘tiger‘, we did not invent the concept of a 
tiger. This is something we discovered when we discovered tigers and decided to 
name them. Not so with the concept of a metre or a kilogram. Although we 
discovered the concepts of length (and mass) we invented the concept of a metre for 
our own convenience; as a means of making judgements about length which we 
could record andor communicate to others. The length ‘one metre‘ was not waiting 
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to be discovered by us in the way that tigers were. We simply chose a length that we 
found convenient and called it a metre. That is all there is to choosing a standard of 
measurement. This means that whatever we call a metre, or would have called a 
metre, idwould have been, a metre. Contrast this with a natural concept like ‘tiger‘. 
A tiger is not whatever is called a tiger. A metre is whatever is called a metre. 
This foregoing leads to a consequence that is in many ways even stranger than 
Wittgenstein’s claim. First of all, if we grant that it is legitimate to say that S is a 
metre in length at to, but contingently so, then it is contingent for a rather surprising 
reason. It is not contingent because S might have had a different length at to, but 
because S might not have been chosen as the standard metre. Furthermore, until S 
was actually chosen as the standard, it would not have been a metre in length - even 
if it had exactly the same length that it had at to! This is a consequence of the 
artificial nature of the concept of a metre. Whatever we call a metre is a metre. If the 
metric system had never been invented then nothing would have been a metre in 
length because nothing would have been judged to be a metre in length. If this 
seems strange then consider what is happening at the moment to when S is chosen as 
the standard metre. Is S already a metre in length at to? And was it, or could it have 
been, a metre in length before to? The answers to these questions may seem 
obviously ‘Yes‘; but that is a mistake. If S was a metre in length at to when it was 
chosen as the standard, or even before to, as most people would probably claim, 
then it must have been the most remarkable coincidence in human history 
when our agent chose S as the standard metre. Just think, of all the sticks he 
could have chosen as the standard for the metric system, he just happened to choose 
one that was exactly one metre in length. Astonishing! Astonishing, and of course 
nonsense. (It is certainly very difficult to square this with the arbitrary way in which 
standards are chosen). Not only is nothing called a metre without the existence of 
the metric system, but nothing actually is a metre prior to the establishment of the 
metric system. Again this supports Wittgenstein because at the moment that the 
metric system is established -i.e to - we could question whether it makes sense to 
say that anything is a metre in length. 
160 
There are several reasons, then, to conclude that the Type 3 cases do not give us 
examples of contingent a priori truths. First of all, in common with the Type 2 
cases, the Type 3 examples such as 
Stick S is one metre long at to 
depend on the distinction between definite descriptions which are synonymous with 
a term and those that merely fix reference. We have seen that this distinction cannot 
be made. Even if we were to grant the distinction, however, there are other reasons 
for rejecting Kripke’s claims. There is Van Brakel’s argument that (8) is necessary 
because it involves two rigid designators, not one. Then there is the infamous claim 
by Wittgenstein that we cannot say of the standard metre either that it is a metre in 
length or that it is not. This has far more plausibility than it may appear at first 
sight; especially if we regard S as a criterion by means of which we judge whether 
or not an object is a metre long. It surely makes no sense to apply a criterion to 
itselJ at least in the present case, and so it makes no sense to judge or assert that S 
is a metre in length or that it is not a metre in length. 
We must also ask what is to be understood by the term ‘metre‘. Once again, if 
this is to be a word in any language, it must contribute to what speakers of the 
language understand by any sentence in which it appears. The only thing that could 
be understood by the word ‘metre‘ is the description ‘The length of S at to (or in 
standard conditions)’ which is supposed to merely fix reference without giving a 
synonym. As we have seen there is no such thing as fixing a reference without 
giving a synonym. Consequently the term ‘One Metre‘ must be synonymous with 
the above description. 
To reiterate, the question: 
How long is x? 
literally means 
How does x compare with some standard (within a certain degree of 
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tolerance) ? 
and nothing more. Likewise, the statement 
x is n units long 
literally means 
x compares n times with some standard (within a degree of tolerance) 
The question “Is the standard metre a metre in length at to?” presupposes the metric 
system and literally means: 
How does the standard metre compare with itself (within a degree of tolerance)? 
This does not make sense. Consequently, the person who asks the question: 
How long is the standard metre? 
does not understand the concept of measurement. It is not a proper question in the 
way that ‘What time is it on the sun?‘ is not a proper question if we use the sun to 
tell the time. There is no answer to an improper question and so we cannot say 
either that S is a metre in length nor that it is not. 
Even if we grant that it does make sense to say that S is a metre in length, the 
statement 
S is a metre in length at to 
would be necessary a priori because of the meaning of the statement. The statement 
would literally mean 
S compares with itself (the standard) at to 
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This is undoubtedly a priori but also necessary. Once again we have failed to find an 
example of a contingent a priori truth. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF NECESSITY 
I1 
ESSENTIALISM 
We turn finally to perhaps Kripke's most interesting claim - the claim that there are 
necessary a posteriori truths and that science can discover real essences empirically. 
This in itself is a bold and highly controversial claim. What is even more 
controversial is Kripke's contention that this essentialism can be established from a 
semantic theory about how names function in natural languages, viz, the theory that 
proper names and names for natural kinds (such as 'gold' or 'water' ) are direct, 
rigid designators. Thus, as we have already seen, statements such as: 
(1) Cicero is Tully 
(2) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
will be necessary even though they were empirical discoveries. More interestingly, 
and more contentiously, so-called 'scientific identities' such as 
(3) Water is H20 
(4) Gold is the element with atomic number 79 
(5) Heat is the motion of molecules 
will be necessary a posteriori (See Naming and Necessity, 1980, p122 ff.) As if this 
were not enough Kripke also adds essentialist claims about the origin of individuals. 
For example, if a certain object is made of ice, then it is essentially made of ice; or if 
a certain individual developed from a particular pair of gametes, then it is necessary 
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that that individual came from just those gametes (1 980, pl10-113). Putnam (1 973) 
makes similar essentialist claims about natural kinds, based on his view that the 
reference of natural kind terms are fixed indexically and socially and not by means 
of a concept in the minds of speakers of any language which sets conditions for 
reference in terms of phenomenological properties. Putnam’s views are supported by 
Donnellan in two unpublished papers (1 973 and 1974) - according to Salmon (1 98 1, 
p163ff). On the other hand, there is a considerable body of literature opposing these 
essentialist claims, not least of which is Salmon’s (1981), even though Salmon is 
himself a strong advocate of the direct reference theory. 
Before evaluating the various arguments for and against this Kripkean 
essentialism we must be clear as to what exactly is involved in the essentialist 
claims. Some obvious misgivings are easily dealt with by Kripke - for example, the 
claim that natural kinds like gold and water do not exist in all possible worlds, and 
so we cannot be dealing with necessary truths here. Kripke makes it quite clear that 
he is dealing with a particular notion of necessity - what he terms ‘weak necessity‘: 
i.e. truth in all possible worlds where the relevant object or kind exists. This is 
sometimes known as metaphysical necessity by Kripke and Putnam. Another early 
qualification that must be made is an epistemological one in answer to the possible 
criticism that, for example, water cannot be necessarily H20 because it might turn 
out not to be H20 at all. I.e. we could have made a mistake in our empirical 
investigations. Again Kripke deals with this objection briskly, by arguing that of 
course the claim that a statement such as ‘Water is H20‘ is necessary depends on its 
being true at all - and of course it may not be. In other words, zfwater is H20 then it 
is necessarily so. This is of course because ‘water‘ and ‘H20‘ are rigid designators 
and therefore refer to the same substance in all possible worlds, where the relevant 
substance exists. (The expression ‘relevant substance‘ is of course crucial to the 
debate). The notion of necessity with which we are concerned, then, is a qualified 
one. We are not concerned with worlds where the relevant object or kind does not 
exist, and we must grant that we could be mistaken about what we take to be 
empirical discoveries about the world. This latter point means that no scientist could 
ever actually be in the position to say that he has discovered the essence of a kind 
because he must concede that he might have made a mistake in his observations: but 
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this does not seem to trouble Kripke. (We shall see that these qualifications should 
trouble Kripke. He should be particularly troubled by a further qualification, the one 
mentioned in chapter 3 to the effect that we really do not need proper names or 
natural kind terms such as ‘water‘ and ‘gold‘ in our language. We could use 
descriptions instead. What this means for the doctrine of Essentialism is that 
statements like (1) - (5) above will be necessary only if we decide to admit names 
like ‘Hesperus‘, ‘Phosphorus‘, ‘water’, ‘gold‘ etc. into our language. This is a 
further weakening of the notion of necessity being employed here. It is a further 
qualification that Kripke must make, and I contend that it is a qualification too far) 
As with the alleged examples of the contingent a priori in chapter 5 we will divide 
the proposed examples of the necessary a posteriori into different types. Type 1 will 
consist of identity statements involving proper names such as ‘Hesperus is 
Phosphorus‘ or ‘Cicero is Tully‘. The Type 2 cases will be the scientific identities 
mentioned above [ (3) - (5) 3 ; and the Type 3 examples will be the ones involving 
claims about the essentiality of origin. The three types are united in that they all 
involve what Kripke claims are rigid designators and what could broadly be 
regarded as identity statements. There are important differences, however. First of 
all, in the Type 1 examples, we are dealing with what seem to be straightforward 
identities between objects - the kind dealt with in Chapter 4. In the Type 2 cases by 
contrast, we are dealing with kinds rather than individuals - i.e. general essences 
rather than individual essences [See Parsons, 1969, in Linsky, 1 97 1 ,p73ffl Even 
though we could perhaps regard kinds as ‘higher order‘ objects (e.g. Marcus, 1976) 
it is not obvious that we are dealing with straightforward identity statements in the 
Type 2 cases. In a statement like 
“Heat is the motion of molecules” 
for example, we could be dealing with the ’is‘ of composition rather than the ‘is‘ of 
identity. This would have advantages and disadvantages for Kripke, as we shall see. 
The other major difference between the different types is that, where we deal 
solely with proper names in the Type 1 cases, we deal also with descriptions in the 
other two types - i.e. descriptions that are supposed to be rigid according to Kripke. 
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This brings problems for the Kripkean view in that it is not always obvious that a 
description could be rigid, even if we accept the rigidity of names (which we may 
not ). The problem is that, pace Almog, while a description like “The square root of 
2” may be rigid, or even “The motion of molecules”, to claim that the description 
“The offspring of gametes G” is rigid is surely to beg the question at issue. 
In this final chapter we will mostly be concerned with the Type 2 cases which 
seem to be the most interesting ( and of course the most contentious ). We shall say 
something about the Type 3 examples but very little about the Type 1s because of 
what was said about identity statements in chapter 4. In this chapter, remember, the 
claim that identity statements of the form a=b are necessary was seriously 
challenged, and found wanting. Obviously, if identity statements are not necessary, 
then we have dealt with the Type 1 cases. We may also have dealt with the Type 2 
cases, but we must be careful here since they do not seem to be quite the same sort 
of claim as the Type 1s. (Although, interestingly, Kripke seems to think that they 
are). 
What also counts against the necessity of the Type 1 examples is the theory of 
meaning developed in chapter 3, whereby, even if proper names are rigid, they must 
have a sense given by a set of definite descriptions in order to contribute to what it is 
that speakers understand by the name. Thus, a statement like: 
“Hesperus is Phosphorus” 
is equivalent to something like: 
“The heavenly body commonly believed to occupy such-and-such a 
position in the evening sky is identical with the heavenly body commonly 
believed to occupy such-and-such a position in the morning sky” 
On Kripke’s own premises, this would be contingent. The only way in which such a 
statement could be necessary would be if the descriptions involved were always to 
be taken referentially (in Donnehn’s sense ) and never attributively. But this would 
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be equivalent to rigidifying all definite descriptions, which would simply destroy the 
distinction between rigid and non-rigid designators. 
We must also be clear about what kind of language we are dealing with. As 
mentioned in chapter 3 we are dealing with what we have called The Scientific 
Language - i.e. the language of scientists and philosophers, or indeed anyone who 
uses language in a serious way to explore the world or describe the world. We are 
not interested in the language of the man in the street because of its sloppiness. We 
may have given up long ago on the idea of the logically perfect language but we 
must be as strict as possible in constructing our semantics, especially when we 
remember what is at stake. 
Of course the theory of meaning developed in chapter 3 also affects the Type 2 
and Type 3 cases, as we shall see below. In the meantime it will be as well to note 
the magnitude of the task Kripke and Putnam have set themselves. Problems with 
essentialism are well known - the most common being the argument that what we 
regard as necessary or contingent is relative to our interests or our way of describing 
the situation at hand. Thus, Quine, in his (1960) famously makes sport with 
essentialism with his paradox of The Mathematical Cyclist. I.e. if it makes sense to 
say that a mathematician is essentially rational but not essentially bi-pedal; and a 
cyclist essentially bi-pedal but not essentially rational, what are we to make of a 
mathematician who is also a cyclist? He would seem to be essentially rational and 
not essentially rational. Or is he essentially rational but not essentially two-legged - 
or vice versa? (1 960, pl99) We do not seem to be able to make any sense here at all. 
Even mathematical essentialism has been attacked by some philosophers. 
Although it may seem obvious that the number 9, for example, is essentially 
composite (in a de re sense) this has been challenged. Harman (1970), for example, 
argues against arithmetical essentialism in the following way. First of all, numbers 
can be identified with sets, and so the number 9 can be identified with a set ( in fact 
numerous sets). But, according to Harman, “.. being a composite number is not an 
essential property of any set. Therefore if numbers can be identified with sets, and 
de re necessity is in question, no number is necessarily a composite number. Being 
a composite number is not an essential property of any number” (1970, pl84) 
168 
One more example, and perhaps the most famous, is Quine’s treatment of the 
problem in “Reference and Modality” (1953, 1961). In this celebrated paper the 
point is again about whether we can make sense of the claim that objects have 
essential properties irrespective of how they are described. Specifically, Quine is 
concerned with the problem of quantification into what he terms ‘referentially 
opaque‘ contexts. For example, from the premise 
(A) 9 is necessarily greater than 7 
and 
(B) The number of planets = 9 
by substitution of co-referential terms we get 
(C) The number of planets is necessarily greater than 7 
which is false according to Quine. The problem is that we cannot go by existential 
generalisation from (A) to 
(D) (3x) (x is necessariIy greater than 7) 
because we cannot specify whether ‘x’ is to be 9, which would make (D) true, or 
‘The number of planets‘, which would render it false. In other words, the way in 
which the number 9 is specified determines which properties are to be regarded as 
necessary or contingent. As Quine says in “Reference and Modality”, quantified 
modal logic requires that 
An object, of itself, and by whatever name or none, must be seen as having 
some of its traits necessarily and others contingently, despite the fact that the 
latter traits follow just as analytically from some ways of specifying the object 
as the former traits do from other ways of specifying it. [In Linsky, 197 1, p30] 
Thus Quine concludes that the only way in which we can adopt an essentialist 
position here would be if we were to indulge in an unjustifiable ‘favouritism’ 
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whereby we only consider the object under a certain specification while ignoring 
others. 
There have of course been many counters to these anti-essentialist views. 
Plantinga, for example, in his (1974, Ch.2) takes issue with Quine’s Mathematical 
Cyclist as well as Harman’s set-theoretic arguments. As for “Reference and 
Modality”, Smullyan (1 948) famously offers a Russellian reply, which Quine really 
should accept - since he is himself a Russellian - while Marcus (Mind, 1960), also in 
a Russellian vein, claims that (B) is not a genuine identity, but a weaker equivalence 
relation, and so does not admit of substitution of ‘The number of planets‘ for ‘9‘ in 
(A). For Kripke, of course, the alleged paradoxes of people like Quine are dissolved 
by the notion of rigidity. It is only rigid designators that can be substituted in 
intensional contexts. ‘9‘ is rigid, ’The number of planets‘ is not; and so there is no 
problem. 
Regardless, however, of the merits or otherwise of Marcus, Smullyan and 
Plantinga, or indeed of the replies to these by Quine (See Words and Objections, 
1967), there are still problems for essentialism concerning natural kinds. A notable 
anti-essentialist of recent times is John Dupre who argues against essentialism in his 
(1993) The Disunity of Science. In this book the point is made that what is to count 
as a natural kind depends on how we decide to characterise things. This is of course 
the point made by Quine but in a less abstract way. Interestingly, despite this, Dupre 
claims to be a realist about natural kinds - but only in a special sense - what he calls 
“promiscuous realism”. For Dupre the naturalness of kinds is a matter of degree 
(p63). Cedars, for example, are not closely related, according to Dupre. The 
classification of various trees as cedars has more to do with the use the wood is put 
to by carpenters than any biological taxonomy (p31). Nevertheless, cedars form a 
natural kind even if they are classified in this way, but such a kind would not be as 
natural as some others, like oak or beech, which are easier to classify (Ibid.). As 
Dupre explains: 
Certainly I see no possible reason why commitment to many overlapping 
kinds of things should threaten the reality of any of them. A certain entity 
might be a real whale, a real mammal, a real top predator in the food chain, 
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and even a real fish. Many, perhaps all, of these designations might be the 
appropriate characterisation of that object for some legitimately scientific 
purpose (Op. Cit, p262) 
Such ‘promiscuous‘ realism would undoubtedly undermine the doctrine of 
essentialism, but that is Dupre’s point. Or at least it is part of his point. The other 
part of Dupre’s thesis concerns the role that a real essence would play in 
determining the properties and behaviour of the objects possessing them (p63). For 
Dupre, we cannot explicate such a role because there are no kinds the members of 
which are identical with respect to all their properties. Thus real essences are not 
necessary for natural kinds (Ibid.). Furthermore, even if a kind is determined by a 
real essence, the discovery of the essence presupposes the discovery of the kind 
(Ibid.). As Dupre himself argues: 
Only the most extreme reductionist could suppose that examining a particular 
individual would allow one to determine to what kind it belonged apart from 
the prior recognition and at least partial characterisation of that kind (Ibid.) 
Thus Dupre concludes: 
.... discovering kinds does not involve discovering essences; and so, given that 
there is no other way of discovering them, nothing does. (p64) 
It is against this background of scepticism about essentialism that Kripke and 
Putnam must argue. Their claims, particularly Kripke’s, are bold because they 
believe they have developed a powerful theory of how natural kind terms (and 
others) are to be explicated. Specifically, they are concerned with how the extension 
of a natural kind term is fixed. Armed with the concepts of rigid designation, 
necessity of identity and the indexical nature of natural kind terms whose reference 
is fixed causally by ostensive definition of a paradigm case, Kripke and Putnam feel 
confident of establishing necessary a posteriori truths. 
As we have seen Kripke’s notion of rigidity has many problems. However, an 
interesting development of the rigidity issue is to be found in Danielle MacBeth 
(1995). In this paper MacBeth makes a distinction between what she terms 
‘semantic’ and ‘epistemic‘ rigidity. Natural kind terms are not semantically rigid 
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because they are predicates ( ~ 2 6 0 ) ~  and as such have essentially associated 
principles of inclusion (p277). But, argues MacBeth, empirical investigation does 
not require that a principle of inclusion be given in advance. Rather, we can 
stipdate that a paradigmatic instance is to be an instance of some kind (p275). For 
example, we can choose a paradigm of a cat and stipulate that it is a cat such that: 
In such a context the assertion ‘Felix is a cat‘ is not a claim that is true or false 
depending on the facts about Felix and the principle of inclusion for ‘is a cat‘ 
but is rather a matter of fixing on a particular as a paradigm instance of the 
kind so that the principle of inclusion for that kind can be investigated (p275) 
This is the notion of epistemic rigidity which is supposed to allow us to investigate 
natural kinds. 
The similarities with Putnam’s method in “The Meaning of Meaning” are obvious 
and unfortunately beset with the same problems. The main problem as I see it with 
this method of choosing a paradigm in order to avoid any principle of inclusion or a 
set of descriptive conditions for membership in the kind is that we must be able to 
re-identzjj the paradigm, especially in the context of a scientific investigation where 
experimental results must be repeatable. The only way in which we can re-identify 
the paradigm or repeat our experimental results is by giving descriptive conditions 
or a principle of inclusion for the kind. This is borne out by Mellor (1977) who 
points out that the above method we have attributed to MacBeth and Putnam is 
certainly not how biologists actually proceed. For Mellor any paradigm cases are 
“causally downwind” of the usage they are supposed to constrain (In Pessin and 
Goldberg, 1995, p74). The archetypes are chosen to fit botanical and genetic 
knowledge, not the other way round (Ibid.) In fact, in Mellor’s view it is a 
consequence of Putnam’s thesis that our most authoritative specimens of a kind may 
not even be of that kind, since we cannot be sure if our current usage stems from a 
paradigm that is indeed of the appropriate kind. [A similar point is made by Zemach 
in his, 1976, p123-124; and by Dupre Op.Cit., p63, where, as we have already seen, 
he contends that even if a kind is determined by a real essence, the discovery of such 
an essence presupposes the discovery of the kind. It is also interesting to note that 
Kripke sees no problem with the possibility of a kind being discovered and 
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rediscovered many times so that we may not know what the original sample of the 
kind was] 
Even a defender of Putnam like Kim Sterelny recognises a role for descriptions in 
what he terms the ‘grounding‘ of natural kind terms (1983, in Pessin and Goldberg, 
Op. Cit.). This is in response to the criticism of causal theories (e.g. Mellor, Op. 
Cit.) that some natural kinds have no paradigm instances - for example, theoretical 
particles or elements high in the periodic table. For Sterelny, different natural kind 
terms are grounded in different ways, depending on the way in which we causally 
interact with the kinds involved. With something like gold, for example, the 
grounding of the term is relatively straightforward and similar to the method 
advocated by Kripke and Putnam - i.e. a speaker is introduced to an actual sample of 
gold and his use of the term ‘gold‘ grounded in causal contact with the paradigm 
sample. His subsequent uses of the term will, according to Sterelny, re-ground the 
term because “For many of his uses of that ... term both samples of the substance and 
his ability to refer will be immediately involved. Such tokens will be semantically 
linked to gold in the same way that his grounding use of “gold” is so linked” (pl02, 
1995). 
Things are obviously more complicated when no paradigm sample is available; 
such as the case of a theoretical particle. In such cases Sterelny envisages two 
possibilities. First of all, a kind term can be introduced by descriptions that pick out 
the causalpowers of the kind. For example, kind K is that kind which has such-and- 
such effects. Such descriptions would be used referentially not attributively to avoid 
having to conclude that the term refers to nothing if we do not get the original 
description exactly right. In the second type of case the causal powers of the 
speculated kind are not known - for example, the case of the neutrino. In such a case 
the descriptions used to introduce the term are initially use attributively, but once 
the effects and interactions of the kind are detected experimentally, samples of the 
kind can be designated by referential descriptions. Thus, according to Sterelny, a 
causal theory of natural kind terms can be given which is more sophisticated than 
the early theories of Kripke and Putnam, but which concedes nothing to the Fregean 
- even though descriptions play an important role. 
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Unfortunately for Sterelny his arguments seem prone to the same problems as the 
previous anti-Fregean theories. To begin with, it surely makes no sense to talk of the 
re-grounding of a term like 'gold' without some means of re-identifying samples. 
This must involve recognition of properties in some way. Even if it is only the 
experts who are required to be aware of the recurring identifying conditions, we are 
still dealing with properties. As Melior puts it in his (1977) "...no doubt the labour 
of reference is divided, as Putnam says, but it may be a Fregean labour for all that 
(1995, p73). Sterelny replies (Ibid. P101) that we cannot be dealing with a fully 
Fregean labour here because there is no Fregean account of reference-borrowing 
available. I suggest that the arguments put forward in chapters two and three of the 
present work, especially the theory of meaning developed in chapter three, show that 
a description theory of names does not require any account reference-borrowing. 
As for Sterelny's account of kind terms where no paradigm is available, it would 
seem to be susceptible to the same counters already made against the Kripkean 
distinction between descriptions that are synonymous with a term, and those that 
merely fix its reference. As we have already seen, this distinction is untenable 
because of the need to specify what is understood by a term. In addition to this, 
Sterelny seems to overlook the possibility of two kinds having the same effects in 
the context in which they are first identified. In such a situation would we succeed in 
fixing the reference of the term? 
So far, then, the anti-essentialist appears to be winning the argument; but there are 
defects here too. For example, we could question Dupre's claim that kinds involve 
degrees of naturalness. Classifying different trees as cedars, for example, because 
they all have a common use as timber, does not seem to be a natural way of 
classifying at all. Even if we accept that distinguishing species can be difficult, as 
with the approximately 290,000 species of beetle, for example, the problem is surely 
not insurmountable. Similarly with Dupre's claim that we cannot explicate a role for 
essence in determining properties and behaviour because there are no kinds the 
members of which are identical with respect to all their properties. This is too strong 
a claim to make on the basis of such a trivial point. Of course no two members of a 
species will be absolutely qualitatively identical, but we can surely live with this. 
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The main point to remember here is that all the normal members of a species will be 
identical with respect to the type of properties each of them has. This is something 
that certainly could be explained by appeal to the notion of essence. 
The degree of naturalness alluded to by Dupre is even less obvious if we deal 
with non-biological kinds, like gold or water, or even heat; and even Dupre must 
accept that many biological kinds are easily identified. Actually it is a defect of 
Dupre’s thesis that he only deals with biological kinds. Non-biological kinds seem 
to be relatively easy to classify; although there could be a problem with isotopes, as 
even Putnam admits (1990, Chapter 4). But even if there is a problem here it is 
nothing like the difficulty presented by the classification of biological kinds. 
Nevertheless, Putnam does see difficulties in dealing with two samples of iron, one 
of which is mono-isotopic, the other ‘natural‘ iron which contains more than one 
isotope (Ibid, p68) Rather surprisingly, Putnam concludes that whether or not we 
classify the two samples as consubstantial may depend on our interests! (Ibid.) 
Putnam may be right about this point, but there are other ways of looking at the 
problem. If mono-isotopic and poly-isotopic iron, or whatever, have a different 
micro-structure and behave differently - albeit only slightly and in highly specialised 
circumstances - then there seems little doubt that, strictly speaking, they are 
different substances. The fact that the layman, whose interests do not coincide with 
those of the scientist, does not make the distinction, or is unaware of the distinction, 
is not relevant. Strictly speaking they are different substances because they are 
constituted differently and behave differently. What more could we wish for in our 
attempt to distinguish different kinds of thing? 
Of course these conditions would only provide criteria for sameness of substance 
in the actual world. The key question now is whether sameness of microstructure 
together with same behaviour provide identity conditions for kinds across possible 
worlds, which is what is required by essentialism. Interestingly, we can find a 
negative answer to this question from Putnam himself in (1 990, Chapter 4) where he 
begins to question his essentialist catechism. In Putnam’s later view microstructure 
is no longer the sole criterion for consubstantiality (even in the actual world). If it 
makes sense to talk of laws of nature then we must make use of laws in our attempt 
to define consubstantiality (1990, p68,69). Thus Putnam concludes that “A and B 
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are the same substance if and only if they obey the same laws” (Ibid.) But, argues 
Putnam, we cannot use this as a criterion for substance identity across possible 
worlds because there could be possible worlds where the laws of nature are 
different (Ibid.) This seems correct because, if there is a possible world where H20 
exists but because the laws of nature are different it does not behave like the 
substance we call ‘water‘ - i.e. it is not drinkable, does not boil at 100 degrees, 
dissolve salts etc. - it is far from obvious that this H20  would be water. 
Consequently, and crucially, Putnam distances himself from Kripke with the words: 
I now think that the question “What is the necessary and sufficient condition 
for being water in a l l  possible worlds?” makes no sense at all. And this means 
that I now reject “metaphysical necessity” (1990, p70) 
This is a crucial admission by Putnam and it would be of great interest to hear 
Kripke’s response to it. Significantly, perhaps, Kripke has failed to comment in 
public - as far as I know. The only thing he could do is appeal to intuition and claim 
that he has an intuition to the effect that it does make sense to ask for the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for substance identity across possible worlds. Such an 
intuition would be severely tested by the admission that the laws of nature can vary 
across possible worlds, so that we could have worlds where H20 has none of the 
properties we associate with water and some other substance, like Putnam’s XYZ, 
has all the properties we normally associate with water (except perhaps the property 
of being separable into hydrogen and oxygen in the ratio 2 3 .  Is it really a 
straightforward case to say which of these substances is water? 
On the other hand, even if we accept that obeying the same laws is a criterion for 
substance identity in the actual world (and even here the notion of ‘same laws‘ could 
be vague as Putnam concedes [p68] ), this may not be a criterion for 
consubstantiality across possible worlds. So even if there are metaphysically 
possible worlds where the laws of nature differ from the actual world, perhaps 
Kripke can still maintain that anything that is H20 in these worlds is water. 
Where does this leave the doctrine of essentialism about natural kinds, then; or 
the Type 2 cases as we have chosen to call them? It seems that Putnam is correct in 
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his claim that there will be possible worlds where the laws of nature are different. At 
the very least this puts a severe strain on the claim that anything that is H20 in such 
worlds is water. It may even bring about the downfall of metaphysical necessity. I t  
is ironic perhaps, but Putnam‘s argument here is actually more powerful than any of 
the anti-essentialist positions mentioned above. Putnam has not given up on 
necessity, however. He still accepts that a statement like ‘Water is H20‘ is 
physically necessary, and that the laws of nature exist objectively, and that science 
can discover these laws and this kind of necessity (1990, p68). If Kripke does not 
accept Putnam’s argument here he would do well to consider the arguments against 
the project to derive non-trivial essentialism from the theory of direct reference to be 
found in Salmon’s Reference and Essence (1981) where the charge against Kripke 
et. al. is once again that of begging the question. 
In this very thorough and well-argued book Salmon deals with the attempt by 
Putnam and Donnellan to derive non-trivial essentialism about natural kinds from 
DRT, and with Kripke’s attempt regarding individual essence. Salmon characterises 
the PutnamDonnellan attempt to derive non-trivial essentialism in the following 
schema, which he terms (after Donnellan) a ‘mechanism‘ for ’generating’ necessary 
a posteriori truths. 
The mechanism for water is as follows (using Salmon’s original numbering): 
(1 3 ’> It is necessarily the case that: something is a sample of water if and only 
if it is a sample of dthat (the same substance as this is a sample o f )  
(1 8’) This (liquid sample) has the chemical structure H20 
(1 9’) Being a sample of the same substance as something consists in having the 
same chemical structure 
Therefore 




(1 5’) It is necessarily the case that: Something is a (bit of) v if and only if it is 
an instance of dthat (the same K-kind that this is an instance of) 
(25’) This has the <- property of being 5 
(26’) Being an instance of the same K-kind as something consists, at least 
in part, in having the same < property that the given thing has 
(28’) Therefore it is necessarily the case that: every (bit of) v is 5 (pl66-169) 
Where v is a common noun, e.g. ‘water’ 
K is a generic natural kind predicate 
5 expresses a hidden structural property 
C; expresses the property of being a hidden structural property of a certain 
sort 
dthat is Kaplan’ s indexical operator which transforms any given singular 
term into a rigid designator (In French, et.al., 1979) 
According to Salmon a similar mechanism suggests itself for generating necessary a 
posteriori truths concerning individuals - what he calls the I - mechanism. For 
example, the I-mechanism for generating the necessary a posteriori truth that a 
certain table, if it is in fact made of wood, is essentially made of wood, is as follows 
(again using Salmon’s original numbering): 
(30’) It is necessarily the case that: Woody is dthat (the table located here) 
(3 1 ’) The table located here was originally constructed from hunk of wood H 
(32’) Being the very same table as something consists, at least in part, in having 
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the same material composition 
Therefore 
(34’) It is necessarily the case that: Woody, if it exists, was originally constructed 
from hunk of wood H 
where ‘Woody‘ is a proper name and rigid designator of a particular table. This 
generalises in a similar way to the natural kind case. 
So according to Salmon, the programme to derive non-trivial essentialism from 
the theory of direct reference takes the following form. We begin with a premise 
stating that a natural kind terrn, or a name for an individual, is a rigid designator. 
This is followed by an empirical discovery that members of the kind have a certain 
chemical composition, or the individual has a certain origin. Thirdly, we have the 
premise which states that being the same x, or whatever, consists in having the same 
chemical composition, or the same material origin, or in the case of a biological 
species, in being of the same biological class as the x. All of which allegedly leads 
to the conclusion that the x is essentially composed of whatever it has been found to 
be composed of, or that it is essentially part of the biological class (e.g. mammal) 
that we have discovered it to be part of. The crucial premise is the third, which 
Salmon claims is a non-trivial essentialist assumption - a metaphysical assumption 
not derived from the theory of direct reference or any semantic theory. It is because 
of this that the PutnamDonnellan program fails. In Salmon’s view it is quite simply 
question-begging . 
Interestingly, according to Donnellan, the third premise is not a metaphysical 
assumption, but a scientific discovery, and hence, a posteriori. He reasons that, since 
there was a time when nothing was known about, say, chemical composition, and 
hence it could not have been known that consubstantiality consists in having the 
same chemical composition, that our current knowledge concerning 
consubstantiality is a posteriori, since it depends on the empirical discovery that 
substances do in fact have a chemical structure. So the claim to essentialism 
concerning natural kinds has two sources of a posteriority according to Donnellan. 
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(1981, p.165,166) I think Donnellan must be wrong here. Of course the third 
premise depends on the empirical discovery that substances do in fact have a 
chemical composition, but once this is discovered, it requires a priori reflection (or 
stipulation) to conclude that consubstantiality consists in sameness of composition. 
So if Salmon’s characterisation of the program to derive non-trivial essentialism 
from the theory of direct reference is correct it would indeed seem that the program 
fails. It fails because the alleged necessary a posteriori truths generated are not 
generated solely from the theory of direct reference in conjunction with empirical 
premises free from non-trivial essentialist import. As Salmon says: “Our essentialist 
intuitions aside, the theory of direct reference seems perfectly compatible with the 
claim that examples such as ‘water is H20‘, ‘Tigers are mammals‘, and ‘This very 
table originated from hunk of wood H’ ... are contingent a posteriori rather than 
necessary a posteriori” (1 98 1, p2 17) 
Kripke’s arguments for the essentiality of origin are similarly rejected by Salmon. 
These arguments take the form of essentialist claims about the origin of artefacts, 
such as a table, or the biological origin of an individual, like Nixon, for example. 
Could a certain table which is in fact made of wood have been made from a block of 
ice? asks Krikpe in “Identity and Necessity”. Similarly, could Nixon, or anyone, 
have developed from gametes other than the ones from which he in fact developed? 
Kripke answers these questions in the negative. Salmon does not of course 
necessarily disagree with these essentialist conclusions - only with the claim that 
they can be derived from the theory of direct reference in a non-question-begging 
way. Once again, according to Salmon, Kripke assumes a non-trivial essentialist 
premise something like: 
(V) If it is possible for a table, x, to be originally constructed from a hunk of 
matter y, then necessarily, any table originally constructed from hunk y is 
the very table x and no other 
which is something an anti-essentialist would deny. Now it seems that an anti- 
essentialist would indeed deny (V), but actually I think Kripke would also deny it 
because this is not what he is claiming at all. Of course a lot depends on what is 
meant by ‘hunk of matter y‘. If it is big enough then surely more than one table 
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could be made from it and no-one would want to assert (V). What Kripke means 
here is that if a certain table comes from a certain hunk of matter, then it is 
necessary that it could not have come from any other hunk of matter, regardless of 
how many other tables could have come from it. 
In fact it seems that Kripke may be on stronger ground in his claims about 
individual essence than with his claims about kinds, although it remains to be seen if 
even these claims stand up to scrutiny. As far as the Kripkean claims to non-trivial 
essentialism concerning natural kinds are concerned, however, it seems that Salmon 
is right. The crucial third premise in the schema to derive non-trivial essentialism 
about kinds does indeed seem to be an unjustified, and in the present context, 
unjustifiable metaphysical assumption. After all, as Dupre points out, there could be 
kinds that encompass radically different structures (1 993 , p26). The contention that 
consubstantiality across possible worlds consists in sameness of microstructure 
would seem to be no more than a prejudice on Kripke’s part. In short, DRT does not 
so much establish essentialism about natural kinds as presuppose it - a much- 
vaunted criticism. 
Returning to the Type 3 cases, the individual essences, it could be that Kripke is 
indeed on firmer ground here. Not only is he not relying on the necessity of identity 
but neither does he deal solely with names. In the case of the table, for instance, 
indexicals are the order of the day, and indexicals seem to be uncontroversially 
rigid. The question for Kripke here is ‘Could this table, which has its origin in a 
certain piece of wood, have had its origin in something else?‘ He still uses examples 
involving proper names, but as with the ‘table‘ example, we are again involved with 
necessity of origin rather than straightforward necessity of identity. The most 
famous example, perhaps, is: 
Nixon is the offspring of gametes G 
This is a posteriori, according to Kripke, yet necessary due to the rigidity of ‘Nixon‘ 
and ‘the offspring of gametes G‘ 
To deal with the latter first, it obviously suffers from the defects of DRT already 
discussed. ‘Nixon‘ is a proper name and we have seen that it is highly doubtful 
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whether proper names are rigid (Kripke certainly has not established this). And to 
say that the description ‘the offspring of gametes G’ is rigid is simply to beg the 
very question at issue. Furthermore, it was not an empirical discovery that Nixon or 
anyone else developed from some particular gametes, in the sense that no-one has 
observed the actual ones. What was an empirical discovery was that human beings 
in general developed from a pair of gametes, and Nixon is presumably no exception 
to this. What we must question here is whether it is necessary that human beings 
developed from one sperm and one egg. Surely the world could have been such that 
people developed from several ova and several sperm which all fused together at 
some point, each contributing some genetic material. The question now becomes: 
“Could this be a world in which Nixon exists?” It is certainly not obvious that Nixon 
would not exist in such a world unless it is necessary to the existence of human 
beings, as human beings, that they develop from just two gametes like in the actual 
world. This would seem not be so. Surely the entire human race could have 
developed from more than two gametes - and this includes Nixon. So the biological 
origin of an individual is not necessary for that individual to be that very individual. 
Of course a certain genetic code may be necessary for Nixon to be Nixon, regardless 
of the origin of the code, but that is another question. 
The example of the wooden table is perhaps more interesting in its use of 
indexicals rather than names. Indexicals are undoubtedly rigid (if anything is) and 
so the expression ‘this table’ will designate the same object in all possible worlds 
(where the object exists). What is interesting here, though, is that even the rigidity of 
the indexical involved does not establish that the table is made of wood in all 
possible worlds. Slote (1 974), for example, challenges Kripke’s position here by 
claiming that the table could have originated in a block of wood w, which before 
being made into the table, changed into silver then back into wood ‘steadily and 
lawfully‘ both ways. If the table was made during the silver stage and later turned 
into wood, then surely, argues Slote, it only accidentally originates from wood 
(1974, p8). Perhaps a more palatable possibility would be to imagine the block of 
wood turning into charcoal rather than silver. This is certainly possible if the block 
was caught in a fire and roasted (There could of course be metaphysically possible 
worlds where wood turns into something other than charcoal when roasted). In this 
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case the table would have been made of charcoal, which is not wood - although it is 
derived from wood. Kripke’s only reply here would seem to be to say that the wood 
still has the same origin in every possible world - i.e. the same tree, the same 
sapling, and ultimately the same seed. But this is to shift the problem from 
determining the origin of the table to determining the origin of the block of wood, 
and ultimately the tree from which the wood came. This just brings its own 
problems. For instance, the tree could have been turned into charcoal before the 
block of wood was hewn from it. And as for the tree having its origin essentially in a 
particular seed, this brings us back to the problem of the essentiality of the origin of 
individuals in a certain pair of gametes. Along similar lines, the tree need not have 
its origin in a single seed at all. The genetic material required to make the tree could 
have converged from several sources. Even if we decide that this genetic material is 
necessary for this tree to be this tree we are a long way from establishing that a 
certain table is essentially made of wood! There is also a problem with the claim 
that genetic code is essential to an individual or a species. For instance, if the 
genetic code involved in producing Nixon had been slightly different (so that the 
resulting individual had a different colour of hair or eyes, for example) would the 
result be a numerically distinct individual? Or if the DNA of tigers had been such 
that tigers did not have stripes, would we be dealing with a numerically distinct 
species? It would seem not. In fact it is difficult to see how genetic code can 
constitute the essence of an individual or a species since it can change, or part of it 
can change. What kind of essence has parts, and what kind of essence can change? 
What is clear is that defining the essence of a living thing is very different from the 
question of what constitutes the essence of an inanimate kind like gold. This is a 
distinction that Kripke does not recognise. 
Kripke’s only possible response to the case where the table turns into charcoal 
would be to say that we no longer have the same table - because the table designated 
as this table is a wooden one. Now this may again be question-begging on Kripke’s 
part, but even if it is not, we should consider the following. First of all, the table is 
the same object (numerically) even after it has been turned into charcoal (or 
whatever) in the same way that Nixon, who was once a cherub-faced child, would 
be the same object (numerically) even when he is a wizened old man. Secondly, if 
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we designate the wooden table as this table then it is this table that was caught in the 
fire and turned into charcoal (or whatever). This is a consequence of the rigidity of 
this. If not then we must question the rigidity of the indexical here. If the word 'this' 
is a rigid designator - and it would seem to be - then ironically it is this rigidity 
which helps to show that the table is not made of wood in all possible worlds. 
So it seems that it is not necessary that an object have the origin that it in fact has; 
even if we accept the doctrine of rigid designation! What is even clearer is that a 
species, like the tiger for example, need not have the same origin in all possible 
worlds; although, curiously, Linsky (1 977) thinks otherwise. According to Linsky, if 
astronauts were to visit Mars and discover creatures that looked and behaved exactly 
like tigers, and even had the same internal structure as tigers, nevertheless they 
would not be tigers because they could not have had the same origin as our tigers 
(1977, p80). Now it is just wrong to say that the Martian creatures could not have 
had the same origin as our tigers. Why could they not have had the same origin? But 
even if they do not have the same origin, if they look like tigers, behave like tigers, 
have the same internal structure and DNA as tigers, and could interbreed with tigers, 
then why are they not tigers? The difference in origin is surely irrelevant here. If it is 
not irrelevant then do we conclude that these creatures are not mammals because 
they do not have the same origin as our mammals; even though they are warm- 
blooded and give birth to live young? Surely not. Once again it is properties that 
determine what is a tiger or not. Origin is in no way necessary. 
Finally we return to the theory of meaning expounded in chapter 3 and how it 
affects the claims of Kripke et. al. regarding the necessary a posteriori - especially 
the Type 2 cases. The new theory has some very interesting consequences for the 
Type 2 examples. It means for instance, that even if terms like 'water' or 'gold' or 
'tiger' are rigid, they must have a sense given by a set of definite descriptions or 
properties which are commonly believed to belong to the kinds in question (and 
which speakers of the language use to refer each other to what they believe to be 
natural kinds). It follows from this that, even if it is necessary that, for example, 
water is H20, it will be just as necessary (in some sense of the word) that water has 
the phenomenological properties it has in the actual world (in standard conditions). 
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So, in general, if microstructure is necessary, so is macrostructure. This is just what 
we should expect when dealing with scientific discoveries since it is a basic tenet of 
science that microstructure determines macrostructure in a law-like manner; or that 
macrostructure is a function of microstructure. And yet to say that macrostructure is 
just as necessary as microstructure (in some sense of ‘necessary‘) would be 
anathema to Kripke and Putnam (at least the early Putnam). This merely shows how 
little DRT understands the concept of a natural kind. 
To see why DRT does not understand the concept of a natural kind or the 
meaning of a natural kind term, consider the examples mentioned above. That is: 
Water is H20 
Gold is the element with atomic number 79 
Heat is molecular motion 
For Kripke and Putnam these are necessary truths ( in some sense of ‘necessary‘). 
But the question we must ask here is not just whether it is necessary that water is 
H20 etc. but whether it is suflcient for anything to be water that it be H20. It seems 
that as far as Kripke and Putnam are concerned it must indeed be sufficient. That is, 
for anything to be water in any possible world it is necessary and sufficient that it be 
H20. The same goes for gold. For anything to be gold in any possible world it is 
necessary and sufficient that it be the element with atomic number 79. This must be 
the case for two reasons. First of all, if we really are dealing with identities here then 
whatever is on one side of the identity sign must be necessary and sufficient for 
whatever is on the other side. Secondly, if it is not sufficient for the kind to have the 
appropriate microstructure, then something else must be necessary. But what else 
could be necessary on the Kripke/Putnam view? Nothing, it would seem. If we did 
decide that something other than the microstructure was necessary for anything to 
belong to a natural kind it could only be the phenomenological properties of the 
kind (plus perhaps its law-like behaviour); but according to Kripke and Putnam, 
these properties are neither necessary nor sufficient for anything to belong to a kind; 
or, at least, for the application of the kind term. As far as Kripke and Putnam are 
concerned, the phenomenological properties of a natural kind merely serve as a 
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guide to what kind we are dealing with. They serve as what Putnam calls 
“operational definitions” (1 975, p232 ). Similarly, for Kripke, these properties can 
be used to fix the reference of a natural kind term, without giving a synonym for the 
term (1980, p131) 
What this means for the Kripke/Putnam view is that phenomenological properties 
are neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be a member of a natural kind. 
This seems to have two extremely counterintuitive consequences. First of all, if the 
phenomenological properties of a natural kind are neither necessary nor sufficient 
for the application of the appropriate term then how can these properties provide any 
kind of indication that we are dealing with the particular kind we believe ourselves 
to be dealing with? Secondly, and more bizarrely, if it is necessary and sufficient for 
anything to be water or gold, or whatever, that it have a certain microstructure, it 
would not be necessary that it had any macrostructure, or phenomenological 
properties. This is unintelligible, and cannot be what Kripke and Putnam intend; but 
it does seem to be a consequence of their view - a consequence they have not 
foreseen. 
Another consequence is that the so-called ’scientific identities‘ may not be 
identities at all. This is because what is on the right hand side of the identity sign is 
at best only necessary for what is on the other side, and not sufficient as an identity 
would seem to require. So a statement like ‘Water is H20’ is not a necessary 
identity between two rigid designators, since it is not any kind of identity. Of course 
we still seem to be dealing with a genuine statement here, and so the question 
remains as to whether we can discover necessity empirically. 
The best that Kripke and Putnam can argue here is that it is not necessary that a 
natural kind have the macrostructure that it has in the actual world (This does seem 
to be what they claim). They cannot argue that a natural kind need have no 
macrostructure at all. So it is necessary that a natural kind have some macrostructure 
- but what macrostructure? Could water have had a completely different 
macrostructure so long as it is H20? Could it have been a blue solid that was 
poisonous to humans (where humans are constituted in exactly the same way as at 
present)? On the KripkePutnam view that would indeed be a metaphysical 
possibility. In fact, according to this view, natural kinds could have had absolutely 
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any macrostructure whatsoever. But this is at least very difficult to accept if we are 
dealing with scientific identities. No scientist would accept that water or gold could 
have had absolutely any phenomenological properties whatsoever, with the same 
microstructure, for the simple reason that science believes that microstructure 
determines macrostructure - in a law-like manner. Water and gold have the 
macrostructure they have because of their microstructure. Macrostructure is a 
function of microstructure as far as science is concerned. The strange thing here is 
that macrostructure is a function of microstructure as far as Kripke and Putnam are 
concerned. As Putnam says in (1 983.~73) 
... The use of a word such as ‘gold‘ depends on our possessing paradigms, 
standard examples that are agreed to be model members of the kind. ... What 
makes something gold is having the same nature as the paradigms; in current 
physical theory this is unpacked as having the same composition, since it is 
the atomic structure that determines the law-like behaviour of a substance. 
Now if macrostructure is a function of microstructure there must be some kind of 
necessary connection between them. This need not be what Kripke calls 
‘metaphysical necessity‘, but it must be something like physical or causal necessity. 
If there is no necessary connection between microstructure and macrostructure then 
how can it be a law of nature that microstructure determines macrostructure? It is 
ironic, but in trying to establish that science can discover the true nature of natural 
kinds, Kripke and Putnam undermine the basic tenets of that science! They don’t 
seem to have realised this, but it makes a considerable difference to the claim that 
statements such as : 
Water is H20 
Gold is the element with atomic number 79 
Heat is the motion of molecules 
are necessary. Even if they are necessary - i.e. even if it is necessary that a natural 
kind have a certain microstructure - it will be equally necessary that it has the 
macrostructure it in fact has. This is the only way in which we can account for the 
relation between the microstructure and the macrostructure. The only way that 
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Kripke and Putnam can deny that it is necessary that kinds have the 
phenomenological properties they have in the actual world (in standard conditions) 
is to deny that macrostructure is a function of microstructure. This they cannot do 
without alienating the scientific community they claim to be aiding. If anyone wants 
to object that it is metaphysically possible that our natural kinds should have 
different phenomenological properties in different possible worlds we need only 
reply that the meanings of our natural kind terms could have been different, because 
they must have some meaning. 
Another point that must be dealt with here is the way in which a natural kind term 
such as ‘water’ is introduced as a rigid designator of a certain substance. As we have 
seen this is done by choosing a paradigm sample and performing a kind of baptism 
whereby we stipulate that this stuff here (the paradigm sample) is water, for 
example. Anything else will be water if and only if it is the same substance as the 
paradigm. As Putnam says in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning”’, any prospective sample 
of water must bear the relation same, to the paradigm sample. This not only applies 
to the actual world but also across possible worlds. Now as far as the claim to the 
necessary a posteriori is concerned we have already seen that Putnam, at least, no 
longer accepts that sameness of microstructure can be regarded as a criterion of 
consubstantiality across possible worlds, but there is another way in which we can 
question the claims to necessity here, and that is to question whether it is even 
necessary that the paradigm sample has the microstructure it in fact has. We do this 
by constructing an argument similar to the one whereby we questioned whether the 
table was essentially made of wood. Along similar lines we can question whether 
the paradigm sample of water is necessarily H 2 0  - assuming that it really is a 
sample of water and that it really has chemical structure H20. I.e. in the same way 
that the table could have undergone some kind of transformation so that it was no 
longer made of wood, the water in our paradigm sample could have been 
transformed into a substance which does not have chemical composition H20. For 
example, there are metaphysically possible worlds where the hydrogen in the sample 
is fused together to form helium and so we have a mixture of helium and oxygen 
instead of a mixture of hydrogen and oxygen. The laws in this world could even be 
such that this mixture looks and tastes like water, but this is not important. The main 
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point here is that H 2 0  might not have been H 2 0  because it could have undergone a 
transformation. We are still dealing with the same sample however. The rigidity of 
the indexical ‘this‘ guarantees it. So this sample of water, which is in fact H20, 
might not have been. If the paradigm sample is not necessarily H20 then it can 
hardly be a necessary truth that water is H20. 
The meaning of natural kind terms is of crucial importance in the present context - 
i.e. in deciding whether or not we have discovered necessary truths empirically. 
According to Kripke and Putnam meaning is given by reference, to paradigm 
instances, which leads to the conclusion that there are indeed necessary a posteriori 
truths. As we have seen this is untenable. Meaning must be given in terms of what 
speakers of the language understand by the term in question, which does not seem 
to lead to any essentialist conclusions. The distinction between the two theories of 
meaning is obvious when applied to most of the previous examples, but there are 
some cases where Kripke seems to be on much firmer ground with regard to the 
necessary a posteriori. These are such identities as 
(P) Heat is the motion of molecules 
(Q) Light is a stream of photons 
It is more difficult to argue against Kripke here because it may not be clear what is 
to be understood by ‘heat‘ or ‘light‘ in the same way that we can specify what is to 
be understood by ‘water‘ or ‘gold’. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a 
straightforward distinction between microstructure and macrostructure in (P) and 
(Q). It is obvious what is to count as the macrostructure of water or gold, but what is 
the macrostructure of heat or light? In Naming and Necessity (pl3 1,132) Kripke is 
quite confident that although we pick out heat by the fact that it causes us to 
experience a certain sensation, nonetheless the term ‘heat’ cannot be synonymous 
with a phrase such as ‘that which causes sensation S‘ because heat might not have 
caused this sensation. The distinction between descriptions that give a synonym and 
those that merely fix reference seems to be secure here because it is surely correct to 
claim that human beings might not have been affected by heat (or light) in the way 
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in which we in fact are. So does Kripke have an example of the necessary a 
posteriori in a statement like “Heat is the motion of molecules”? 
Actually he does not, and the reason for this brings us to the very heart of the 
problem of establishing the necessary a posteriori. First of all, even if it is not 
obvious what a term like ‘heat‘ or ‘light’ is to mean, what is clear is that something 
must be understood by them - otherwise they are simply not part of any language. A 
term like ‘heat‘, therefore, must have a sense which speakers grasp when they 
understand any sentence containing the word; and the only candidate for this sense 
is the description 
That which causes sensation S 
Or, more precisely, 
That which is commonly believed to cause sensation S 
If this is accepted then the statement 
Heat is the motion of molecules 
reduces to 
That which is commonly believed to cause sensation S is the motion of molecules 
which is not a necessary truth. 
Now this foregoing is just what Kripke is at great pains to deny. He would object 
that ‘heat‘ cannot be synonymous with the description ‘That which causes sensation 
S’ because what we call ‘heat‘ might not have had this effect on us. Now it is 
undoubtedly true that heat might have affected us differently, or not at all; just as 
water or gold might have affected us differently. But, I contend, this is irrelevant to 
the present debate. The fact is that heat causes us to experience a certain sensation, 
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and so, as a matter of fact, the word ‘heat‘ ( or whatever word we use ) has to mean 
‘That which causes sensation S’, or ‘That which is commonly believed etc.‘ because 
there is nothing else for it to mean. The Kripke/Putnam requirements on meaning 
are too strict. They constantly argue that natural kind terms cannot be synonymous 
with a list of properties because it is logically possible that the kind in question 
should lack some or even all of the properties it has in the actual world. But this is 
irrelevant. There is no need to deal with what is logically possible here because 
when we say that, for instance, tigers are striped, we are not dealing with a logical 
truth. No-one wants to claim that ‘Tigers are striped‘ or ‘Gold is yellow‘, or 
whatever, are logical truths; so what is the point in talking about what is logically - 
or even metaphysically - possible here? What is relevant here is that it is a fact (as 
far as we can see) that natural kinds have certain properties. Furthermore, it is a fact 
that natural kind terms must be understood in a certain way, and this can only be in 
terms of the properties they are believed to possess. Thus in some sense of 
‘synonymous‘ natural kind terms are synonymous with lists of properties, contrary 
to the claims of the direct reference theory. 
However, Kripke may have one card left to play, and that concerns the necessity 
of self-identity. There is a way of reading Kripke which leads to the conclusion that 
the necessity of identities such as ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus‘ or ‘Heat is the motion of 
molecules‘ is to be derived from the necessity of self-identity. In “Identity and 
Necessity”, for example, we find the following: 
If names are rigid designators then there can be no question about identities 
being necessa ry.... in every possible world a and b will both refer to the same 
object x, and to no other, and so there will be no situation in which a might not 
have been b. That would have to be a situation in which the object we are now 
calling ‘x‘ would not have been identical with itself (In Moore (Ed.) 1993, 
P W  
Later in the same paper we find Kripke discussing the necessary a posteriori with 
regard to heat and the motion of molecules ... 
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... as Bishop Butler said “everything is what it is and not another thing”. 
Therefore, “Heat is the motion of molecules” will be necessary not 
contingent .... (Ibid., pl88) 
Yet another indication that Kripke derives his essentialism about natural kinds from 
the necessity of self-identity is to be found on page 133 of (1 980) with the words: 
We have discovered a phenomenon which in all possible worlds will be 
molecular motion - which could not have failed to be molecular motion, 
because that’s what the phenomenon is 
It seems clear, then, that Kripke derives his essentialism from the necessity of self- 
identity and that he regards the denial of the necessity of scientific identities as 
tantamount to the denial of the necessity of self-identity. (Salmon makes the same 
point in chapter 3 of Reference and Essence). In the ‘heat‘ example it is easy to 
sympathise with Kripke on this point. After all, if heat is molecular motion in the 
actual world, then how can it fail to be molecular motion in any possible world if it 
is to be that very thing in those worlds? 
Now I do not wish to deny the necessity of self-identity, but that is not the point 
at issue here. What is at issue is whether we have discovered empirically something 
which could not have been otherwise. So what exactly did we discover when we 
discovered that heat is molecular motion? We certainly did not discover the self- 
identity of heat - i.e. we did not discover that heat is heat or that molecular motion is 
molecular motion, just as we did not discover empirically the self-identity of the 
planet Venus when we discovered that Hesperus is Phosphorus. These things were 
known a priori. In fact they can only be known a priori. We simply cannot discover 
self-identity empirically, so how can Kripke, or anyone, derive the necessary a 
posteriori from the necessity of self-identity? To attempt such a thing is like trying 
to square the circle. 
So what did we discover when we discovered that heat is the motion of 
molecules? It seems that the only thing we could have discovered empirically is that 
the phenomenon that causes us to experience a certain sensation turns out to be 
molecules in motion. There is nothing else to be discovered empirically here. This 
fits exactly with what was said previously about the meaning of a term like ‘heat‘, 
and so, on Kripke’s own premises, we have not discovered anything necessary here. 
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The main problem with the necessary a posteriori regarding natural kinds is how 
to individuate kinds. The Fregean does so according to phenomenological 
properties, which does not lead to de re necessity. Kripke and Putnam claim to have 
refuted this position and to be able to individuate kinds by reference to causal 
contact with paradigm instances. These instances are, according to Putnam 
...g iven existentially and not by criteria.. . . Actual things, whatever their 
description, which have played a certain causal role in our acquisition and use 
of terms determine what the terms refer to .... (1 983, p73) 
However, as we have seen, this is a seriously mistaken view. The key phrase here is 
“Actual things whatever their description” because what this implies is that, if it 
does not matter how a type of thing is described, then it does not matter how it is 
experienced. But it does matter how we experience things in the world because we 
must experience them in order to pick them out. The Kripke/Putnam view whereby 
we fix the reference of a natural kind term by choosing a paradigm sample of the 
kind regardless of how it is experienced or described is actually a naive view for two 
reasons. First of all, we can only be in a position to choose a paradigm because we 
recognise, or believe we recognise, certain properties. Secondly, we must be able to 
re-identzh the paradigm, and this can only be done in terms of properties. This is a 
very important point when we are involved in a scientific investigation where 
experimental results must be communicated to other scientists, and, crucially, 
experiments must be repeatable. We can hardly publish a paper in a scientific 
journal proudly announcing that we have discovered that this stuff is H20, or 
whatever. We must say what it is that we have discovered to be H 2 0  and this 
involves us in the meanings of our terms - meaning which can only be given in 
terms of the properties we believe the kinds to possess. 
The failure of the Kripkean essentialist program has many sources. First of all, the 
failure to appreciate that referring terms, be they singular or general, must have a 
sense given by a set of definite descriptions or a list of properties that are commonly 
believed to belong to the kind in question. Secondly, the failure to realise that we 
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cannot discover necessity empirically, if by 'necessity' we mean the necessity of 
self-identity . This is something which just cannot be discovered empirically. 
Thirdly, the failure to be clear about what is meant by an identity statement. 
Fourthly, the failure to realise that, even if we choose paradigms in the way 
advocated by Kripke and Putnam, we must be able to re-identify the paradigm, 
which involves us in descriptions. And fifthly, the failure to recognise that even the 
paradigm may not have its microstructure necessarily - if we mean metaphysically 
necessary. (All this is in addition to the problems mentioned previously due to 
Dupre, Salmon, and Putnam (1994)). The problem for the direct reference theory is 
that it takes identities like: 
Hesperus is Phosphorus 
Heat is molecular motion 
Water is H20 
to be basically statements of self-identity (if it says anything at all about their 
content) Or at least their core content is a proposition expressing the property of 
self-identity. Hence the necessity. To see that self-identity does not lie at the core of 
these statements we need only look at what must be understood by these sentences. 
They cannot possibly be understood as statements of self-identity because they can 
be the subject of speculation, conjecture and debate - debate which can be resolved 
by empirical investigation. This proves that these statements in no way involve 
anything as simple and trivial as self-identity because self-identity is not something 
that could be the subject of such speculation, conjecture and debate (controversial 
debate at that). Nor could a debate about self-identity be resolved empirically. The 
content of such statements must be given in terms of what speakers of the language 
must understand by the appropriate sentences. What must be understood by these 
sentences will depend on the situation being described; but whatever it is, it will not 
be anything necessary. 
Our scientific identities may of course be physically necessary, but that is 
something very different from the metaphysical necessity mooted by Kripke and the 
early Putnam. In fact physical necessity may not be any kind of genuine necessity at 
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all, since the laws of nature are discovered by inductive generalisation, which brings 
its own problems. The so-called Laws of Nature may be mere descriptions of 
apparent regularities devoid of any normative force whatsoever. On the other hand, 
we do seem to be reaching a deeper level of reality when we discover chemical 
composition or DNA structure - a level previously hidden from us - and so perhaps 
there is something to the realist position after all. What is clear, however, is that 
whatever we discover empirically, it will not be necessary in the metaphysical sense. 
What is even clearer is that essentialism cannot be derived from any semantic 
theory. As we saw in chapter 3, if the sense of a natural kind term must be given in 
terms of what speakers of the language believe, then questions of necessity would 
hardly seem to arise for what we have called the ‘Scientific Language‘. We must 
also remember that, strictly speaking, we could devise a language which only used 
descriptions and no proper names or natural kind terms at all. So Kripke would have 
to qualify his thesis to the effect that a statement like 
Water is H 2 0  
is necessary a posteriori, $it is true, and where necessity is taken in the weak sense. 
And, zfwe accept terms like ‘water‘ and ‘H20’ into our language. This I suggest is a 
qualification too far. 
It could be that no metaphysical doctrine can be derived from a semantic theory - 
or at least from a theory of naming. In the words of Joseph Almog, “Naming is 
naming and necessity is necessity”. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Direct Reference Theory (DRT) states that proper names, and possibly natural 
kind terms, refer directly to their designata and not by means of any Fregean 
descriptive sense which determines their reference. Rather, reference is determined 
by a causal chain leading from use of a term back to an initial baptism of an 
individual, or, in the case of a natural kind term, a paradigm sample of the kind. For 
Kripke names are not only direct designators, but rigid designators, which leads him 
to conclude that there are necessary a posteriori truths and contingent a priori truths. 
We have seen that these claims have not, and cannot be upheld. Although DRT 
does have some cogent points to make against the traditional theory (or what it takes 
to be the traditional theory) some kind of description theory must be accepted - 
which destroys the claims to the necessary a posteriori and the contingent a priori. 
The chief advocate of DRT is Kripke in his (1 972, 1980) where he proposes three 
arguments against the description theory - The Modal Argument, The 
Epistemological Argument, and The Semantic Argument. To illustrate, consider the 
example: 
(*) Aristotle taught Alexander 
where the name 'Aristotle' just means 'The teacher of Alexander'. In Kripke's view 
this would have the consequence that (*) is necessary, a priori and analytic; whereas 
it would seem to be almost a paradigm case of a statement that is contingent, a 
posteriori and synthetic. This seems to be correct and provides at least a strong 
primafacie case against the description theory. 
However, as we have seen, the Modal Argument trades on an illicit shift of scope. 
Kripke's strongest argument is the Semantic Argument which he illustrates with his 
'Godel' example. This forces us to modify the senses of names but not to abandon 
them. From now on the senses of proper names and natural kind terms must be 
given in terms of what is commonly believed by the speakers of the language. (It is 
difficult to say whether this belief is de dicto or de re. Probably we should say that 
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it is de dicto in the first instance, and may turn out to be de re on closer examination. 
Or perhaps we simply cannot talk about de re beliefs, just as it is very difficult to 
talk about de re necessities). This leads us to conclude that sense determines 
reference in that it is speakers who refer by evoking concepts in the minds of other 
speakers. I.e. speakers refer each other to what they take to be things in the world. 
This is all there is to reference. 
DRT makes many fundamental mistakes. It seems to be question-begging in 
several ways. Salmon (1981) highlights an example of this in DRT's attempt to 
derive non-trivial essentialism from a semantic theory. And Almog (1 986), correctly 
it would seem, points out that the crucial notion of rigidity actually presupposes 
essentialism. Then there is Kripke' s basic 'intuition' that proper names behave 
differently from descriptions in modal contexts (and probably non-modal contexts), 
from which he concludes that they cannot be synonymous. This is question-begging, 
because zf names are synonymous with descriptions then they do not behave 
differently in these contexts. 
There is a serious 'use/mention' confusion in DRT - especially regarding proper 
names. Examples can be found in Putnam (1975), Kripke (1980), Marcus (1976), 
and Evans (1 973). 
As far as the claim to the necessary a posteriori is concerned Kripke and Marcus 
do not understand what is meant by an identity statement. Marcus' (1 947) 'proof of 
the necessity of identity must be judged a failure. (See Ch.4) In addition to this 
there is a way of regarding identity statements as contingent. 
DRT's most serious mistake is to fail to deal with the notion of understanding. 
Understanding is without doubt the most important concept in the philosophy of 
language because without understanding there is no language. A referring term like 
a proper name or natural kind term can only refer if it is part of a language. This 
means that it must be understood in some way; which means that it must have a 
sense which speakers can grasp. It follows from this that sense is at least necessary 
for reference. The best that Kripke and Putnam can do is show that sense is 
indeterminate. This means that reference is indeterminate, so we are hardly in a 
position to talk about metaphysical necessities being derived from a theory of how 
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names refer. In fact strictly speaking, we may not know what we are talking about 
most of the time! 
Sense is also sufficient for reference since it is speakers who refer by referring 
each other to the world (or what they take to be the world). Thus, sense determines 
reference, and names are synonymous with descriptions given in terms of what is 
commonly believed by the speakers (It also means that there is a sense in which 
meanings are in the head, but not in the way advocated by Searle). This profoundly 
affects the project to establish the existence of necessary a posteriori truths and 
contingent a priori truths in the following way. First of all, there is no distinction 
between descriptions which fix reference and those that give a synonym. If a name 
like ‘Neptune’ is to be a part of a language it must be synonymous with the 
description that Kripke claims to be merely fixing reference. This puts an end to the 
claim that there are contingent a priori truths involving proper names (Although 
Kaplan’s examples involving indexicals may be on more solid ground). Secondly, if 
terms like ’water‘ or ‘gold‘ or ‘heat’ are synonymous with descriptions then 
statements like 
Water is H20 
Gold is the element with atomic number 79 
Heat is the motion of molecules 
are either definitely not necessary, or the question of their necessity does not arise 
since we are always dealing in beliefs of speakers. 
To say that speakers refer is not to make a distinction between speaker’s reference 
and semantic reference. Speaker’s reference just is semantic reference. I.e. it is 
language that refers but only in the sense that it can be used by speakers in a certain 
way. 
There is no distinction between referring and using a term correctly. If we use a 
referring term correctly we will be referring. And if we are referring we must be 
using the term correctly. Meaning is use. Also, reference is use. 
DRT fails to establish a way of referring to the world which does not involve 
descriptions, just as it fails to establish the existence of the necessary a posteriori 
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and the contingent a priori. Perhaps the simplest way to show this is to consider the 
possibility of a language which does not use proper names or even natural kind 
terms but uses descriptions in their place. Such a language is certainly possible. The 
opposite to this - i.e. a language which employed names but no descriptions - is not 
possible because there would be nothing to contribute to understanding, which 
means that we would not have any kind of language at all. The failure to deal with 
what is understood by a name is the biggest mistake made by DRT. It shows that the 
direct reference theorists really don’t understand what language is. 
DRT does however force us to re-examine our views about sense, reference and 
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